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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the role of political funding in two electoral authoritarian regimes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The issue of political funding has been investigated thoroughly in 
developed democracies in the West, but only relatively recently have scholars tried to 
investigate the importance of political funding in Sub-Saharan Africa and in non-democratic 
regimes who still hold elections. The aim of this thesis is thus to investigate what types of 
political funding exists in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, and what 
contextual factors that affects the availability of funding for different actors. An additional 
goal is to highlights some of the implications of political funding for the political regime. 
The thesis uses three steps to approach this research question. First, it compares and 
contrasts existing theory on political funding with previous work on issues related to political 
funding, and builds a theoretical framework based on this. It then turns to case studies of 
Uganda and Angola using process tracing to conduct a thorough within-case analysis to map 
out both which funding types exist and the mechanisms and processes surrounding these 
funding types. Finally, the thesis compares the results of the two case studies in a cross-case 
comparison and draws tentative conclusions about funding in electoral authoritarian regimes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa based on this. 
The main finding of this thesis is that political funding is an important tool in the 
authoritarian “toolbox” in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. The ruling 
parties in both Uganda and Angola have access to a lot more sources of funding than the 
opposition parties. Most of the sources that are available to the ruling party and not the 
opposition parties are linked to their continued electoral dominance and control over state 
institutions. In general, the findings of this thesis indicates that plutocratic funding and 
income from graft are the two categories of funding that are most important in the Sub-
Saharan African context, and that, on average, the ruling party is able to attract more funding 
from these funding sources than the opposition. In addition, the thesis highlights that the 
ruling party in both Uganda and Angola uses its control over the state to deny the opposition 
possible fundraising sources that they cannot control, but that the approach to this varies 
between the two regimes. This implies that to fully understand the role of political funding in 
electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, we need to focus more on the whole 
funding situation, and not just the way which the ruling parties enrich themselves.  
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“Two serious challenges will keep upsetting the African democratization process: political party financing and 
succession politics.”  
Salih and Nordlund (2007: 128) concluding their analysis of the role of political parties in the 
challenges for sustained multiparty democracy in Africa 
 
Chapter 1 – Political funding as an issue in Sub-Saharan Africa: An introduction 
The introductory quote highlights two of the main challenges facing the democratization 
process in Sub-Saharan Africa: political finances and how to facilitate a peaceful succession. 
While the issue of succession politics is there for all to see, the role of political finance is 
perhaps a subtler and less well-known area of African politics. Political finance and political 
funding in particular is an undertheorized topic (Hopkin 2004), especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004; Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007). Cross-case comparisons 
and even case studies are rare (Scarrow 2007; Butler 2010). The aim of this thesis is to 
investigate and build theory on the issue of political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This will be done through case studies of the funding situation in two 
electoral authoritarian regimes: Uganda and Angola, and by comparing the results of the case 
studies in a cross-case analysis. The primary objective of the thesis is to answer the following 
questions: what types of political funding exists and what contextual factors shape political 
funding in these regimes? However, since political funding is a variable with a “dual” nature 
in that it not only is affected by contextual factors but also affects them, it is natural and 
indeed necessary to touch upon and consider the implications of political funding in electoral 
authoritarian regimes. By providing tentative conclusions on this topic this thesis hopes to 
contribute to the literature on the “menu of manipulation” in these regimes as presented by 
Schedler (2002a). This question will be of secondary importance however, since any 
meaningful contribution to this literature is dependent on an accurate description of political 
funding as a phenomenon.  
 
The methodological approach and findings of the thesis 
The thesis therefore combines what George and Bennett (2005:75-76) call “heuristic” and 
“building block” case studies. Heuristic case studies are primarily used to analyze and build 
typologies on the main research question. The theoretical point of departure of my thesis is 
western typologies of political funding. I then expose these typologies to the few works 
available on political funding in Sub-Saharan Africa, and based on this I modify and create a 
theoretical typology. I then investigate the empirical reality by conducting within-case 
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analysis using process tracing to investigate the issue of political funding in both Uganda and 
Angola. In this section I find that both the MPLA government in Angola and the NRM-party 
government in Uganda use state resources to beef up their party’s presence in the political 
arena. Both the incumbent parties have significantly more funding at their disposal than the 
opposition, and part of this is linked to funding types which only the party in power can 
receive. However, when it comes to the opposition parties, the situation between the countries 
differs. Opposition parties in Uganda generally lack funding, and rely heavily on a few 
individuals within the opposition parties as well as the international community to provide 
them with resources. In Angola, the lack of funding is also a problem for opposition parties, 
but because of state subsidies the problem is not as direct because the MPLA regime allows 
some resources to trickle through official channels. This creates other problems however, 
because the parties thus become more dependent on the goodwill of the ruling party.  
While it is not the main focus of this thesis, the case studies show the importance of 
addressing the role played by the incumbent regime in manipulating the funding situation. 
Therefore, a portion of my thesis will be devoted to the second issue of the implications of 
political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes. Here I employ the “building block” 
approach in that I only focus on a specific part of the problem related to the wider concept of 
electoral authoritarianism. My aim is not to prove that political funding is the mechanism that 
preserves electoral authoritarianism, but rather that it seems to play a role in the case of 
Uganda and Angola. I therefore investigate how the incumbent parties manipulate political 
funding, both by illustrating this within the cases and then by comparing between them. The 
analysis shows how the two incumbent parties have shaped the funding systems through their 
control of formal institutions, but at the same time how the contextual environment has led to 
diverging strategies in terms of how they have approached this. The result is the same 
however; an unlevel playing field for the opposition to compete on.  
 
The cases; the phenomenon; the setting 
Before I start the process described above, it is important to clarify some issues. First of all, it 
is important to have some contextual knowledge about the cases investigated in this thesis. I 
therefore present a small empirical section on both Uganda and Angola that highlight why 
political funding is important there. I then show what political funding is and why it is a topic 
worthy of scholarly attention. Finally, this chapter describes the nature of the setting that this 
thesis is dealing with: pragmatically oriented parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. 
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1.1 The cases: Uganda and Angola 
The 2011 election in Uganda solidified President Yoweri K. Museveni and his National 
Resistance Movement-party’s (NRM-p) hold on power in the country where multiparty 
politics was banned until 2005. This year, the NRM-p and Museveni celebrates 25 
consecutive years in power of the African country which they originally came to power in 
through a civil war. In the election, the issue of the use of money and resources was of great 
importance, and most monitoring reports highlighted both the importance of resources in the 
campaigns and how the NRM-p and President Museveni used state resources throughout the 
election process (AUOM 20011; Commonwealth Secreteriat 2011: 19-20; EUEOM 2011). 
Forty days before the election, the NRM-p-dominated Parliament passed a supplementary 
budget worth over US$1
In another Sub-Saharan African country with a checkered past, Angola, the 2008 
parliamentary election was the first since the 1992 election which saw MPLA
250 million, US$33.6 million of which went directly to State House 
and part of which were aimed at the “facilitation of jobless youth.” (Nanjobe 2011). A day 
after the passing of the budget, each NRM flagbearer was given over US$8500 for the 
campaigns (Nalugo and Mugerwa 2011). The use of money to indirectly or directly buy votes 
has become an important part of the political process in Uganda (DEMGroup 2011).   
2 beat UNITA3 
and thus indirectly triggered the second phase of the civil war.4 The 2008 election saw MPLA 
significantly increase their majority in power. This, followed by the recent constitutional 
change that creates a de facto parliamentary system where the leader of the largest party in 
power becomes president, entrenched Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ hold of a Presidency which 
he has occupied since 1979, as well as MPLA’s hold on power in a country they have ruled 
since independence. Just before the registration of political parties for the election, the 
government gave a flat sum to all registered political parties, a lot of which did not compete in 
the actual election,5
                                                 
1 In my thesis I will use United States Dollars ($US) for all monetary measures. In Uganda, most of my data was 
collected in Ugandan Shillings (UGX). I use a exchange rate of 1 US$ = 2350 UGX, as this was the exchange 
rate close to the 2011 election on February 18th, and it is close to the average rate for the whole election period. 
In Angola, USD is an accepted currency that is used in local transactions, and most of the sums provided to me 
were given in USD, not in the local Angolan Kwanza. 
 while withholding the campaign funding for those parties who actually 
qualified until two weeks before Election Day. The European Union Election Monitoring 
2 Abbreviation used for full name of party:  “Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do 
Trabalho”. In english: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Labour Party. 
3 Abbreviation used for full name of party:  “União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola”. In english: 
“National Union for the Total Independence of Angola”. 
4Jonas Savimbi famously said that he would not accept the results of the election if UNITA did not win (Maier 
1996: 72-73). 
5 Interview with Nelson Pestana, Political Scientist at CEIC-UCAN and member of the BD   
4 
 
team viewed the use of state resources by the MPLA as one of the major flaws of the election 
(EUEOM 2008: 7, 20-21). 
The fact that Uganda and Angola have both recently arranged elections where the role 
of political funding has been highlighted is not their only common denominator. With a total 
of 57 years in power between them, the rulers of the two countries are placed 3rd and 6th on 
the list of the longest serving heads of state in Africa. The political parties surrounding the 
leaders share this power-legacy. Both came to power through winning a civil war, but allowed 
the opposition in the war to maintain its political branch and participate in elections. Both 
have accepted multiparty elections as the basis of their legitimacy, at least theoretically. 
Finally, neither Angola nor Uganda is considered to be democratic by most democratic 
indicators.6
 
 They therefore seem to match the description of what Schedler (2002a; 2006) 
calls electoral authoritarian regimes, which are regimes who organize elections to obtain 
some form of democratic legitimacy, but are not democratic. The ruling party does not resort 
to open repression, but rather maintains its hold on power by “placing those elections under 
tight authoritarian controls” (Schedler 2002a: 36-37). 
1.2 The phenomenon: Political funding 
The broad issue of political finance is an extremely complex political phenomenon to 
investigate and understand, especially comparatively (Nassmacher 2001: 9; Van Biezen and 
Kopecky 2001; 2007). Therefore, it is important to explain at an early stage what political 
funding is, what subtypes that exist and how it relates to the broader category of political 
finance. Figure 1.1 below illustrates how this fits together; the primary focus of this thesis is 
the concept of political funding highlighted in red and its subcategories. To start off with the 
broadest category in the figure: political financing deals with everything connected to the role 
of money in politics (Nassmacher 2001: 9-10). Political funding, which is the main 
phenomenon that I will focus on, deals with the income side of political finance. On the other 
side of the equation is political expenditure. This is not the direct focus of this thesis, but 
since expenditure is related to the issue of funding, some elements that fit into this category 
will necessarily be included in the analysis. Moving down the conceptual ladder, political 
funding includes both what the literature calls party funding and campaign funding. 
                                                 
6 Uganda’s Freedom House rating has been stable since at 5 on Political Rights and 4 on Civil Liberties since 
2004. Angola’s rating has been stable at 6 on Political Rights and 5 on Civil Liberties since 2003. Polity IV has 
consistently classified them as “Closed Anocracies”, with a rating from -5 to 0. Neither would be called 
democratic by most indicators that focus on election outcomes (such as Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and 
Limongi’s index or Vanhanen’s index), because of the large majorities they have won and the fact that there has 
been no turnover in either case. 
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Figur 1.1 The concepts surrounding “money in politics” as understood in this thesis 
 
 
Party funding is funding for a political organization both in and outside the campaign period, 
while campaign funding is funding specifically linked to fundraising activities for a candidate 
to compete in elections (Nassmacher 2001: 10). Since, for reasons alluded to below, this 
thesis uses the political party as its basic unit of analysis and analysis it over time, not just 
during campaigns, I will analyze both party funding and campaign funding as income for the 
party which the candidate belongs to.7
Having defined the concept under investigation, it would be beneficial to the reader to 
know why it is important to study political funding. As pointed out by Mathisen and Svåsand 
(2002: 4) it is hard to specify the impact of funding on political outcomes. Nevertheless, they 
point out that the actors themselves generally consider it to be an important factor. US-based 
 This can be problematic in terms of conceptual 
stretching (Sartori 1970). But as argued by Nassmacher (2001: 11), the degree to which 
political funding focuses on candidates or campaigns is related to who runs the political 
campaigns, and if it is a candidate- or party-centric system. I therefore choose to look at this 
as a contextual difference rather than as a different concept, though I acknowledge and 
identify in the case studies which types of funding that are primarily for campaigns and which 
that are not. Political finance literature generally refers to monetary contributions, and 
disregards other forms of resource contributions (Mathisen and Svåsand (2002: 4). But I 
investigate political systems where money is a scarce commodity for many people. Other 
resources can therefore be very important and more readily accessible (Saffu 2003). 
Therefore, although money will be the primary issue, I will include other resources such as 
free time in the media and free election material in my conception of political funding. 
                                                 
7 Note that both these categories are not the same as the subtypes of state subsidies presented in table figure 2.2. 
Figure 1.1 deals with all political finance 
Specific concept
General concept Political finance
Political 
funding
Party 
funding
Campaign 
funding
Political 
expenditure
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scholars have concluded that in the US-setting, while there might be a threshold over which 
the importance of fundraising diminishes, “incumbent politicians cannot even hope to get 
elected if they do not meet minimum fundraising requirements” (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004: 
619). Ever since James Kerr Pollocks’ study of party finance in Britain, Germany and France 
in 1932, scholars have periodically reviewed the impact of financial resources on the political 
game in the Western context. Three classical reasons for why this is an important topic are 
presented by Casas-Zamora (2005: 2). A lopsided financial situation between political actors 
can create a situation that hampers electoral equality and an even playing field; it also 
increases the political influence of a certain part of the electorate compared to other parts. 
Finally, fundraising processes can create conflicts of interest for elected representatives, or 
flat out rejection of the common good in exchange for the interests of a narrow financial 
spectrum. These are fundamental issues when deciding whether or not an election has been 
free and fair (Elklit and Svensson 1997: 38), and thus investigating the phenomenon of money 
in politics in different settings is very important (Nassmacher 2001:10). Comparative works 
about the topic are scarce.8
There is reason to believe that political funding is even more important in the Sub-
Saharan African setting. Not only are resources scarce, but funding for example an election 
campaign is extremely expensive in a country with low levels of literacy and technology 
(Saffu 2003). Therefore, access to state resources gives the incumbent huge advantages in the 
political game (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Salih and 
Nordlund (2007:51) argue that “dominant parties dominate the legislature and could 
monopolize the lawmaking process to promote the predominant party’s economic and social 
interests”. Considering this it is strange that Fisher and Eisenstadt’s (2004: 622) call for more 
research on the role of party funding in “impoverished countries” has not been heard. Even 
case studies of the funding of political entities in lesser-developed African countries are rare 
(Butler 2010). Reviewing comparative studies on political finance, Scarrow (2007: 196) only 
finds one which includes African countries.
 
9 Perhaps it is because of a lack of good data, 
something which seems even more acute in the Sub-Saharan African setting than in other 
settings (Saffu 2003). But I argue that this can be solved by in-depth analysis and 
triangulation of data sources.10
                                                 
8 See Nassmacher (2001) for a good review of previous comparative work 
 
9 At least one more does exist and is utilized in this thesis: Bryan and Baer (2005) 
10 See section 3.3 on “Data” for a much richer analysis of the challenges connected to researching political 
funding 
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Finally it is also important to remember that political funding can both be an output of 
and have an impact on policy decisions (Nachmasser 2001: 10). This is imperative for the 
secondary issue of my research question: the implication of political funding for electoral 
authoritarian regimes. Much of the legal regulation of political funding is included in general 
legislation of political parties or political campaigns (Karvonen 2007). How policy on and 
regulation of political parties and campaigns are shaped is therefore of great interest when 
investigating the phenomenon of political funding. An important distinction between the 
development of parties in the Western world and parties in Africa is that while regulations 
concerning political organizations normally were created gradually in Western countries, they 
have been created and implemented at a faster pace in Africa. This creates room for the 
incumbent party, especially if in power during the transition from a limited-party system, to 
shape the political game to an extent not possible in the Western context (Mathisen and 
Svåsand 2002: 7; Mozaffar 2002; Salih and Nordlund 2007: 104-105). Treisman (1998: 12) 
illustrates this in the Russian context, where he finds that one of the most important 
mechanisms used by the ruling party to preserve power in post-communist Russia was to deny 
opponents possible funding sources. Both MPLA in Angola and the NRM-party in Uganda 
were in power during the transition to multiparty politics, and therefore in prime position to 
make sure the rules favored themselves. Political finances and political funding is one of the 
most regulated topics in terms of party regulation, though it is comparatively under-regulated 
in Africa (Saffu 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007: 106).  However, both Angola and Uganda 
have regulated it. Nonetheless, when evaluating these kinds of regulations it is just as 
important to notice what is not regulated. Salih and Nordlund argue that: 
 
“For reasons of partisan or personal advantage, incumbents at the time of transition, 
during constitution-making and at the passing of legislation on political parties, 
elections and electoral commissions have preferred to address none or only some of 
the issues involved in political financing” (Salih and Nordlund 2007: 117). 
 
1.3 The setting: pragmatically oriented parties in electoral authoritarian regimes 
In my thesis I have chosen political parties as my basic units of analysis. I do, however, 
recognize that a political party is not a homogenous unit and that there are actors with 
diverging motives within each party.11
                                                 
11 This point is illustrated both through the introductory quote and through figure 1.1 
 However, using the party as my basic units of analysis 
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does not prevent me from doing a within-unit analysis in each case as well. Thus I should be 
able to account for the “actor-factor”. Furthermore, analyzing at the party level has two major 
advantages. Almost fifty years ago LaPalombara et al. (1966) highlighted the potential 
importance of political parties in developing democracies, especially in establishing 
accountability between the government and the electorate. There are few functioning political 
systems that do not contain political parties. They can therefore be considered imperative to 
the political process. Second, while President Museveni in Uganda and President dos Santos 
in Angola are both strong Presidents, they both depend on party-support in the legislative 
arena. This is imperative for the secondary focus of my research question, because without 
this legislative support the incumbent party would not be able to create an uneven playing 
field in such a subtle way. This is a trademark of an electoral authoritarian regime: rulers need 
parties to control the electoral game (Schedler 2009: 389). The fact that Uganda and Angola 
both have incumbent parties that enjoy executive and legislative control in their respective 
countries make them interesting cases because it allows an investigation of both the effect of 
and the effect on policy on political funding as described in the previous section. This makes 
them ideal to investigate both parts of my research question.  
According to a very extensive report on political parties in Africa, African parties are 
primarily “instruments developed by the elite for state capture” (Salih and Nordlund 2007: 
129; also echoed by Gyimah-Boadi 2007:25). In other words: the primary objective of a 
political party is to capture and hold governmental power, something which is in line with a 
view that highlights the pragmatic nature of political parties:  
 
"[A] political party is an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making 
nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental 
power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government" 
(Huckshorn 1984: 10, emphasis added). 
 
This highlights the office-seeking nature of political parties; the quest for power, rather than 
the quest for policy, has become the rationale for its existence (Strom 1990; Müller and Strom 
1999). Mainwaring (2003) argue that even democratically oriented parties in authoritarian 
societies have to be vote- and office-seeking to some degree. In fact, he points out that in 
authoritarian regimes faced with elections and pressure to democratize the parties play a “dual 
game” – both in terms of electoral politics and the nature of the regime (Mainwaring and 
Scully 2003: 10-12). Controlling the opposition parties therefore becomes essential. Scholars 
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argue that, depending on factors ranging from the personal objectives of party leaders via the 
institutional checks and balances to the degree of party programmatic platforms, parties will 
seek to create a playing field that favors their party (LaPalombara and Anderson 1992; Carey 
and Reynolds 2007) and enables them to stay in power. Such a definition of a party leads us to 
expect that an incumbent party will do what it can, depending on structural constraints, to 
stay in power. In order to understand the intentions of the elite, one therefore has to focus on 
the instruments they use: political parties. 
In electoral authoritarian regimes, the elections that these parties compete in are not 
“shams”; they are meaningful, competitive to a degree, and provide some sort of legitimacy 
for the winner. However, they violate one or some of the important constitutive norms that are 
the foundation for democracy (Schedler 2002a: 42-43). These regimes often follow the 
procedural definition of democracy, but are lacking in terms of free and fair competition 
between actors, or in terms of whether or not the electorate’s choice is the absolute authority 
within the regime (van de Walle 2002: 68-69). They are typically former “fully authoritarian” 
regimes that got “stuck in transition” (Carothers 2002), but can also be regimes that have 
experienced democratic regression (Morlino 2009).  
Ever since Collier and Levitsky’s (1997) and Carother’s (2002) seminal articles, there 
has been a debate about how you classify regimes who are not democracies but conduct 
elections. While some claim that electoral authoritarian regimes are part of what is known as 
“hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2002; Rocha Menocal et al. 2008; Bogaards 2009), Morlino 
(2009: 279) interprets Schedler’s term as a new form of flat-out authoritarianism, and thus not 
a hybrid regime. Schedler (2006: 5) does indeed specify that electoral authoritarian regimes 
are in fact a form of authoritarianism, but so does Levitsky and Way (2002) in their analysis 
of competitive authoritarianism, and Morlino (2009: 280) does seem to think that this is a 
legitimate subtype of hybrid regimes. In fact, Schedler specifies that the new forms of 
authoritarianism are part of the puzzle surrounding hybrid regimes (Schedler 2002a: 36). I 
argue that Morlino’s critique fails to capture the range of regimes included under the label 
hybrid regimes. While these regimes are definitely authoritarian, they are nevertheless hybrid 
in the sense that they incorporate and accept the shell of democracy. This must be taken 
seriously, and an analysis must therefore take into account the dual nature of the regime. My 
approach is similar to that of Brownlee (2009), who treats electoral authoritarian regimes as a 
broad and important subtype of hybrid regimes, and based on Levitsky and Way (2002) and 
Diamond (2002) divide these into competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic 
authoritarianism. These are separated by the strength of the oppositional challenge in the 
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regime (Diamond 2002; Brownlee 2009: 518). As a consequence of this view, I also utilize 
literature on hybrid regimes to explain the context which I am investigating. 
The incumbent party in electoral authoritarian regimes is a dominant party who 
preserves its power through elections. They all dominate both the presidency and the 
legislature to a degree that they can control the political game because they win control of 
both the executive and legislative institutions of government through these elections 
(Bogaards 2004; Salih and Nordlund 2007: 51; Schedler 2009: 389). You find dominant 
parties in both democratic and authoritarian systems; but these typically behave very 
differently (Bogaards 2008). This might seem like a mundane observation, but it is important 
in order to understand the importance of the dominancy factor in the dual nature of political 
funding.  In electoral authoritarian regimes, they are able to use their incumbency to an even 
larger degree; and especially so in countries where they have controlled the transition to 
electoral and multiparty politics. When you combine a dominant office-seeking political party 
in power with an electoral authoritarian regime, you get a situation where the incumbent party 
should, depending on certain contextual constraints, be able to create policies on important 
issues such as political funding that are favorable to them. Thus my thesis is based on the 
assumption that investigating political funding is not only important in itself, but the nature of 
political funding makes it an interesting object of study because of the implications it has for 
the wider political system as well, and especially so in electoral authoritarian regimes. This 
basic assumption will be throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
With these fundamental concepts and the link between them in mind, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the literature on political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes. Chapter 2 
shows that there has been little theoretical literature on the topic; most of the literature on 
political funding is based on the reality in Western democracies. In order to bridge this 
theoretical gap, the chapter presents the different funding typologies that have been developed 
from the Western context. It then compares these typologies with the empirical reality shown 
in the few studies that focus on political funding in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as other 
countries affected by the third wave of democratization. The final part of the theoretical 
chapter is dedicated to reviewing relevant literature in order to find out how the context of 
electoral authoritarianism as well as other contextual factors could possibly affect political 
funding, and what strategies of political funding that can be viable in such a context. 
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Chapter 3 presents the methodological framework of this thesis, and debates the 
choices made and challenges faced throughout the process of writing it. It starts off with a 
general discussion on choice of method, and shows that a combination of a within-case 
analysis using process tracing and a cross-case comparison between the cases are necessary in 
order to identify mechanisms and increase the potential for theory building. In the second part 
of the chapter, the focus is on defining what Uganda and Angola are cases of, and what the 
implications of this is for theory building. Finally the chapter looks at the data collection 
process and challenges related to collecting primary data on a sensitive issue. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are within-case analyses of the situation of political funding in 
Uganda and Angola. By using both primary and secondary data to investigate the process and 
mechanisms at play, these chapters present case studies of the phenomenon of political 
funding in the two countries. The case studies show both what kind of political funding is 
available for the different political parties and what factors that seems to shape this 
availability. These chapters constitute the empirical section of my thesis, as well as the first 
and most fundamental step of analysis. They highlight what parts of the theoretical typology 
constructed in chapter 2 that are reflected in the respective cases. The case studies also 
introduce some new elements that the theory failed to highlight however, such as the 
importance of the temporal dimension in the introduction of state subsidies.  
Finally, chapter 6 completes the analysis by comparing the two cases to each other. 
This also doubles up as the conclusion of my thesis. The comparison is done in order to find 
out if some of the traits shown in the previous case studies can be found across cases and thus 
increase the chance that these findings are generalizable to electoral authoritarian regimes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in general. The cross-case comparison shows that while both regimes 
seem to manipulate political funding in order to skewer the playing field, their approaches 
vary somewhat. Some of this variation can be explained by contextual variables. What does 
seem to be the case however, is that both the Ugandan and Angolan regimes uses political 
funding both to create what Schedler (2002b) calls unfair competition and to manipulate the 
“actor space”. Based on this, tentative conclusions about the role of political funding in 
electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa are made. These tentative conclusions 
can be used as a point of departure for further research. 
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“When authoritarian incumbents go out to face the voting public and get its electoral seal of approval for their 
continuance in power, they often confront emerging opposition parties under conditions of radical unfairness. In 
case after case, this unfairness has to do with money and the media. Usually, electoral authoritarians enjoy 
ample access to public funds and favorable public exposure. The whole apparatus of the state – often including 
government-run media – is at their beck and call, and they often can harass or intimidate privately owned media 
organs into ignoring opposition candidates.”  
(Schedler 2002a: 44, emphasis added) 
 
Chapter 2 – Creating a foundation: Theory on political funding 
In a seminal article from 2002(a), Andreas Schedler goes through the “menu of manipulation” 
of electoral regimes, and argues that the difference between electoral democracy and electoral 
authoritarianism is that the latter do not comply with minimal democratic norms. Using the 
seven democratic criteria of Robert Dahl (1971), he formulates possible strategies for norm 
violation that a regime could use to manipulate the political and electoral process. If the 
regime does use one of these strategies and violates one of the democratic norms, they are to 
be considered an electoral authoritarian regime. On Dahl’s third criteria – the formation of 
preferences – Schedler specifies that this is fundamentally about the freedom of demand: That 
citizens are able to learn about the different alternatives in an equal manner. This, according 
to Schedler, depends on equal access to money and the media, as illustrated by the 
introductory quote above. The article also highlights the danger of clientilist networks based 
on power and money controlling the voting process (Schedler 2002a: 44). Many scholars have 
previously highlighted the perceived importance of such networks in the Sub-Saharan African 
setting (Kopecky and Mair 2003; Saffu 2003; Van de Walle 2003; Van Biezen and Kopecky 
2007). It is therefore reasonable to assume that theoretically money can play a decisive role in 
electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. But research on the role of political 
funding in Sub-Saharan African countries has been limited, especially so in these kind of 
regimes. The little that has been done has not focused on political funding per se, but rather 
on a wider or narrower set of issues such as discussions on political parties (Kopecky and 
Mair 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007), specific subtypes of political funding (van de Walle 
2003) or the general issue of money in politics (Bryan and Baer 2005).  
Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter is to create a theoretical overview of political 
funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa that can be used as a basis 
for further theory building through the case studies of Uganda and Angola. The focus of this 
thesis is on generating new knowledge; to use new descriptive findings to highlight a 
phenomenon. But new descriptive findings are most valuable if they can utilize and contribute 
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to already existing information and when they can shed new light on previously generated 
theory, concepts and typologies (Mahoney 2003: 134).  
It would therefore be a folly to ignore the previously published literature on political 
funding simply because most of it has been built on empirical observations of Western 
democracies. The point of departure of this chapter is therefore the general literature on 
political funding. I will start off with a description of basic fundraising strategies and 
typologies of these as presented in the literature, and discuss which of these are most useful 
for identifying funding patterns in another context (2.1). At the same time however, these 
typologies are ideal types based on the Western context. There is therefore every reason to 
believe that these typologies need to be modified in order to be useful in the empirical context 
discussed in this thesis. As an intermediate step before my case studies, I will therefore turn to 
previous empirical studies of political funding to identify how the strategies work in practice, 
and to what degree they are being employed by parties in Sub-Saharan Africa. While I use 
empirical literature from countries affected by the third wave of democratization globally, I 
am specifically interested in finding out what funding strategies seem theoretically viable in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2.2). Finally, this chapter will look at how the electoral authoritarian 
context can affect and be affected by political funding, as well as how other contextual 
variables such as electoral systems affect it. Schedler’s description of the role of political 
funding highlights its theoretical importance, but empirical studies of the mechanisms and 
processes identified by Schedler are rare. Nevertheless, the literature should be able to provide 
some useful pointers (2.3).  
 
2.1 Fundraising strategies 
There are a vast number of ways for political parties and candidates to raise money for 
political activities. Salih and Nordlund (2007: 117) argue that some are more compatible with 
democratic ideals than others, but at the end of the day political parties have to manage with 
the kinds of funding that they are able to attract. Four major typologies have been developed 
to categorize political funding according to source. All four are based on studies of funding in 
developed democracies. Each one adds a dimension compared to the previous typologies. 
Table 2.1 below summarizes the similarities and differences between them.  
Beyme (1985) was the first to propose a typology of political funding according to the 
sources of the funds. He used internal, external and state support as the basic containers for 
classifying funding, and this has become a popular mode after this. Beyme’s typology is 
useful in that it is quite inclusive; however, since it is so obviously based on Western 
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European politics and disregards illegal sources of funding, it is not suited as a theoretical 
basis for analyzing electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Table 2.1 Differences between typologies of party funding based on Western democracies 
 Beyme  
(1985) 
Nassmacher 
(2001) 
Hopkin (2004) Casas-
Zamora 
(2005) 
Main categories of 
funding 
Internal, 
External, 
Public  
Grassroot, 
Plutocratic, Public, 
Graft  
Clientilistic, 
External Elite, 
Internal Elite, 
Cartel 
Private, 
Public, 
Illegitimate 
Separates on source 
of funding 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Separates on nature 
and size of funding 
No Yes Yes Nature only 
Includes 
consequence of 
funding 
No No Yes  
(Organizational 
thickness) 
No 
Includes illegal 
source 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Includes Mass party Yes Yes No Yes 
Sources: Beyme (1985), Nassmacher (2001), Hopkin (2004), Casas-Zamora (2005) 
 
Nassmacher (2001) also focuses on the source of the funding, but approaches it slightly 
differently by focusing on the nature as well as the source of the funding. He separates 
between grassroot funding, which are small sums of money provided by the rank-and-file or 
associated organizations, plutocratic funding, which are larger contributions made by wealthy 
individuals, corporations or organizations as well as monetary contributions aimed to change 
policy, and income from graft, which are patronage and clientilistic practices that lead to the 
party directly or indirectly using state resources. Finally, he also includes public subsidies as a 
category. As both the plutocratic and graft categories highlight, Nassmacher’s typology 
includes both illegitimate and illegal sources of income. While these types of funding are hard 
to investigate, it is important to include illegal or illegitimate funding sources due to their 
perceived importance. This has lead to increased focus on these types of funding in the post-
1990 literature (Scarrow 2007) and in the Sub-Saharan African context (Van de Walle 2003). 
Table 2.2 below shows the different categories and what specific types of funding fit into each 
category in Nassmacher’s typology. While some sources mentioned below by Casas-
Zamora’s typology are not included in Nassmacher’s typology, these are quite easy to identify 
and add to one of the four categories. For example income from party businesses would be put 
under grassroot finance as long as they were a relatively modest sum of the party’s total 
15 
 
income. This is the essence of Nassmacher’s typology; if parties are funded by a few, large 
sources, it cannot be considered grassroot funding.  
 
Table 2.2 Specific types of funding as specified by Nassmacher’s (2001) typology 
Grassroot finance Plutocratic finance Graft Public subsidies 
Small contributions 
from: membership 
dues, within-party 
donations, donations 
from supporters 
outside party 
Larger contributions 
from: individual 
supporters, 
corporations, interest 
groups, institutions, 
“voluntary” 
donations to curry 
favor with party 
Abuse of power for 
party profit, through: 
macing, party tax, 
toll-gating, kickbaks 
Official state funding 
through: campaign 
support, party 
operational support, 
indirect support       
(i.e. tax breaks) 
Source: Nassmacher (2001: 23-26) 
 
 Another theoretical typology of funding according to funding source is Hopkin’s 
(2004) typology of party financial strategies. This typology differs from the previous two on 
two important aspects. First of all, it builds on Nassmacher’s typology presented in table 2.2, 
but takes it a step further by not only focusing on the  source and nature of the funding, but 
also on the kind of links it creates between the giver of the funds (donor) and the recipient of 
the funds (political party or candidate). It thus gives an indication of not only who funds the 
party, but also whether this creates an organizationally “thick” or “thin” party. Second, and 
most importantly, it introduces the aspect of party financing in a “free-riding society”. By 
utilizing theories from political economy and the rational choice paradigm, Hopkin shows 
how funding by the mass-party principle, as presented by Duverger (1954), is unsustainable 
because parties are collective goods which cannot be upheld by grassroot funding in the long 
run because of the problem of free-riding. Consequences of this include that parties become 
more office-seeking and that parties need a different funding strategy than simply relying on 
this strategy. Thus, according to Hopkin, while grassroot funding might be an ideal, it is not a 
reasonable assumption that it can be a primary source of income for political parties in a free-
riding society.  
Based on this, Hopkin presents four types of funding strategies and four types of 
parties to go with them: the Clientelistic Mass Party (CMP), the Externally Financed Elite 
Party (EFEP), the Self-Financing Elite Party (SFEP) and the Cartel Party (CP) (Hopkin 
2004 : 631). The CMP is a party that exploits state resources to distribute selective incentives. 
Like the CMP, CPs also receive the largest share of their revenues through state funding, 
however for CPs based on regulated state funding, and thus the same as the public subsidies in 
Nassmacher’s typology. Hopkin (2004: 635) and Katz and Mair (1995) claim that this funding 
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is a form of collective action between the parties, so that each party agrees to maintain 
funding for the opposition when it is in power, in return for a promise of the support being 
maintained when the party loses power. This creates an organizational system where the 
parties become more autonomous from its rank-and-file members, and more dependent on the 
state (Katz and Mair 1995). The final two categories of Hopkin’s typology are in a way 
subcategories of what Nassmacher calls plutocratic financing. They are separated by whether 
they court external or internal contributors. The EFEP gets funded by selling policy to 
external beneficiaries, whether individuals, business groups or interest organizations. EFEP 
parties are often top-heavy and rely on capital-intensive campaign techniques, something that 
they share with the SFEP. SFEP parties do not sell policy externally however. Instead they are 
normally funded by their own party elite who are also beneficiaries of the policies they 
propose (Hopkin 2004: 632-634). 
Finally, Casas-Zamora (2005: 18) has created the most discriminating typology of 
funding sources. The typology has three broad categories: private-, public- and illegitimate 
funding. Within these categories there are numerous subtypes and it is therefore very useful in 
order to identify what types of sources are actually available and how they relate to each 
other. Furthermore, the typology is the first to include foreign contributions as a sub-category. 
The role of foreign funding of political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa has attracted significant 
scholarly interest in recent years12
However, Casas-Zamora’s typology does not separate on the size of the funding, and on 
whether or not donations are internal or external to the political party or political actor. As we 
shall see below this is imperative for the Sub-Saharan African setting and in electoral 
authoritarian regime. Therefore, I will use Nassmacher’s typology as a basis for my empirical 
evaluation, and include his four broad categories grassroot funding, plutocratic funding, state 
subsidies
, and should therefore be taken seriously in this context.  
13
                                                 
12 I.E. Burnell (2000), Mathisen and Svåsand (2002), Carothers (2006), Burnell and Gerrits (2010) 
 and graft as a basic information containers in my theoretical typology. These 
broad categories are importantly both universal and discriminating enough that they should be 
distinguishable also in the Sub-Saharan African context. I do however add a fifth category 
based on Casas-Zamora’s typology; that of foreign funding. The reason for this is explained in 
depth below, but there is reason to believe that foreign funding plays a more important role in 
Sub-Saharan Africa than in other parts of the world (Bryan and Baer 2005). Figure 2.2 below 
presents my typology of political funding in Sub-Saharan Africa. The main categories are 
adapted from the previously described typologies. However, the sub-categories have to be 
13 Because of the importance of the state in Africa, I do not call it “public subsidies” but rather “state subsidies” 
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more discriminatory and adapted to the local setting than the ones described above.  I 
therefore base the creation of my subcategories on section 2.2, where I discuss previous 
empirical research on the five broad categories of political funding. 
 
2.2 Empirical lessons – an evaluation of possible funding sources in Sub-Saharan Africa 
As stated in the beginning of the chapter, very little research has been done on political 
funding in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially comparatively and with the exception of South 
Africa14
 
. Two notable exceptions are Yaw Saffu’s chapter on the funding of political parties 
and election campaigns in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2003 and Bryan and Baer’s study of 
money in politics from 2005. I therefore rely heavily on these throughout this part of this 
thesis. However, while covering many aspects, they are not substantive enough to cover all 
funding modes in all types of settings. Therefore, an evaluation of the five broad categories 
presented in figure 2.1 in terms of empirical relevance needs to use empirical evidence from a 
wide range of sources.  
Figure 2.1: A typology of political funding based on funding source in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
Manning (2005) and Ishiyama and Quinn (2006) argues that, while the Eastern 
European countries and countries affect by what Huntington (1991) named the third wave of 
democratization in Europe and elsewhere certainly differs from Africa on many issues, the 
lessons learned from these cases could possibly be used as a reference point for Sub-Saharan 
African cases. Furthermore, and importantly for this thesis, political funding has been 
investigated more thoroughly in this setting. Findings and hypotheses from these countries 
can thus provide useful assumptions for research on this topic, and a useful contrast to the 
scarce literature on the topic in Sub-Saharan Africa. This section will therefore use relevant 
                                                 
14 See for example Butler (2010) 
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literature from Sub-Saharan Africa that both directly and indirectly touches on political 
funding, as well as global literature that is deemed relevant to the topic. The goal is to discuss 
the general categories identified above and presented in figure 2.1, and identify the empirical 
subtypes of political funding that seem most relevant and adapted to the region. Furthermore, 
this section will present hypotheses about the conceived importance of each subtype and if the 
funding type seems to be important for the incumbent or the opposition. This is summarized 
in table 2.3 at the end of this section. 
 
Grassroot funding 
I start with Hopkin’s theoretical assumption about the non-saliency of the traditional mass 
party mode of funding as portrayed by Duverger (1954), which is very similar to what 
Nassmacher (2001) calls grassroot funding and Casas-Zamora (2005) calls party membership 
dues. Mass Parties were primarily funded by their members through membership dues and 
other sources within the social groups they were deemed to represent (Katz and Mair 1995: 6; 
Nassmacher 2001: 23).  These Mass Parties typically arose through the struggle to gain a 
voice in, and win control over, state structures (Katz and Mair 1995: 10). Thus, they 
fundamentally came to play in countries where suffrage came gradually and reluctantly. This 
has not been the case in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where universal suffrage most 
often came directly after independence.15
There are reasons that are even more basic than this for why grassroot funding cannot 
be the modal source of funding for most Sub-Saharan African parties. Organizing political 
activities across space and time in Sub-Saharan Africa is extremely expensive due to low 
literacy, low levels of income and little technological equipment among a predominantly 
spread-out, rural population. Running campaigns and recruiting members is extremely hard 
for any political actor and political party. For this reason, small contributions would have to 
come from a massive amount of people in order for this to have any impact on the financial 
situation of a party. Furthermore, the above-mentioned general poverty makes such 
contributions even less likely, as the average citizen simply does not have enough money to 
contribute directly with funds (Saffu 2003: 21-23). However, this does not exclude the 
possibility of African citizens contributing in kind with other forms of physical or material 
resources. Disregarding non-monetary contributions would therefore constitute a significant 
danger when investigating funding in the Sub-Saharan African context. In addition, there are 
  
                                                 
15 Notable exceptions are South Africa and Zimbabwe 
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some examples of small donors becoming significant factors in the political process, notably 
in Ghana and Zambia (Saffu 2003: 23). Bryan and Baer, who interviewed several hundred 
current and former politicians in Africa, found that 26% percent named funding raised by the 
party as the principal revenue source (Bryan and Baer 2005: 11). However, they do not 
specify if this was donations, membership dues or other forms of internal financing, 
something which is integral to my research. Finally, older parties in Africa, especially those 
with ties to regimes before 1990, are likely to have some business or property that can 
generate income. For newer parties however, this is unlikely due to the fact that in order to 
make initial investments, parties need initial capital; banks are mostly unwilling to lend to 
opposition parties who do not have significant initial capital (Saffu 2003: 26). 
On average though, the structure and organization of political parties in Africa seem to 
indicate that they are not conducive to being run based on grassroot funding as their main 
source of income. Parties everywhere have experienced a general decline in membership in 
the last 40 years, but even when taking this into account, parties in Africa are generally 
speaking organizationally thin and have few links with civil society. The way and manor in 
which electoral politics was introduced in Africa helped create a system where parties have 
not developed mass-membership organizations (Salih and Nordlund 2007: 104). The 
relationship goes both ways, however. Manning (2005) highlights the importance of how 
electoral politics were “forced on” African countries and that pluralism in the classical sense 
does not seem like a valid option in Africa today. However, while her main argument 
concerns a lack of bridging social capital in the region, one of the important factors she 
highlights as a reason for this lack of pluralism is a general lack of alternative funding sources 
other than the state (Manning 2005: 716). And the state is often closely associated with the 
governing party (Manning 2005: 714). In this sense, the lack of pluralism and developed party 
organizations is actually hampered by a lack of alternative sources of funding, thus making 
mass-membership organizations less likely.  
Thus, while grassroot contributions obviously play some role for political funding in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, previous research seems to indicate that this needs to be combined with 
other sources. Following this, it is possible to distinguish between several subtypes of 
grassroot funding, and create hypothesis on these. First of all, you have the traditional 
membership dues from paying members. These are not considered to be important by the 
literature, due to the relatively few fee-paying members of the parties in Africa. Perhaps 
importantly however, the literature seems to indicate that incumbent parties are more likely to 
have a larger membership, because of their control of the state. Second, you have small 
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donations by members and supporters. These can be important, especially non-monetary 
contributions. Finally, you have party business that can generate a lot of income, but primary 
benefactors are incumbent parties or parties who have previously been in power. 
 
Plutocratic funding 
The other aspect of Nassmacher’s non-state sources of funding is what is commonly known as 
substantial donations. According to Nassmacher (2001: 24), plutocratic funding is larger 
voluntary contributions made by individuals, businesses or other organizations. These 
donations are made either because the donor supports the party or candidate or because the 
donors want to gain access to politicians or contracts, or to affect policy. Hopkin (2004: 632) 
argues that despite technological change and subsequent capital-intensive campaign 
techniques, parties and other political actors today are faced with an increasingly expensive 
political game. And with the fall of revenues from grassroot funding, one of the possibilities is 
to sell policy or positions to beneficiaries in exchange for funding. These transactions are 
more or less legal and transparent, deepening on the regulation surrounding it (Hopkin 2004: 
633). Nevertheless, this is definitely related to party rent-seeking and graft, and Van Biezen 
and Kopecky (2007: 240-241) call it straight-out corruption because it “involves the exchange 
of money for public decisions”. However, because the sources of the funds are outside the 
state, I include it under plutocratic funding. Research from Brazil has shown that 
contributions from external businesses are both an important source of funding for political 
actors in the country, and that this funding has facilitated more pro-business policies (Samuels 
2001; Claessens et al. 2008). Evidence from Russia seems to indicate that this is not 
necessarily the case however, as it is very hard to enforce contracts in poorly institutionalized 
political systems. This seems to make private contributions both less likely and less effective 
(Treisman 1998: 14).  
A possible solution to this issue is that the donor can create his own party or “buy” an 
existing one. Nassmascher’s typology puts internal donations as a part of grassroot funding, 
not plutocratic funding. Hopkin (2004: 634) however argues that plutocratic donations can be 
internalized to the extent that the donors become an official part of the party and even become 
politicians themselves. This is why he separates between external and internal elite funding, 
and names them both as donation-based practices. According to Hopkin, large donations do 
not belong under grassroot funding even though they are internal to the party, because the 
motivation behind the donation is to forward the narrow interest of the donor. It can thus be 
considered a form of political “entrepreneurship”. Thus SFEP are clearly narrower parties 
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than parties based on grassroot funding. Hopkin names Forza Italia under Berlusconi as an 
example of this (Hopkin 2004: 635).  
According to Saffu “donations are the modal source of political financing in Africa” 
(Saffu 2003: 22). While some of these might be small and altruistic contributions, the 
significant ones are typically made by rich businessmen who regard “politics as business … 
and political parties as appropriate investments.” (Saffu 2003: 23).  Furthermore, it seems like 
it is just as popular to engage in politics yourself as it is to support someone else’s party. 
There seems to be a general trend that politicians in Africa are also wealthy individuals, 
although opposition politicians typically struggle to attract external corporations or individual 
donors who would much rather donate money to the party in power (Saffu 2003: 23-24). 
Bryan and Baer (2005: 13) show the importance of having a personal fortune when you are 
contesting as a candidate in African elections; 52% name the candidate’s own funds as the 
principal revenue of their individual campaign. The importance of business contributions is 
significantly less than in other regions though (Bryan and Baer 2005: 11).  
While donations therefore seem to be very important in the Sub-Saharan African 
context, the exact impact that they make seems contingent on both the form of and motivation 
behind the contribution, as well as the context in which it is made. It is thus possible to create 
two sub-categories of plutocratic funding in Sub-Saharan Africa based on whether or not the 
large donations are made internally or externally: external plutocratic and internal plutocratic 
funding. These types of funding should both be considered to be very important in the Sub-
Saharan African context. They differ from each other in which parties they are important for 
however. Because of the lack of an independent business sector, opposition parties should 
struggle to attract external plutocratic funding. Since the discussion above shows that 
political entrepreneurship is important however, the theory seems to indicate that internal 
plutocratic funding could benefit both the opposition and incumbent. 
 
State subsidies  
The general trend of declining income from internal party activities and the need this creates 
for alternative sources and the growing importance of relatively few donors as highlighted 
above are some of the reasons why most liberal democracies have chosen to implement state 
subsidies for political parties or public funding of campaigns (Nassmacher 2006: 448). Parties 
are seen as critical to the democratic process, and thus they should be maintained by the state. 
According to this line of reasoning, public funding guarantees that each vote counts equally 
by making sure no person, business or organization can buy influence through financial 
22 
 
contributions. In this way corruption should also become less of a problem. These reasons, 
combined with the rising costs of carrying out political activity in the modern world, have 
been the foundation of the establishment of public funding of political parties (Pierre et.al. 
2000: 4). This trend has caught on in new or emerging democracies in Europe where public 
funding is even more important than in established democracies (Van Biezen 2004: 711).  
There are several forms of state subsidies.  As explained by Casas-Zamora (2005) the 
primary way in which they differ is whether the grants are direct or indirect, and whether they 
are permanent or campaign-oriented16
Partly because there are so many different possible subsidy arrangements, there seems 
to be a disagreement within the literature about the exact effect of state subsidies. The 
European literature has typically focused on whether public funding has led to either 
increased dependency on the state and therefore a professionalization of political parties, or to 
what degree state funding freezes the party system and prevents new political actors from 
entering the political scene (Katz and Mair 1995; Pierre et.al. 2000; Van Biezen 2000; Casas-
Zamora 2005; Birnir 2010). While the literature seems to be inconclusive, the one thing that it 
highlights is the diverse consequences of state subsidies for political parties. A case in point is 
Mendilow’s (1992) study of public party funding and party transformation in Israel. He finds 
that public funding has contributed to the creation of large, elitist catch-all parties, but at the 
same time that public funding fragmentalizes the party system. In fact, Mendilow argues that 
smaller parties are more dependent on public funding than larger parties. Birnir (2005), 
however, argues that while this may be the case in established democracies, in new or 
. Indirect subsidies are tax-breaks for political parties, 
or similar arrangements, while direct subsidies involve money or other resources given by the 
state to the political parties or candidates. Permanent funding is funding given to political 
parties at regular intervals even between elections, while campaign-oriented funding is 
funding given to parties specifically to be used during elections. Furthermore, there are 
numerous other criteria that can vary as well, such as eligibility for the funding, what 
allocation rules should be used to calculate the amount for each actor, and whether or not the 
total allocation sum is constrained or not. State subsidies usually exist within a larger 
framework of party- or financing-regulations, and these are necessarily possible to manipulate 
by the politicians. Thus, while the goal of the introduction of such a framework might be to 
create a better and more transparent situation for the political actors, it can certainly be used 
for the opposite as well (Van Biezen and Kopecky 2001).  
                                                 
16 Casas-Zamora (2005: 32) call these electoral, but I use campaign because they are campaign-oriented as 
defined in figure 1.1 
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emerging democracies the introduction or increase of state subsidies tends to freeze the party 
system. This shows both how public funding can be used in a diverse way to promote 
sectional interests, and how the context in which it is introduced affects the outcome. Roper 
(2002) finds the same in post-transition Romania in the 1990s; politicians altered state 
subsidies in such a way that it favored them because they controlled the political process at 
the time. Any analysis of state subsidies must therefore be both detailed and concerned with 
all aspects of the state subsidies, not just whether there is such an arrangement. 
State subsidies of political parties is less common in Africa than in other parts of the 
world (Mathisen and Svåsand 2002), and in cases where they do exist they often do not 
involve sums significant enough to make an impact, or the implementation is woeful (Saffu 
2003). So even though 20% of the politicians in Bryan and Baer’s study name direct public 
funding as their parties most important source of income (Bryan and Baer 2005: 11), I would 
argue that this primarily seems to indicate that state subsidies matter in countries where the 
implementation of the subsidies is meaningful. It is easy to point to state subsidies simply 
because they exist and should contribute funds. Nevertheless, the lack of both regulation and 
implementation of state subsidies can be just as important to investigate. There is, according 
to Saffu, reason to believe that this is linked to the nature of many transitions in Africa: 
 
“The relative absence of public funding provisions in the new constitutions and the 
laws that governed the recent transitions to multiparty democracy in Africa are 
testimony to the extent to which the transition programmes were directed and 
dominated by incumbent authoritarian rulers who did not lack political or financial 
resources” (Saffu 2003: 25). 
 
This seems to indicate that investigating state subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa is therefore just 
as much an investigation of how state subsidies has or has not been implemented. 
Fundamentally, the previous discussion seems to indicate that the implementation of state 
subsidies might have implications not only for what types of political funding exists, but also 
for the implications of political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, the 
previous discussion show that both that state subsidies are likely small and selectively 
implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa and furthermore that where there are state subsidies, 
there is reason to believe that these will favor the incumbent party. In my typology I primarily 
separate between party funding which target parties between campaigns, and campaign 
funding which is meant to help parties and candidates during the campaign.  
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Income from Graft 
In Casas-Zamora’s (2005:18) typology, illegitimate income is funding from sources that are 
not legal. According to Nassmacher (2001: 24), graft deals primarily with the part of the 
illegal funding that comes from the use or abuse of state resources. As shown in table 2.2 
above he separates between four types of graft. Two of these are linked to positions: Macing 
involves public servants being forced to contribute part of their salaries to the ruling party, 
while assessments are contributions made by individuals who are directly dependent on the 
party, such as politicians or publicly owned corporations. The other two are linked to public 
contracts and tenders. Toll-gating is similar to the concept of selling policy as mentioned 
above in that an external source supports the party in exchange for policy, but it is more direct 
in that they get public contracts directly in return. Finally kickbacks are instances where the 
ruling party gets a set percentage of the value of such contracts. All these instances are hard to 
identify, but can be very important both for the structure and composition of the patron-client 
relationship that tends to develop (Nassmacher 2001; Saffu 2003). While I acknowledge the 
use of these strategies, the important distinction for this thesis is whether they generate 
positions or policies that generate money for the parties, or if the incumbent party use state 
money directly. According to Van Biezen and Kopecky (2007: 240-241) you can divide 
different forms of graft by how they abuse state resources; they divide the concept into party 
patronage, clientilism and corruption. Patronage involves the distribution of public-sector 
jobs; distribution of public positions in return for votes and organizational support. Party 
clientilism is the distribution of favorable contracts, subsidies, pork-legislation - in other 
words policy - in return for votes and organizational support. Both of these rent-seeking 
strategies depend on the party having access to the state apparatus and coffers. Finally they 
also include what they call corruption, which is debated in the section on plutocratic funding 
above. The fundamental issue that holds parties and systems based on graft together is “the 
use of public resources in particularistic and direct exchanges between clients and party 
politicians or party functionaries” (Müller 2006: 189).  
Hopkin’s typology also deals with the more direct use of illegitimate state funds and 
resources for political purposes, and he adds a dimension by linking it with the structure and 
organization of political parties. According to Gunther and Diamond (2003) a clientilist party 
is organizationally thin. However, Hopkin (2004: 632) specifies that this strategy can only be 
maintained to the extent that the public coffers can support the network, meaning that the 
organizational thickness depends on the size of the public coffers. This seems to have been 
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the case in post-communist Russia, where the party in power was unable to exploit patronage 
networks simply because they did not have money to distribute (Treisman 1998: 9). Similarly, 
the turnover of power in Senegal in 2000 was connected to the incumbent not being able to 
maintain his broad clientilist network (Galvan 2001). There are both material and non-
material sources of graft, patronage and clientilism (Müller 2006:189), and smaller tokens and 
gifts can be significant, especially in less developed countries (Hopkin 2006: 409).  
What do parties gain from participating in graft, patronage and clientilism? Most 
obviously they receive votes, but just as important they receive resources in return, such as 
labor and money and policy-making capacity (Müller 2006:191). The jobs, positions and 
contracts you get to distribute is especially important in state-dependent economies (Hopkin 
2006; Müller 2006), and the salaries and policy making capacity helps build a party 
organization (Hopkin 2006: 410). However, there are even more substantial benefits, 
especially for the ruling parties in developing countries, and especially in Africa. According 
to Hopkin (2006) developing countries are generally more clientilist than the Western 
democracies, and shows that variables such as institutionalization of parties, social capital, 
and degree of bureaucratization have all been proposed as explanatory variables for this. In 
Africa, there seems to be an indication that the most common funding relationship between 
political parties and the state is that of patronage and clientilist practices (Kopecky and Mair 
2003; van de Walle 2003). If this is the case then one would expect a difference between 
those who are in power and can access state resources, and those who are not in power (Van 
Biezen and Kopecky 2007: 246).  
This highlights the perceived importance of access to and control over the state in the 
issue of funding in Africa: the winner of an election “wins twice”: both executive power and 
control of state resources. Saffu claims that African elections tend “to be contests between all 
opposition parties and candidates on the one hand, and the governing party’s candidates and 
the state on the other” (Saffu 2003: 27). Graft could thus be hypothesized to be very important 
in the Sub-Saharan African context, but only for the incumbent party. Furthermore, following 
Van Biezen and Kopecky (2007) graft could involve exploiting patronage (positions), 
clientilism (policy) or direct use of state money and resources for the party. Finally, it seems 
like the possibilities and size of the graft network is dependent on the general access to 
resources of the government. 
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Foreign funding 
The last twenty years has seen an increasing focus on the role of foreign democracy assistance 
(Burnell 2000), something which has also lead to a small, but increasing literature focusing on 
the role of the international community in funding political parties and candidates (Burnell 
and Gerrits 2010). In 2006 the total amount of external party aid worldwide was considered to 
be around US$200 million (Carothers 2006: 12), which, while being only a small amount of 
the total aid for developmental purposes, is still an amount that can make a significant 
difference for political parties worldwide. This has, however, also made it one of the most 
controversial forms of foreign aid, precisely because it interferes with the political sovereignty 
and the internal affairs of  a country (Burnell and Gerrits 2010: 1069). Nevertheless, some still 
choose to engage political parties directly with funds. These approaches typically differ on 
two dimensions; if they are for specific parties or all parties and what type of activities that 
are eligible to funding. The first approach is the sister-party approach where organizations 
and institutions linked with political parties in the West provide organizational support and 
funding for sister parties in developing countries (Mair 2000; Weissenbach 2010), although 
the parties selected might be siblings only in name (Carothers 2006: chapter 5). This kind of 
support typically seeks to promote the values of the donor party, and they typically try to 
avoid supporting political party activities per se, but rather activities that reflect these values 
such as party education (Mair 2000: 134; Wild and Golooba-Mutebi 2010). German Stiftungs 
were heavily involved in these kinds of activities during the Cold War. While the interest in 
engaging political parties directly cooled post-1990, it has recently increased again (Mair 
2000: 142-143; Weissenbach 2010). Donors are reluctant to support day-to-day or campaign-
related activities though. In this sense it is similar to the technical-assistance model, which 
also focuses on the technical competence of parties and voter education, but is a cross-party 
initiative given to all parties equally (Wild and Golooba-Mutebi 2010: 10). The last type of 
approach is relatively new: the basket fund model focuses on grant-making facilities that 
political parties can apply for (Wild and Gooloba-Mutebi 2010: 11). This is a model that 
offers equal opportunity for all political parties to participate, but donors can contribute more 
direct funding to the activities of political parties through for example funding national party 
conventions or other forms of organization building (Rakner and Svåsand 2010: 1262; Wild 
and Gooloba-Mutebi 2010: 11).  
While case studies of individual donor efforts aimed at improving democracy through 
assisting political parties in African countries have often found it difficult to prove any direct 
success (Bolleyer and Storm 2010; Rakner and Svåsand 2010; Wild and Golooba-Mutebi 
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2010), they can nevertheless have a real impact on the political process. Again, it is important 
to note that the political actors in the recipient countries seem to think that such initiatives are 
important (Rakner and Svåsand 2010). According to Bryan and Baer’s survey, 12% of 
African parties consider foreign contributions to be their principal source of revenue, 
compared to 7% for non-African countries (Bryan and Baer 2005: 11). However, it is 
important to realize that western influence generally does not seem to be enough to force any 
regime to democratize (Brown 2005), and especially not an electoral authoritarian regime 
(Levitsky and Way 2005). In fact, many foreign donor officials continually make excuses for 
why the countries keep underperforming (Brown 2011: 513).  
Finally, there are two other sources of foreign funding that needs to be mentioned. A 
case study of Ghana has shown the importance of the diaspora in the political game there, and 
found that it became an important source of funding for the largest opposition party in the 
1990s. There are often many disgruntled losers living in other countries who fund opposition 
parties in the country of their origin (Saffu 2003: 24). Furthermore, less transparent and more 
direct contributions from foreign governments or businesses have previously been shown to 
fund especially incumbent parties in countries such as Zimbabwe, Niger, Ghana, South Africa 
and Botswana (Saffu 2003: 24-25). This seems to indicate that while foreign contributions are 
not the most important sources of funding in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are three subtypes of 
foreign funding that at least make some impact in some countries. Two of these seem to favor 
the opposition and the final one seems to favor the incumbent. Contributions from official 
donors are often available for all parties, but they typically try to target weak parties and this 
seems to indicate that they are more important for the opposition. Donations from the 
diaspora typically are given to the opposition, while more covert funding from other foreign 
governments tends to favor the incumbents. 
 
 Table 2.3: Sources of political funding sorted by degree of importance and which actors they are 
important for 
 Perceived theoretical importance in Sub-Saharan Africa  
Low Medium High 
Important 
for which 
actors 
Incumbent Party funding, 
Campaign 
funding, Covert 
Party business External plutocratic, 
Patronage, Clientilism, 
Money from graft,  
Opposition Diaspora,  
Donor 
  
Both  Small donations, 
Membership dues 
Internal plutocratic 
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Table 2.3 above summarizes section 2.2. In total I have identified 5 categories and 13 
subtypes of political funding that one can expect to find in Sub-Saharan African, as presented 
in figure 2.2 at the beginning of this section. Table 2.3 below distinguishes between these 
subtypes based on two dimensions indicated in the previous discussion; the degree of 
perceived importance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and whether they seem to benefit the incumbent, 
opposition or both. This is the theoretical basis of my analyses of Uganda and Angola. I will 
look at to if and how table 2.3 actually reflects the reality in these countries. The table seems 
to indicate that incumbent parties in Sub-Saharan Africa Africa have access to several sources 
of political funding that the opposition does not have. The reasons for and implications of this 
in electoral authoritarian regimes should be interesting to investigate. First however, some 
theoretical implications of contextual factors on political funding will be presented. 
 
2.3 The setting: How strategic behaviour and contextual factors affect political funding 
As described in the introduction, political funding is a “dual” phenomenon in that it is both 
affected by and affects the context in which it exists. This section will try to clarify this 
relationship. While the main focus is on the effect of the context on political funding, part of 
the theory also indirectly addresses the implications of the funding for the context. Thus the 
theory serves a dual purpose in that it implies consequences both for the primary focus of this 
thesis: types of political funding, and for the secondary focus of the implications of the 
funding issue. It also shows how these two issues are interlinked. 
 
Electoral authoritarianism and strategies of manipulation 
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, Schedler claims that electoral authoritarian regimes 
have a “menu of manipulation” which the incumbents can use to manipulate the elections to 
their advantage. He primarily separates between electoral fraud, political repression, 
manipulating the actor space, manipulating rules of representation, manipulating the issue 
space and unfair competition (Schedler 2002b). Of these strategies, Schedler specifically 
mentions that the strategy of unfair competition involves the issue of political funding. 
Incumbent parties can manipulate competition by giving incumbent candidates access to state 
funding and resources, and favorable coverage and more time in the state media (Schedler 
2002b: 108). This specifically entails political parties using their incumbency advantage to 
access resources, and thus you would expect incumbent parties in electoral authoritarian 
regimes to gain a significant part of their funds from different forms of graft. Gyimah-Boadi 
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(2007) shows how several electoral authoritarian regimes in Africa use state resources and 
either patronage- and clientilist-networks to win elections. However, he also highlights the 
potential dangers of using such an approach in these regimes: the costs might become too high 
for the economy to bear, creating other and more pressing political problems which create 
electoral discontent.  Furthermore, Schedler’s theory could also possibly point to the creation 
of rules governing state subsidies that favor the ruling party, since an electoral authoritarian 
party would be in a situation to do this through its dominancy, much as was done in Romania 
in the early 1990s (Roper 2002). 
The fact that the incumbent party in electoral authoritarian regimes dominates both the 
legislature and the executive could possibly affect the legislative process in terms of 
regulation of funding. Sartori (2005) separates between two forms of dominant party systems: 
the predominant-party systems and the hegemonic party systems. While the first one is 
labeled as competitive, the latter one is not. Both conduct elections where the dominant party 
wins, but they differ in terms of the possibility for turnover (Sartori 2005: 205). In this sense 
the distinction is similar to the one presented in chapter 1 between competitive 
authoritarianism and hegemonic authoritarianism. What is important here though is that 
studies have shown that both predominant and hegemonic dominant parties manipulate rules 
concerning political funding in order to favor themselves. McElwain’s (2008) study of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan throughout its dominant period following the World 
War II is a case in point for predominant systems. He shows that it manipulated funding 
regulations by allowing for more funding from the business community, something which the 
LDP knew would favor it because incumbents traditionally enjoy strong support in the 
business community (McElwain 2008: 37). However, the changes had to be made in a subtle 
way in order to prevent them from creating disunity within the party, and in order to prevent it 
from being challenged on a constitutional basis (McElwain 2008: 34-35). This can be 
compared to the electoral manipulation described by Albaugh (2011) in her study of 
Cameroon, which seems like a case of a hegemonic authoritarian electoral regime. Here 
President Byia and his Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) agreed to waive 
the fees for people’s registration cards in supportive regions, thus effectively using 
government resources to manipulate the registration of voters (Albaugh 2011: 399-402). This 
seems to indicate that the use of government resources and funding schemes tilted towards the 
incumbent can be less subtle the more hegemonic a regime becomes. According to Greene 
(2010) dominant authoritarian regimes can survive for long periods of time if they manage to 
politicize public resources:  
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“When political incumbents can access and use these public resources for partisan 
purposes, they can outspend competitors at every turn and make otherwise open 
competition so unfair that they virtually win elections before election day.” (Greene 
2010: 808) 
 
By doing this, they can avoid using overly repressive tactics and outcome-changing fraud. 
This makes the control of political funding a “subtle” authoritarian tool, and the way that 
electoral authoritarian regimes use it an intriguing topic of investigation.  
 
Other contextual factors 
Greene’s (2010) analysis is also important because it highlights the role of other contextual 
factors in shaping funding. Significantly, he finds that the structure of the economy is 
important because it shapes the degree to which the dominant party can politicize public 
resources. Greene finds that the size of the public sector affects the strength of electoral 
authoritarian regimes in a significant manner across cases. He concludes that dominant parties 
cannot preserve their power without access to some kind of resources to fuel clientilist 
networks (Greene 2010: 828). This is much the same argument as presented by Quinn (2002) 
who claims that the inward-oriented policies and majority state ownership has created a 
climate which is suitable for one-party dominance in Africa. A theoretical implication of this 
would seem to be that the composition of the economy matters for the political funding 
options available for the incumbent party to manipulate, and thus for the composition of 
political funding in general. 
Another contextual factor which could affect the funding climate is that of the 
electoral system. Some electoral systems are party-centered, while others are more candidate-
centred. Carey and Shugart (1995) have previously demonstrated that systems with little or no 
party control over who runs on party tickets and where votes are cast for individual candidates 
not on party lists tend to produce candidate-centered political systems. Plurality formulas are 
more likely to produce these kinds of systems than proportional formulas. Samuels (1999) has 
previously shown that systems where candidates are able to raise money on a personal rather 
than party level are much more likely to lessen the role of parties even more. An important 
consequence of this is that you would expect more candidate-centered political funding in 
regimes with plurality election systems, and thus increase the importance of the individual 
candidate’s ability to raise funds.  
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Different Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) might also have an effect as well, 
since they are the institutions who most often are responsible for implementing the regulation 
on political finance and funding, and EMBs can therefore be influenced by ruling elites to 
produce the desired outcomes (Salih and Nordlund 2007: 113). Mozaffar (2002) separates 
between three types of EMBs depending on whether or not they are placed within government 
bureaucracy; the non-autonomous, semi-autonomous and autonomous. A non-autonomous 
electoral commission should thus in theory make it easier for the incumbents to shape 
political funding in a preferable way for themselves. 
Finally, there is an issue not specific to all electoral authoritarian regimes but to 
Angola and Uganda and some other countries that could potentially affect the funding 
situation. As stated in the introduction, both Angola and Uganda are run by parties that 
initially came to power through armed struggle. Rakner and Rønning (2010) split these types 
of parties into two, based on whether they originated in fighting for independence or against a 
colonial regime or came to power fighting an internal war against an authoritarian regime. 
The NRM-party in Uganda is clearly the case of the latter, while the MPLA in Angola 
originated in the fight against a colonial regime. Carey and Reynolds (2007) argue that where 
African parties emerge from have a significant impact on their later performance, especially 
related to accountability and relationship with the state. They classify parties according to 
historical legacy and the two classifications relevant here – corporate military and liberation 
movement – are both characterized by high levels of internal loyalty and discipline (Carey and 
Reynolds 2007). Thus the parties emerging from these settings should be unitary and better 
able to implement the will of the party in the legislature, making legitimate but highly pro-
incumbent state subsidies more likely. Regimes that emerged militarily victorious from the 
civil war and actually defeated their opponents in the battlefield are more likely to be able to 
implement favorable policies to themselves than in countries where the war ended in a pact or 
peace agreement (Joshi 2010). In general though, political finance in post-conflict societies is 
not transparent and well-regulated. Second, grassroot funding is likely not a good option both 
due to the poverty level as well as the low trust in political organizations and institutions.  
Finally, both foreign funding and illegal sources of funding are more important than in other 
countries due to the relative lack of both legal public and private funding sources (Fischer 
et.al. 2006). This seems to roughly correspond with the general nature of electoral 
authoritarian regimes in Africa described above, and the post-conflict nature of the regimes 
should therefore serve to strengthen this.  
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 “There is an unfortunate tendency in comparative politics to choose a particular way of doing research because 
it seems the One Best Way to do research” 
 Tarrow (2010: 252)  
 
Chapter 3 – Processes, mechanisms and more: Choosing the methodological tools  
The introductory quote from Tarrow highlights what I have been trying to avoid 
methodologically while working on my thesis. I have therefore tried to heed the advice of 
Charles Ragin and Theda Skocpol; one should always choose the method best suited to 
answer your resource question (Ragin 2004) and there is no way of answering a question that 
is inherently better than another (Skocpol 2003). This is an essentially pluralistic 
methodological viewpoint, and one that demands a rigorous debate about methodological 
choices made throughout the research process. 
 
Point of departure: methodological implications of the research question 
As pointed out in chapter 1, the objective of this thesis is twofold. The primary objective is to 
investigate what types of political funding exist and the factors that shape them in two 
electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Here the dependent variable is clearly 
political funding and the context or scope condition is electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. At the same time, the secondary objective of the thesis is to give some 
indication of the implications of political funding in Sub-Saharan African electoral 
authoritarian regimes. This treats political funding as an independent variable that affects the 
context. The duality of the nature of political funding described in chapter 1 is thus reflected 
in my research question, and will therefore also be reflected in my research design and 
methodological choices.  
The goal of this thesis is to make a contribution to the literature on political funding by 
investigating it in a particular setting. Chapter 2 has highlighted the lack of literature on 
political funding in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in electoral authoritarian regimes. 
New research and especially cross-case comparisons that can contribute to theory-building in 
this setting is therefore necessary. Fundamentally, this has to start with a descriptive approach; 
without correct empirical information on types of political funding in my two cases, it is 
impossible to address the bigger issues of what factors affect political funding, and the 
secondary issue of the implications of the phenomenon. Since my empirical findings from 
Uganda and Angola are meant to build on an existing literature as presented in chapter 2, this 
is an important contribution in itself. George and Bennett argue convincingly about the 
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importance of theory and typology building by investigating a particular subtype of a 
phenomenon or by investigating the scope conditions of an established theory or typology 
(George and Bennett 2005: 75-76). This thesis does both and thus contributes to an existing 
scholarly literature, something which is very important in itself (Mahoney 2003: 134). My 
research design therefore has to incorporate the need for accurate and theory-driven detailed 
empirical observations of and data on the dependent variable. 
At the same time, both the question of what factors that shape political funding and the 
implications of this refer to a causal process and a causal mechanism. These type of accounts 
stand out because they “explain salient features of episodes, or significant differences among 
them, by identifying within those episodes robust mechanisms of relatively general scope.” 
(Tilly 2001: 24). The focus is on the process surrounding the variables as much as the 
variables themselves. This is a good way of looking at the research question because 
analyzing the process should identify both the variables affecting political funding, and at the 
same time provide tentative conclusions about the implications of political funding.  
  With this dual purpose in mind, this chapter will identify the research design best 
suited to such a task. The first element that needs to be identified is the type of research 
design the thesis will employ. By examining and discussing literature on descriptive analysis 
as well as causal mechanisms and causal processes, a case study approach using a 
combination of within-case process tracing and cross-case comparison is identified as the best 
research design (3.1). Furthermore, it is important to establish what studying political funding 
in Uganda and Angola can contribute to. Therefore a discussion of case selection and spatial 
scope conditions is necessary (3.2). Finally, this chapter looks at the issue of data (3.3). Data 
on political finance in general and especially political funding is notoriously scarce, especially 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and I therefore argue that data triangulation is of the essence when 
investigating the different cases. Since the thesis aims to describe a process based on accurate 
and detailed empirical observations, I argue that it is necessary to collect primary data through 
fieldwork, and the chapter thus discusses the methodological challenges and implications of 
this. 
 
3.1 Choosing a method: case studies, empirical validity and causal mechanisms 
The discussion above highlighted two elements that should guide the methodological choices 
made: the need for both detailed descriptive analysis and an analysis of causal mechanisms 
and the processes surrounding them. While descriptive analysis is rather straight forward and 
a small but important part of any analysis, causal mechanisms and causal processes are 
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complex and less transparent types of phenomena. The methodological discussion therefore 
has to start by clarifying what is meant by causal mechanisms and causal processes. 
 
Causal mechanisms and the process surrounding them 
Falletti and Lynch (2009: 1143) define causal mechanisms as “portable concepts that explain 
how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome.” 
This echoes Elster’s (1998:45) previous definition of mechanisms as “frequently occurring 
and easily recognizable patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or 
with indeterminate consequences.” While the definitions disagree on the determinacy of the 
outcome, both definitions highlight the fact that causal mechanisms are affected by unknown 
contextual conditions. This fits well with my thesis, where I wish to study a phenomenon 
(political funding) and how the contextual conditions affect and in return are affected by it. 
Defining the scope is very important when dealing with mechanisms (Falletti and Lynch 
2009; Tarrow 2010). Contextual elements will vary from case to case, but it is important to 
find relatively similar types of cases contextually as political funding is a phenomenon that is 
very context-dependent (Butler 2010). Comparing a liberal democracy such as Norway with 
Uganda and Angola would thus be of little use because the contextual variables would differ 
too much. Therefore, defining both the temporal and spatial scope of both the study and its 
findings will be one of the essential elements of this chapter. 
A final note needs to be made on the causal nature of this analysis. While the primary 
research question on the source of political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-
Saharan Africa is causal in the sense that it will look at several potential causes for the types 
of political funding, the secondary question about the implication of this is not a causal study. 
Rather, it provides tentative conclusions on the implication of the mechanism of political 
funding in the types of regimes in questions. Neither part of the research question aims to 
measure the causal effects, but rather to identify causal mechanisms. I am not measuring the 
degree to which the state’s presence in the economy affects political funding. Instead I try to 
map out if and how these two variables are linked and interact with other variables, and the 
consequence of this. These are two very different tasks, but both are equally important in 
order to establish causal arguments (Gerring 2007: 44). The tentative conclusions provided in 
this thesis should not be seen as complete answers, but rather as a “building block” (George 
and Bennett 2005: 76) in the literature on political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes. 
After all, research does not look for the complete answer, rather the answer to the research 
question at hand (McKeown 2004: 156). Even though mechanisms have been called “bits of 
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sometimes true theory” (Coleman 1964: 516-519; Stenchcombe 1998: 267), they are 
nevertheless a real advance in knowledge because they provide us with an important part of 
the causal process (Rueschemeyer 2003: 329). 
 
How to achieve precise description of causal mechanisms 
What method is best for solving this “dual” question? When researching something as 
“numerical” as political funding and the consequences of political funding, one would perhaps 
expect a quantitative approach. However, a consequence of the highly secretive nature of 
political funding is that there are few budgets and audited accounts available for the public or 
even researchers. This lack of data makes quantitative analysis hard both because of scarcity 
and possible reliability issues. In situations where you do not have sufficient data that are 
reliable without triangulation, even fundamentally quantitatively-oriented researchers argue 
that qualitative studies of a few cases are better (Lijphart 1971; King et al. 1994). 
Furthermore, many scholars argue that qualitative analysis of a few cases17
                                                 
17 Often called “small-n qualitative analysis”.  
 is 
especially suited to both  identify descriptive patterns and analyze mechanisms even when 
you have the data available for quantitative analysis (Munck 2004: 112; George and Bennett 
2005: 220; Lieberman 2005: 444; Gerring 2007: 5; Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1161; Tarrow 
2010: 239).  As pointed out above, both identifying mechanisms and investigating how they 
work is a complex undertaking involving multiple contextual elements. In a way, mechanisms 
contain “finer grain” than variables. Therefore, when searching for mechanisms you are 
looking for details of a causal story (Elster 1998: 49). In terms of the phenomenon I am 
investigating, this means that I have to investigate political funding in a broad sense without 
losing the detailed knowledge necessary. In Angola for example, a failed coup in 1977 seems 
to be just as important for the elitist nature of the MPLA as more recent events. A good way of 
finding these details is to use process tracing. Process tracing is a way to analyze a changing 
process within a case (Tarrow 2004: 174); it seeks to identify the causal chain and causal 
mechanism between the independent and dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005: 206). 
It is often used to both build and test theories, depending on the available research on the 
topic (George and Bennett 2005: 209; Rueschemeyer 2003: 318). In this sense, it is an ideal 
method for this thesis precisely because it allows you to generate more theory on the basis of 
a few cases.  It is furthermore a good tool for investigating situations where you suspect 
reciprocal causation (Munck 2004: 108), which makes it ideal to investigate my “dual” 
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research question. Finally, process tracing helps improve internal validity by going through 
the within-case process in a rigorous way using multiple data sources (Gerring 2007: 173). 
Thus it is a well-suited method for investigating each individual case through intensive study. 
This is important for me because I am investigating the phenomenon in a setting where there 
has been little previous research, and process tracing can help identify the detailed empirical 
description that is necessary to identify both variables and mechanisms.  
Process tracing can also help highlight and establish the temporal dimension and scope 
condition of my research question. As highlighted in chapter 2, incumbent parties in electoral 
authoritarian regimes have often been in power for a significant period of time. Furthermore, 
because of the difference between funding patterns during campaigns and outside campaigns, 
any analysis of political funding should include an entire election cycle when doing within-
case analysis (Nassmacher 2001: 22). Thus, any mechanisms of control will most likely have 
a temporal dimension. Pierson (2003) argues convincingly about the effect of slow-moving 
macro-processes, and shows why qualitative studies using one or two cases are a useful tool 
for identifying these effects. Specifying the temporal scope of investigation is therefore 
essential when dealing with mechanisms (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1153).  Domination is a 
phenomenon that often is linked to historical variables (Rueschemeyer 2003: 311). In Uganda 
for example, President Museveni uses the spectre of Amin as a threat in order to preserve his 
domination (Helle et al. 2011). I therefore investigate relevant phenomena and independent 
variables that go back to the ascendance to power of the incumbent party in each case-study. 
However, while the causes might go back in time, this thesis limits the temporal scope of the 
dependent variable political funding to the current electoral cycle of each case, simply 
because this is the time period which it is possible to produce most reliable data on. 
Thus, within-case studies using process tracing on the cases of Uganda and Angola 
should be able to provide both the necessary empirical richness and a description of the causal 
process and mechanisms surrounding the phenomenon of political funding. This should also 
help identify the spatial dimension of the phenomenon. However, in order to better understand 
temporal variation within the universe of electoral authoritarian regimes, comparing across 
cases might increase the validity of both the answers to both the primary and especially the 
secondary element of the research question. 
 
Comparing across contexts 
Process tracing also works well as a part of a larger research design and is often used as a tool 
by methodological pluralists in connection with other research methods ( Mahoney 2003: 
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364-365; George and Bennett 2005: 208; Tarrow 2010: 253), and this is something which I 
plan to take advantage of. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) emphasize that comparing 
with a small number of similar and relevant cases can contribute greatly to the value of any 
causal analysis because it increases the dialogue between theory and empirical reality in a 
unique way, creating what Locke and Thelen (1995) call “contextualized comparisons”. 
Gerring (2007: 12) argues that case studies and cross-case comparison works well in one 
research design because they complement each other.   
While I plan to use process tracing to analyze the interplay between variables, 
mechanisms and context within each case, there are reasons for looking for variance across 
cases as well. First and foremost, the findings of the individual case studies will be tested 
when compared across cases (George and Bennett 2005: 220). The similarities and differences 
between political funding in Uganda and Angola can be analyzed, and this strengthens the 
validity of the final conclusions, and can be used to create typologies of political funding 
based on the similarities or even differences between the cases (George and Bennett 2005: 
215). While the individual case studies ensure internal validity and causal homogeneity within 
each study, this does not hold across cases. An example from this thesis serves to illustrate 
this: the electoral system in Uganda and Angola are different and seem to have diverging 
effects on political funding. Since my goal is theory building on political funding in electoral 
authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is necessary to take into account possible 
causal heterogeneity in the mechanisms as well, and this is best investigated by using a cross-
case analysis (Gerring 2007: 20). Munck (2004: 111) says that “an alternative approach to 
assessing causal homogeneity is to identify multiple domains, within each of which the 
analyst finds causal homogeneity and between which there is causal heterogeneity.” He goes 
on to say that these differences can be used for typologies. Furthermore, only by going 
beyond a single-case study can you investigate factors that are held constant within that case 
(Rueschemeyer 2003: 320). Thus, the spatial scope condition of my research question calls for 
cross-case comparison. 
It is important to remember that there is a fine line between multiple case studies and a 
study that is cross-case. In fact, George and Bennett (2005) argue that there is little difference 
between the two as long as the number of cases is relatively small. Nevertheless it is normal 
to say that a study turns into a cross-case study when the focus of the study shifts from the 
individual case to a sample of cases (Gerring 2007: 20). In this thesis, the focus is mainly on 
the case studies; the cross-case comparison is used to compare the findings of the within-case 
analyses. The advantages of cross-case comparisons are highlighted by Tarrow (2010: 243-
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44); he argues that analysing two cases allows the researcher to maintain the advantages of 
case studies described above, and at the same time permit “dual-process tracing”, which 
reduces the possibility of wrongful generalizations. My research question calls for cross-case 
comparison because of the importance of the context when researching mechanisms (Falleti 
and Lynch 2009: 1147). Previous studies of mechanisms have combined within-case analysis 
and cross-case comparisons with success.18
So what is the output of this thesis going to be? The long answer has been provided 
above. The short answer is a tentative theoretical typology based on the case studies and their 
empirical description of political funding and the causal description of the processes and 
mechanisms linked with this phenomenon. Through both within-case and cross-case analysis, 
this will be used to modify the typology presented in chapter 2, so that it can provide tentative 
conclusions about the types and causes of political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as who they seem to benefit and the implications of this.  
 
 The methods that seem to suit my research question best is to use a within-case 
analysis of different cases using process tracing in order to identify the empirical reality as 
well as the processes and mechanisms at play. This is combined with a cross-case comparison 
of two cases in order to test the findings of the case studies and investigate how different 
contexts affect the mechanisms. However, it is important to point out there are also possible 
pitfalls connected to using cross-case comparison on a few cases. Most of these are tied to 
case selection and insufficient degrees of freedom (Rueschemeyer 2003: 323; Tarrow 2010: 
246-48), and can be solved by having sensible scope conditions and the related issue of 
thoroughly debating your choice of cases.  The temporal and variable-oriented scope 
conditions have already been established. I will now turn to the issue of choosing the cases of 
study to establish the spatial scope conditions of this thesis. 
 
3.2 Case choice: External validity, spatial scope conditions and other considerations 
How many and what type of cases does one need? A goal for research should be to maximize 
the number of observations you make that are relevant for your research question (King et al. 
1994: 213). But it is important to emphasize that maximizing observations does not 
necessarily mean increasing the number of cases. A case-study or other research designs with 
few qualitative cases can work just as well as a study of a large number of cases (King et al. 
2004: 191). When selecting cases, you need to take into account both the research question, 
                                                 
18 See for example Gibson (2005)  
39 
 
the theoretical background and previous research to identify both the spatial scope conditions 
of the thesis, and to decide how many and which cases that are fruitful to study (Mahoney 
2003: 136; Rueschemeyer 2003: 323; George and Bennett 2005: 20; Tarrow 2010: 251-52). 
The section below will try to highlight these considerations. 
First it is important to discuss some methodological issues related to case selection 
when studying only a few cases. How you identify and choose your cases has an important 
bearing on the results of your research. More specifically it has a large impact on the external 
validity of your findings. External validity refers to the representativeness between the sample 
of cases you study and the population of cases that you wish to generalize to (Collier and 
Mahoney 1996; Gerring 2007: 43). King, Keohane and Verba (1994) name lack of external 
validity because of selection bias as one of the major problems of qualitative research 
involving few cases. How can you ensure external validity and avoid selection bias? First of 
all, the danger of selection bias decreases the smaller the universe of cases which you are 
trying to generalize to (Gerring 2007: 49). This is linked to the issue of scope conditions. The 
fact that my research question severely limits the scope of my investigation by specifying that 
it is only looking at political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
thus increases the likelihood of my findings being externally valid. Investigating two cases 
instead of one also increases external validity (Tarrow 2010). The spatial scope conditions 
will be discussed further in the following pargagraphs. Even before considering this though, it 
is necessary to be aware of another challenge when selecting cases: that of focusing on 
extreme cases of the dependent variable (Collier and Mahoney 1996). This might be a 
problem, since part of the objective of this thesis is to identify the composition of the 
dependent variable. Since I select the cases before I study them, it is therefore difficult to 
know if they are indeed extreme cases. This is however, a problem that all exploratory studies 
encounter. Furthermore, while this is an exploratory thesis it builds on previous literature and 
this makes it possible to say something about the extremeness of the cases in relation to the 
larger context (Collier and Mahoney 1996), which could be considered a finding in itself. 
As stated above, my research question defines the most important spatial scope 
conditions: this thesis will investigate political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Because the primary research question identifies political funding as the 
dependent variable, this part of the question avoids a common critique of qualitative studies of 
a few cases: selection on the dependent variable. According to this critique when you study 
countries with the same value on the dependent variable, you are only studying what your 
chosen cases have in common (Geddes 1990). Therefore, you should select a negative case 
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where the phenomenon you want to investigate could have happened, but it did not (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2004). All countries have some form of political funding, and there is every reason 
to believe that there will be variation between countries. In addition this is a strictly theory 
and model building analysis of political funding, for which Lieberman (2005: 447) argues that 
unit selection on the dependent variable is actually necessary. 
While both Uganda and Angola certainly are Sub-Saharan African countries, defining 
them as electoral authoritarian regimes deserves more attention. Therefore, the first question I 
need to answer is if Uganda and Angola are electoral authoritarian regimes. As stated in 
chapter 1, I view electoral authoritarianism as a type of hybrid regime. Both Uganda and 
Angola have typically not been identified as hybrid regimes in cross-case comparisons or 
large-n analysis due to the relatively few multiparty elections they have held for the past 20 
years.19
Brownlee (2009) proposes a different approach, where he uses the World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) to construct dummy variables for the presence of 
limited multiparty elections and the competitiveness of these elections. These data measure 
legislative and electoral competitiveness, something which is the central focus of Schedler’s 
(2002a; b) definition of electoral authoritarianism compared to flat-out authoritarianism. The 
DPI scores range from 1= no legislature to 7= largest party got less than 75% of the vote. 
Brownlee (2009) defines countries that are scored 1-4 the year after their last election as full-
fledged authoritarian regimes, while countries scored 5-7 are defined as electoral authoritarian 
regimes. The threshold is based on the fact that if countries hold multiparty elections they are 
scored 5 or above. Furthermore, Brownlee says that only countries that scored a 7 (largest 
party got under 75% of the votes) can be considered as competitive authoritarian, while 
countries scored 5-6 (multiparty competition but largest party won more than 75% of the 
vote) are hegemonic authoritarian, thus reflecting the distinction made by both Sartori (2005), 
 Many works have been written that discuss how to identify both hybrid and electoral 
authoritarian regimes. The straight-forward method is to use either the Freedom House or 
Polity IV ratings, and identify the “middle-tier” as hybrid regimes, such as done by Diamond 
(2002) and Morlino (2009). This works as a way of separating democracies from the rest. But 
where do you cross the line between electoral authoritarianism and flat-out authoritarianism? 
Using Freedom House and Polity IV to identify this line has been criticized, because the 
measures are too rigid and do not capture the complexity, range and variation of these regimes 
(Wigell 2008; Ekman 2009; Brownlee 2009).  
                                                 
19 An exception is Morlino (2009), who identifies Uganda as a hybrid regime 
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Diamond (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2002). The countries are scored both for legislative 
and executive elections, and according to Brownlee (2009), it is enough that one of the scores 
reflect competitiveness for them to be consider electoral authoritarian. The year following the 
last election, Uganda (2007)20 was scored 6 for legislative elections and 7 for the executive 
elections and Angola (2009) 6 for legislative and 2 for the executive elections.21 Neither 
country was considered to be democratic that year by either Freedom House or Polity IV. 
Thus both countries can be labeled electoral authoritarian regimes, but while Uganda can be 
considered a competitive authoritarian regime, Angola is more at home in the hegemonic 
authoritarian category. This seems to reflect the conclusions of recent case studies of both 
Angola (Orre 2010a; Schubert 2010) and Uganda (Makara 2010) carried out after the last 
elections which all focus on the importance of elections but at the same time how the 
incumbents manipulate the electoral playing field. While the criteria identified here would 
also apply to several other Sub-Saharan countries,22
There are additional reasons for choosing Uganda and Angola. As pointed out above, 
case selection should be theory driven. Chapter 2 identified some variables that could have an 
effect on political funding. For example, the dual nature of political funding makes countries 
where the incumbent has controlled the transition to multiparty politics especially interesting. 
This has been the case in both Uganda and Angola. At the same time, the time dimension is 
different between the cases. Uganda’s civil war ended in 1986, while the Angolan civil war 
ended in 2002. Therefore, the effects of the civil war and the post-conflict aspect of politics 
should be much more visible in Angola. There are other differences as well. The economy of 
Angola is primarily driven by oil-revenues (Hodges 2004; 2007), while Uganda’s economy is 
much more dependent on agriculture.
 investigating only two cases is necessary 
in order to preserve the empirical richness that is needed (Tarrow 2010). This also allows me 
to include both a hegemonic and a competitive electoral authoritarian case. 
23 The state is thus considered to be much more 
important in the Angolan economy than in Uganda.24
                                                 
20 The DPI only runs until 2010. If one applied the criteria to include the 2011 election however, Uganda would 
be scored 7 and 7 on both elections, as the NRM won 71% of the legislative seats and President Museveni won 
68% of the votes in the executive election 
  The amount of Official Development 
Aid as percentage of Gross National Income has averaged at 0.5% in Angola over the last four 
21 Executive elections in Angola have not been held since 1992, but with the recent switch to a parliamentary 
system the executive score should reflect that of the legislative, as it does in other parliamentary systems 
22 Angola, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the 
Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda all 
fit this definition of electoral authoritarian regimes. 
23 Data from World Bank Development Indicators, 2006-2010. Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
24 Data from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, section 8.3.1 on nominal gross domestic product by type of 
expenditure by kind of economic activity of countries and geographical groupings. 
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years, while through the same period it has averaged at 13,5% in Uganda.25
Practical reasons have also had some impact on my choice of cases. As identified in 
the introduction, these countries have quite recently held elections where political funding has 
played a big role. At the same time they have previously not been seen as electoral 
authoritarian regimes because of their relatively recent transitions to multiparty politics. 
Therefore, I specifically want to target these cases in order to generate new knowledge. 
Finally, because researching cases where there is little scholarly literature is very demanding, 
I wanted to make sure I chose cases where I could receive help and advice from experts at my 
associated institutions.
 This indicates that 
the economies of the two cases are different, and this indicates variation within the range of 
electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. As pointed out in chapter 2, the two 
countries have different electoral systems, another variable that could have an effect on 
political funding. This is a good mix of similarities and differences between the two cases. 
26
 
 Both Angola and Uganda have been widely studied by researchers at 
these institutions, something which made it practically possible for me to collect data through 
fieldwork. I now turn to this process and highlight some of the challenges encountered there.  
3.3 Data: Challenges related to triangulation and fieldwork 
As highlighted in chapter 1, there is not much data available on the issue of political funding, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Van Biezen and Kopecky (2001: 416; 2007) argue that 
finding numbers and other data on sources that have incentives to hide the truth is a very 
challenging task. Following this, finding data on any form of illegal funding is very difficult, 
especially in a comparative setting (Hopkin 2004: 628; Van Biezen and Kopecky 2007: 240; 
247). Any situation that deals with actors and mechanisms such as power are very difficult to 
identify using only a single data source (Gerring 2007: 173; Falleti and Lynch 2009). It is 
therefore difficult to answer my research question based on purely secondary sources. 
Following this, I argue that traveling to the countries and conducting fieldwork there was 
essential for answering my research question. However, I start off the debate on the data by 
highlighting two methodological concerns that have guided my data collection. 
 
Two methodological concerns about data: measurement validity and reliability 
The issue of measurement validity and the reliability of the data are extremely important 
when discussing data quality. If the quality of the data suffers on either of the two dimensions, 
                                                 
25 Data from World Bank Development Indicators, 2006-2010. 
26 Institute of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen, and Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen 
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the results you obtain from analyzing them will be questionable at best. Measurement validity 
is the extent to which a researcher manages to operationalize and score his observations in a 
way that reflects the concept that the researcher wants to measure (Adcock and Collier 2001: 
529). If your measurements are not accurate, you risk measuring something completely 
different from what you want to. Reliability on the other hand, refers to the degree of 
consistency between the coding of units into the same categories executed by different 
scientists or by the same scientist at different times (Hammersley 1992: 67). In other words; if 
you replicate the research and get the same results, your data are reliable. 
I argue that my research design is ideally suited to handle both of these important 
issues, even when considering the above-mentioned data situation. Measurement validity can 
be secured through my choice of methods. Using case studies as the basis for my analysis 
minimizes the risk for measurement error, because it can assess variables on many dimensions 
(George and Bennett 2005: 220), as well as making concept misformation less likely because 
it starts at a lower level of abstraction (Sartori 1970). Collier (1998:3-4) argues that using 
cross-case “contextualized comparisons”, also help prevent concept misformation and 
conceptual stretching by exposing the data to “rigorous” comparison. 
The methods I use also ensure that I can improve validity and reliability by using data 
triangulation, which means using multiple sources of information to investigate a 
phenomenon within a case. Gerring says that “the hallmark of process tracing, in my view, is 
that multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference – bits 
and pieces of evidence that embody different units of analysis” (Gerring 2007: 173). By doing 
this, you also ensure that you try to generate as large a number of observations within each 
case as possible (King, Keohane and Verba 2004: 191). Triangulation also allows you to 
contrast and compare the answers you get from some sources of data with other sources, thus 
creating a chance to control the reliability of the data. This is especially important when you 
are dealing with data from semi- or unstructured interviews (Aberbach and Rockman 2002) 
and participant observation (Glaser 1996). 
 
Finding and triangulating data on political funding in Uganda and Angola 
With the previous methodological concerns in mind, I now turn to what data I will use in my 
thesis. As stated above, collecting data on sensitive issues such as funding of political 
organizations and individuals is difficult. It is especially hard in political systems where you 
either have (1) no public system of controlling the financing of political parties, (2) the 
control is internal to the system and not publicized, or (3) low or selective enforcement of the 
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control regime. Without such control regimes it is hard to obtain items such as the audited 
accounts and budgets of political parties. Angola and Uganda both have controls and reporting 
mechanisms when it comes to political financing, but the political system in Angola does not 
publicize the findings of its control-mechanism, and implementation is very selective.27 The 
problem of selective implementation is also present in the control system in Uganda.28
 
 
Therefore, while it is possible to find official data on the funding of political parties in both 
cases, the reliability is likely to be low. This thesis also investigates how the context is 
affecting political funding. Thus, I need data that can highlight a broad range of contextual 
factors; triangulation is not just necessary for methodological reasons, but also for empirical 
ones. 
Figure 3.1: Data categories by mode and source of collection. 
 
 
What types of data sources can I triangulate in order to increase validity, reliability and 
the number of observations? There are several possible sources, both in terms of primary and 
secondary data. Figure 3.1 above shows the different types of sources used in my thesis.  
Instead of the normal separation between primary and secondary data, I have divided them 
into three categories based on the mode and source of collection. In my thesis, I use data from 
all of these categories. In terms of the first data category, “published material”, the available 
data varied significantly from case to case. Since, as debated above, the amount of audited 
accounts and commissioned reports on the topic are both low in number and often unreliable, 
                                                 
27 Interview with Nelson Pestana, Political Scientist at the CEIC. Bergen 25th February 2010 
28 Interview with Frederick Gooloba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, Kampala 9th of December 2010. 
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collecting data from other sources is imperative. I have, however, managed to collect audited 
accounts and commissioned reports on the funding of political parties from Uganda.29 In 
Angola this was not possible due to their non-publication rule when it came to the audited 
accounts of the political parties. However, relevant laws and regulations were available in all 
cases.30
Therefore one has to turn to the second and third category of data presented in figure 
3.2; “assessments” and “observations”, to find data on political funding in Uganda and 
Angola. Most of the data types in these categories are data that have to be acquired through 
fieldwork. I have therefore conducted fieldwork in both Angola and Uganda.
 In terms of previously published academic articles on the topic, there are also 
relatively few available. Political funding in Uganda has not attracted as much research, 
primarily because parties were not allowed between 1986 and 2005. However, recently there 
has been an increased focus on the importance of money and resources in Ugandan politics, 
and following this also an increase in scholarly literature. Finally, research on Angolan 
politics has for a long time been linked to the legacy of the civil war. The Portuguese 
language also seems to be a deterring factor for many researchers (Orre 2010: 84). 
31
 
 This has 
enabled me to collect both more secondary sources in the “published material category”, and 
primary data in terms of observations and assessments. In terms of observations, this is 
beneficial because it allows you to study behavior, something that is very useful when 
studying processes and mechanisms (Glaser 1996: 533). An example of this is that during my 
time in Luanda, Angola, I was able to observe the strict hierarchy of the liberation parties, and 
the effect this had on transparency and flow of information. The fieldwork also enabled me to 
collect more newspaper- and feature articles about relevant political events. Furthermore, it 
enabled data collection from multiple sources with sometimes conflicting perspectives which 
is an important component of triangulation (Goldstein 2002: 669). Most importantly for me is 
that it enabled me to do interviews with actors in the process or observers with special 
knowledge: the often named experts. These expert interviews are my main source of primary 
data, and the process surrounding their collection therefore has to be described thoroughly. 
                                                 
29 The reliability of the audited accounts of the political parties in Uganda is low, as parties have admitted to 
purposefully not reporting all information in their accounts. Furthermore, accounts from all parties have not been 
submitted. The ruling NRM-party is among the parties who have not submitted their accounts for auditing. 
30 The relevant law governing party finance in Angola was of course in Portuguese, but I managed to acquire an 
English version. 
31 The fieldwork in Uganda was carried out in between the 6th and 21st of December 2010. The fieldwork in 
Angola was carried out between the 13th of January and the 1st of February 2011 
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Collecting data through expert interviews 
When you collect data through expert interviews there are numerous steps that you go have to 
go through, and expert interviews have to be tailored to serve the purpose of the study 
(Peabody et.al. 1990; Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Goldstein 2002). First you have to decide 
who the experts are in your case. Experts are people who posses especially relevant 
knowledge for the research question, and often the fact that they have this knowledge has 
practical consequences for the empirical reality connected to the question (Bogner and Mentz 
2009: 50; Meuser and Nagel 2009: 21). In my case experts are people who have knowledge 
about the funding of political parties and political candidates and the process surrounding this 
phenomenon. Therefore, I wanted to interview representatives of political parties in Uganda 
and Angola. More specifically I wanted to interview the General Secretaries and Party 
Treasurers of the biggest parties in both Angola and Uganda. Because of the need for 
contextual knowledge, I also wanted to interview local experts with knowledge about the 
political game and political funding, such as academics and people in the media. Experts can 
provide you with three types of knowledge; technical-, process- and interpretative knowledge 
(Meuser and Nagel 2009: 53). I have collected all types; technical knowledge to provide data 
on funding, and process- and interpretative knowledge in order to better understand the 
processes and mechanisms surrounding political funding in each individual case. 
   Another choice you make is how structured your interviews should be; unstructured, 
semi-structured or structured. These have different advantages. Unstructured interviews leave 
more room for flexibility when conducting the interviews, whilst the structured interviews 
create data that are easier to compare across cases (Peabody et.al. 1990: 452). Since I needed 
to obtain data that are at least possible to compare across interviews and also across cases, I 
needed some form of structure. However, flexibility was also important to me. First of all, the 
interviews I conducted were often ad-hoc, and I therefore had to adapt the questions to the 
setting. When doing expert interviews you need to be able to adjust the interview to the time 
and situation at hand (Glaser 1996: 534). Less structured interviews also allows you to ask 
more open-ended questions, something which is preferable when interviewing experts; they 
tend to give away more information when they simply talk (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 
674; Meuser and Nagel 2009: 31). The interviews I conducted which generated the most 
information were the ones in which the interview object simply talked and I “guided” him 
using probes and small questions. Most importantly for my research though, semi-structured 
interviews allows you to “get beneath the surfaces of a response to the reasoning and premises 
that underlie it” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). So even though this makes coding and 
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comparing more difficult because standardizing the data becomes difficult (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002), it is necessary when dealing with mechanisms.    
A semi-structured interview is conducted using an interview guide where the 
researcher creates topical groupings of questions which he would like to ask the interview 
object (Peabody et.al 1993: 452). I created four interview guides for my fieldwork, because I 
wanted to tailor each interview guide to each type of interview object. These were politicians, 
organizational representatives of political parties, academics and media.32 All of the interview 
guides contained elements of the three types of interviews presented by Bogner and Mentz 
(2009: 46-48); but while the politicians and representatives of political parties were asked 
explorative questions, the other groups were mainly asked systematizing and theory-
generating questions. I first created three main topics that I was interested in: general 
questions on the situation of political parties, specific questions on the finances of political 
parties, and more general questions on how political funding is perceived. Under each topic I 
had five to ten different questions, which I used as a guide when conducting the interviews. 
The questions were selectively used, but all topics were touched upon in each interview. This 
is the basis for comparability between interviews (Meuser and Nagel 2009: 35). When 
creating an interview guide, it is important to get feedback on it from other scholars with 
experience from the field, as well as running pilot interviews (Peabody et al. 1990: 452). After 
both presenting my interview guides to scholars with extensive knowledge from fieldwork in 
Uganda and Angola and conducting pilot interviews with my fellow master-students, I revised 
my interview guide multiple times.33
When in the field, the first challenge you face is getting access to the interview objects 
that you want. This is important not just because of data generation, but also sampling and 
comparability (Goldstein 2002: 669). You face multiple obstacles on the way; the first one 
being finding out who occupies the positions you are interested in (Goldstein 2002: 670). I 
found this quite easy, as most of the relevant information was either given to me on the web 
pages of the relevant parties, or through other key informants. Accessing them was more 
 I did add questions while in the field, however, 
especially as I chose not to ask only neutral questions, as advised by Peabody et al. (1990). I 
found information that I felt was important to confront the other interview objects with in 
order to get several different viewpoints, and because I tried to make the interview as natural 
as possible. 
                                                 
32 I realized early in the fieldwork that the organizational representatives of the political parties in Angola and 
Uganda were almost always also politicians, so once in the field I merged the two interview guides. 
33 The final interview guides used can be seen in appendix 1 
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difficult. In Uganda I got telephone numbers from key individuals, and called them and set up 
appointments myself. All representatives of the opposition parties welcomed me; in the ruling 
NRM-party they did not answer me however. I was still able to access other high-ranking 
officials in the ruling party however, making the loss of data and comparability minimal.34 In 
Angola, I faced the general problem of language. I do not speak Portuguese, and only about 
half of my interview objects spoke English. Language difficulty is a big problem when doing 
semi-structured interviews (Barriball and While 1994: 330). I therefore had to use an 
interpreter, which can create problems in terms of validity and reliability (Bujra 2006). I was 
lucky enough to enlist an interpreter who had conducted similar interviews before, and he 
immediately understood the objective of my study. He only asked questions from the 
interview guide, or selected prods agreed upon in advance if this was appropriate. As an added 
advantage, he had many contacts in the political parties which he could contact to arrange 
interviews. I was therefore able to interview high-level officials in all of the targeted parties in 
Angola but one.35
In terms of the actual execution of the interviews, it is important to be aware of the 
importance of the interviewer (Peabody et al. 1990; Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Meuser 
and Nagel 2009). I tried to be an enlightened conversation partner, and used techniques from 
all four ideal interviewer types presented by Bogner and Menz (2009: 58-68), but I primarily 
tried to be friendly and not to be seen as a threat. My status as a master student and assistant 
researcher helped me in this; I generally believe that my access to the field and to the data was 
 Although I did not manage to talk to the General Secretaries or Treasurers 
of most of the parties, the people I did reach were sufficiently involved in the financial side of 
the party to have expert knowledge about it. In terms of academics and people in the media, I 
targeted a few key interview objects when I came to Angola and Uganda, and after these I 
“snowballed” further interview objects. This worked very well; academics and people in the 
media are generally friendlier as they use interviews themselves in their work. After receiving 
access, I gave them a letter of introduction that introduces me and my project. This was very 
important for my access in Angola, while it was not as important in Uganda. The fact that the 
letters of introduction highlighted my interest in political funding could have led to the 
interview objects overstating the importance of political funding. However, this is a general 
problem when conducting interviews, and a normal practice within the field (Peabody et al. 
1990). 
                                                 
34 For a full list of interview objects see appendix 2 
35 The party Nuevo Democracia only has one representative in the Angolan Parliament and is considered to be a 
party that is very close to the ruling MPLA. 
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improved by my “innocent” and non-threatening posture. I chose to tape the interviews when 
conducting them, in order to improve the flow of the conversation and also improve the 
reliability of the data.36
After collecting the data, I transcribed the interviews and coded them using the 
qualitative coding software nVIVO. I coded the data by first using the topics and questions 
from the interview guide. I also coded them using the different coding items presented by 
Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 675), which categorizes data by how directly they are relevant 
to each question or topic. Manifest coding items address questions and topics directly, latent 
coding items are more indirect answers to questions that did not necessarily ask for that 
information directly, while global coding items are more general traits or perceptions of the 
interview.
 While some argue that this could lead to interview objects becoming 
more guarded and that it thus can prevent you from obtaining the necessary data (Peabody 
et.al 1990: 454; Orre 2010: 85), I did not perceive this as a problem. I informed each 
interview object that they could choose if they wanted the interview taped or not, and all 
interviewees were happy being taped. The recorder only interfered when other people or 
occurrences interrupted the interview process; I chose to stop the recording when such 
interferences happened, out of privacy concerns.   
37
  Some final remarks need to be made about some interaction effects encountered 
collecting the primary data. These are general problems which are not problematic in terms of 
the quality of the data if you are aware of them while collecting and coding (Abels and 
Behrens 2009: 144). I notably encountered the problem of the “catharsis effect” (Abels and 
Behrens 2009: 146); sometimes it was unclear whether the interview object voiced his 
personal opinion or that of his parent party, organization or institution. It is very important this 
is clear so that you do not take a personal opinion for something other than that (Meuser and 
Nagel 2002: 34). When you are aware of such interaction effects, you can reduce or eliminate 
them both during the interview by using prods or during the coding process by using the 
coding categories above; personal opinions will more often be coded as latent or global rather 
than manifest. This highlights the importance of triangulating interview data (Abels and 
Behrens: 151). Therefore, the multiple data sources presented in figure 6.2 above are, though 
differing in size, equally important when I now turn to a rigorous empirical analysis of 
political funding in Uganda and Angola. 
 After this, I used the coded data to compare across interviews and across cases. 
 
                                                 
36 Both copies of the audio files and transcription of the recordings can be obtained by contacting the author. 
37 More detailed coding guides can be obtained from author on request. 
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“Funds and fear.” 
Wafula Oguttu, Chief Spokesperson of the FDC, stating the main challenges for political parties in 
the 2011 election in Uganda. 38
 
 
Chapter 4 – Political funding in Uganda  
In February 2011 President Yoweri K. Museveni of the ruling National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) party39 won a landslide in the second consecutive multiparty presidential election in 
Uganda.40
Monitoring reports after the elections have named the uneven playing field among 
political parties and candidates in terms of finances and resources as one of the most 
important flaws of the election (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011: 19; EUEOM 2011: 24-25). 
This corresponds well with the image given by of the General Secretaries and Party 
Treasurers of the three main opposition parties. When asked “What are the main challenges 
for political parties in Uganda?” five out of six of them mentioned the issue of resources and 
funding specifically, and in addition the Party Treasurer of the Uganda Peoples Congress 
(UPC), though not questioned directly on this, expressed grave concerns about the finances of 
his party.
  Museveni, labeled “the favorite autocrat of the aid-community” by a Norwegian 
newspaper (Sætre 2011), can therefore celebrate his twenty-fifth year in power later this year. 
The ruling NRM party also increased the number of representatives in the parliament, to some 
extent due to defeating the opposition in some constituencies, but primarily because of an 
increase in the number of constituencies and victories in these. Thus the elections 
consolidated the NRM-party’s position as a dominant party in an electoral authoritarian 
regime. The opposition has labeled the election as “full of flaws” and “fraudulent”, and the 
leaders of the three largest opposition parties have all rejected the election results (Besigye et 
al. 2011).  
41
                                                 
38 Interview, Kampala, 14th of December 2010. 
 The issue of resources was what most Ugandans seemed to think was most uneven 
and unfair in the campaigns, as a poll conducted by Afrobarometer in January 2011 showed 
(Afrobarometer 2011: 18). Rakner and van de Walle (2009: 216) name access to state 
resources as a huge incumbency advantage. In this chapter, I argue that the NRM-party and 
39 In this paper I refer to the National Resistance Movement political party as “the NRM-party”. In previous 
literature this has previously been named the NRM Organisation (NRM-O), while the previous system of 
governance has been called the National Resistance Movement (NRM). I simply refer to the previous system as 
the “Movement-system”. 
40 See Helle et al. (2011) for full election results 
41 Interviews with Jack Sabiiti (PT of FDC), Alice Alaso (GS of FDC), Wafula Oguttu (PS of FDC), Issa 
Kikungwe (PT of DP), Mathias Nsubuga (GS of DP) and John Bossa (GS of UPC). Party Treasurer of UPC 
Peter Walubiri was not asked the question directly because of time shortage. All interviews carried out in 
Kampala between 10th and 21st of December 2010.  
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President Museveni has created a system that is ideally suited to the type of fundraising that 
the NRM-party is specialized for; ad-hoc, person focused fundraising linked to access to the 
state. Furthermore, I argue that because of this, funding has become one of the crucial factors 
for understanding the continued dominance of the NRM-party in the Ugandan political 
system. Finally, the system has created several obstacles in terms of fundraising for the 
opposition, notably restrictions on foreign funding and a private sector that is scared of 
donating to the opposition parties because of a fear of government retributions.  
Following this, this chapter will map out the situation in terms of funding for the four 
largest and most significant parties in Uganda (6.1). The chapter then goes through historical 
factors that seem to have affected the issue of political funding for political parties in Uganda 
(6.2), before it turns to the structural factors that affect funding, with a particular focus on 
formal laws and institutions as well as the economy (6.3). Finally, a summary looking at how 
the system that has been created is favorable to the type of fundraising that the NRM is best 
suited for is presented, before the chapter briefly looks at the implications of this for the 
political regime in Uganda (6.4) 
 
 4.1 The current funding situation for the four largest political parties in Uganda 
As shown in chapter 2, funding is an extremely important part of Sub-Saharan African 
politics, mainly because of the importance of clientilist networks and the simple fact that 
running a political party and carrying out an election campaign in developing countries is very 
expensive. In Uganda, vote buying is expected and does occur with alarming frequency, and 
money has become an essential part of election campaigns (Afrobarometer 2011; 
DEMGROUP 2011). Opposition parties struggle with this, because they do not have the same 
possibilities to supply material and monetary hand-outs as the NRM-party.42
 
 One would 
therefore also think that raising money is of the utmost importance for political parties. In this 
section I will therefore briefly go through the financial state of the four largest parties in 
Uganda; the NRM-party, FDC, DP and UPC.  
The NRM-party 
While the NRM-party is “financially sound”, according to Chief Spokesperson Ofwono 
Opondo,43
                                                 
42 Interview with John Bossa, General Secretary of UPC, Kampala 14th of December 2010 
 the party has no budget and a very weak financial structure (Mufumba 2010). The 
NRM-party does not collect membership dues or sell party cards – they hand them out for 
43 Interview in Kampala, 17th of December 2010. 
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free.44 This way the party has no stable way of securing funding from members on a regular 
basis. However, while the party has previously had problems paying salaries and rent when 
the party is not in campaign mode45, they are very good at “ad hoc” fundraising in front of 
election campaigns.46 When the party needs money it is able to call upon a large number of 
private individuals and businesses, both within and outside the party, to contribute to the 
party. All NRM-party officials with public positions are expected to contribute with a 
percentage of their salary to the party. Uganda had the third largest cabinet in the world after 
Kenya and North Korea in 2010 at a total of 71 members and an expansion was proclaimed 
after the 2011 election (Mwenda 2011; Njoroge 2011b). This, combined with the very large 
NRM-party dominated local government network described later in this chapter, means that 
the NRM-party is able to call upon a large number of well-doers who are salaried by the 
government within the party.47 This means that a large part of the NRM-party is funded 
indirectly through employing people in the public sector, who in term contribute with small 
and large donations to the party, depending on their position in the government. Kiiza (2008: 
235) found that much of the foreign aid that flows into Uganda was used to fuel patronage 
networks and expand government. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, all the 
opposition parties and Ugandan experts claim that the NRM-party is using state resources in 
the campaigns. While the NRM-party does not admit using actual money from the 
government coffers, they admit that they do use state resources during the campaign period. 
However, they claim that this is just a natural incumbency advantage as seen in most 
countries.48
Both supporters outside the party and the business community are also expected to 
contribute during the campaigns. The NRM-party receives large contributions from the 
business community and it is the only party who get these contributions openly. While the 
 The validity of this claim has been severely questioned, particularly since the 
NRM-party by Christmas 2010 had failed to get their audited accounts approved by the 
Electoral Commission, and by the passing of a very large supplementary budget in January 
2011. This use of state resources and whether or not it is a natural incumbency advantage is 
an important part of the discussion of whether or not political funding is a tool utilized by the 
NRM to maintain its electoral dominance. 
                                                 
44 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala 17th of December 2010 
45 I.e Lukoma (2010)  
46 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, Kampala 9th of December 2010. 
47 Considering that a MP makes about 14,5 million UGX a month (DEMgroup 2011: 12), a very high salary for 
Ugandan standards, this is a big potential source of income. 
48 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of NRM-party, and Hippo Twebaze, assistant to the GS 
of NRM-party,  Kampala 16th and 17th of December 2010 
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NRM-party claims that this is mainly because of “business-friendly” policies throughout 
twenty-five years of NRM-rule, they do not rule out that some businessmen might give them 
money in order to be favored by government,49 as claimed by the opposition. What seems 
certain is that there is a general skepticism or fear among the business community to 
contribute to other parties than the NRM.50
The NRM-party also receives some money from abroad, however, they do not 
participate in Western party support as the opposition parties do. Instead, they receive money 
from “fellow liberation movements around Africa”
  
51 or wealthy Arab leaders who are former 
friends and associates of Museveni’s.52 In addition, there are claims that the NRM-party 
receives money from the foreign business community.53
 
  
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 
FDC as a party grew out of the NRM during the “Movement-system”, and has after the 
reintroduction of multiparty politics in Uganda established itself as the largest opposition 
party. Party Treasurer of FDC Jack Sabiiti names the sale of party cards from members as an 
important source of revenue.54 These cards cost 1000 UGX to purchase, which is 
approximately 40 US cents. However, there have been confirmed reports of people receiving 
cards for free as well (Wild and Golooba-Mutebi 2010: 5), and this coupled with the low price 
makes it unlikely that it is a source that the party can build its fundraising on. In addition, 
Sabiiti names contributions from officials elected in the FDC party tickets as an important 
source of income. These contribute amounts from US$106 a month for Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and scale down to US$13 a month from a local councilor. Clandestine 
donations from party sympathizers in the business community also happen, though the FDC 
claim that there is a general harassment of FDC-sympathizers in the business community.55 
They also sell party merchandise, and have acquired some property through loans.56
Foreign contributions are a major source of income for the FDC, and they are able to 
attract funding through the “sister-party support” and “basket-fund model” described in 
 
                                                 
49 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala 17th of December 2010 
50 Interview with Julius Kiiza, Political Scientist at Makerere University. Kampala 10th of December 2010 
51 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala 17th of December 2010 
52 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, Kampala 9th of December 2010. 
53 Interview with Mwambutsya Ndebesa, Professor in History at Makerere University, Uganda. Kampala, 10th of 
December 2010. 
54 Interview in Kampala 12th of December 2010 
55 Interview with Alice Alaso, General Secretary of FDC, Kampala 13th of December 2010 
56 Interview with Jack Sabiiti, Party Treasurer of FDC, Kampala 12th of December 2010. 
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chapter 2. They have consistently been able to qualify for full funding from the Deepening 
Democracy Program. In 2010 they received the maximum legal amount of 400 million 
Ugandan shillings, which amounts to approximately US$170.000, from the donor’s political 
party component.57 The IPC-coalition where the FDC is a major player also received support 
from the Swedish Christian Democrats and the British Conservative Party (Wild and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2010: 9), though there has apparently been some problems with the latter 
recently.58 They also receive support from other partners abroad, but this is mostly technical 
support and capacity building activities, and as pointed out in chapter 2 this is generally given 
to all parties. Donors confirm that the most important reason why FDC qualify for and receive 
more support than other parties is their superior financial organization and among these the 
fact that they have their accounts in order.59
 
  
Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) 
The only other political party besides the NRM-party that has ruled Uganda after 
independence is the UPC. This legacy also affects their current financial position. Compared 
to the other opposition parties, their advantage is that they have some property left from their 
period in power, notably their headquarters in Uganda House, as well as the Milton Obote 
Foundation; a party foundation with large property and business interests. The support from 
the Foundation, however, seems to dry up between elections.60 While there have been 
problems with these sources in the past due to disagreements within the party, they are now 
contributing towards the party and the party campaigns.61
UPC gets small contributions from rank-and-file members, but more often than not 
this is in kind and material support rather than monetary support.
 However, their most consistent and 
important source of income is that of its MPs who give 20% of their salaries to the party, 
making UPC extremely reliant on maintaining their regional stronghold in the north. 
62
                                                 
57 Source: copy of disbursements made by the DDP to political parties, 30th of November 2010. 
 The party has struggled 
with internal factionalism and poor organization for a few years, but seems to be able to better 
work as a wholesome party after the election of Dr. Olara Otunnu as party leader. This has 
been reflected in their ability to attract foreign funding; in 2010 they were given US$67000 by 
58 According to the newspaper Red Pepper (2010), the party had problems with with its international donors, 
primarily because of a suspicion that the funds received from the international community was not being spent 
on what it was supposed to used for. According to the newspaper, this led to the donors suspending support for 
the campaigns. This was denied by the party. 
59 Interview with Simon Osborn, responsible for political parties at DDP. Kampala, 20th of December 2010 
60 Audited accounts of UPC, 2007 and 2008. 
61 Interview with John Bossa, General Secretary of UPC, Kampala 14th of December 2010. 
62 Interview with Peter Walubiri, Party Treasurer of UPC, Kampala 15th of December 2010. 
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the DDP party program.63 In addition, they receive money from party members in the 
Diaspora.64 However, the UPC is still struggling as a national party in Uganda, and although 
they financially might be healthier than other opposition parties in Uganda (Njoroge and 
Katureebe 2009), they do not have the organization to put up candidates in all parliamentary 
constituencies, and the General Secretary claims that this is due to a lack of resources.65
 
 
Democratic Party (DP) 
The other traditional party in Uganda has endured a torrid few years since the last election, 
primarily because of internal squabbles and defections (Wild and Golooba-Mutebi 2010: 6). 
Following this, DP’s economic situation has been deteriorating (Njoroge and Katureebe 2009; 
Asiimwe 2010). Recently, the “young” fraction of the party achieved an important victory 
when Norbert Mao was elected as party leader at the first party conference held in several 
years. This conference was mainly funded by the US$83000 they received from the DDP,66 
and the party has traditionally received significant amounts from donors and the diaspora 
(Ayers 2006: 327; Kiiza 2008: 251), but Party Treasurer Issa Kikungwe says that the party 
wants to depend on other sources because of all the conditions that are attached to donor 
money.67 The new party leadership has started the work of building a financial footing for the 
party. Among the things they are working on are sale of party membership cards which they 
sell for life, and not on a year by year basis. DP has three different categories of cards, based 
on how much the member wants to contribute. The amount varies from US$22 for a bronze 
member to $US425 for a gold member. The party does receive support from their MPs on par 
with the other opposition parties, though both of these sources of income have been affected 
by the internal squabbles in the party. DP is currently working on business schemes and sale 
of advertisement in the party newspaper, and they also have a larger presence online than both 
the NRM-party and the FDC-party.68
 
 However, many of these measures are yet to produce 
tangible results, and DP has struggled for funds during the campaign (Asiimwe 2010). 
Describing the funding gap between the NRM-party and the opposition 
The discussion above indicates that there is a clear funding gap between the NRM-party and 
the opposition. While the size of the NRM’s coffers might vary throughout an election cycle, 
                                                 
63 Source: Copy of payments made by the DDP during 2010. 
64 Interview with Peter Walubiri, Party Treasurer of UPC, Kampala 15th of December 2010. 
65 Interview with John Bossa, General Secretary of UPC, Kampala 14th of December 2010. 
66 Interview with Simon Osborn, responsible for political parties at DDP. Kampala, 20th of December 2010 
67 Interview Kampala, 13th of December 2010 
68 Interview with Issa Kikungwe, Party Treasurer of DP, Kampala 13th of December 
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they have numerous sources that they can fundraise from when elections approach and they 
start their machinery. Figure 4.1 below illustrates this: NRM-party has a lot more sources that 
are perceived to be of high importance to fundraise from. The sources that are available to the 
ruling party but not to the opposition are first and foremost linked to them controlling the state 
and since official state subsidies have yet been put into practice in Uganda, most of these 
advantages are related to the graft category presented in chapter 2. Both patronage, money 
from graft and clientilist tactics are potentially important sources of funding for the NRM-
party.69
 
 Partly because of this, the party also benefits from external plutocratic funding. I will 
return to this more thoroughly in section 4.4 below. The opposition parties on the other hand 
mostly rely on internal contributions, both of a grassroot and plutocratic nature, as well as 
foreign funding. This seems to be broadly consistent with the theoretical model presented in 
table 2.3 in chapter 2. The rest of this chapter will look at the other aspects of the research 
question: the factors that have helped shape this funding situation and the implications of this 
for the type of regime that is currently in power in Uganda.  
Figure 4.1: Number of funding sources sorted after degree of importance for different political parties in 
Uganda 
 
Source: See appendix 3 
 
4.2 Political parties and funding in Uganda – a brief historical overview 
The history of political parties in Uganda is intrinsically linked to the general history of the 
country. Parties were for a long time at the forefront of political conflict, but after the rise to 
power of President Museveni and the “Movement-system” in 1986 they were banned until 
                                                 
69 For a full classification of all 13 subtypes of funding sources for all the parties see appendix 3 
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2005. Nevertheless, even during this period there were partisan interests that shaped the 
political process in Uganda (Kasfir 1998; Carbone 2003). According to Professor in History at 
Makerere University in Kampala, Mwambutsya Ndebesa, political parties have a sixty year 
old history in Uganda. But “these political parties are sixty years young, not old. They have 
never grown.” He furthermore goes on to say that there has never been and still is not an 
ideologically-based party system in Uganda.70 Other experts agree that there have never been 
institutionalized parties or an institutionalized party system in Uganda.71
 
  
The party system up until 1986 
Broadly speaking, Uganda from the first election in 1961 and subsequent independence in 
1962 and until 1986 was a two-party system with the Democratic Party (DP) and the Ugandan 
Peoples Congress (UPC) who split along religious and ethnic lines, interrupted first by a brief 
one-party rule under Milton Obote from 196872 and then by the long no-party military 
dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971 until 1979. After Amin a brief and violent election period 
led to the return of Obote and UPC to power after what many termed as flawed elections in 
1980. These elections were basically a struggle between ethnic and religious groups 
represented through DP and UPC, and a pro- or anti-Obote election (Mutibwa 1992: 138-
145). After the elections, the UPC set up a military-backed one-party regime, marginalizing 
the opposition (Mutibwa 1992). This serves to illustrate that the general lack of links between 
civil society and the political parties have historical roots. This delinking of political parties 
and society has had important implications for political parties in Uganda and the lack of a 
social base has created a need for other funding sources.73
 
 The lack of “bridges” between 
citizens and the state is a big problem in Uganda today, and one problem that political parties 
are unable to fill at this moment in time (Wild and Harris 2011).  
                                                 
70 Interview with Mwambutsya Ndebesa, Professor in History at Makerere University, Uganda. Kampala, 10th of 
December 2010. 
71 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Political Scientist and Senior Reserach Fellow at the Makerere 
Institute of Social Research in Uganda. Kampala, 9th of December 2010.  
72 While the formal implementation of one-party system rule through the banning of all opposition parties did not 
happen until the 22nd of December 1969, Mutibwa (1992: 56) argues that it was a de facto one-party system 
already in mid-1968. 
73 Interview with Mwambutsya Ndebesa, Professor in History at Makerere University, Uganda. Kampala, 10th of 
December 2010 and Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Political Scientist and Senior Research Fellow at 
the Makerere Institute of Social Research in Uganda. Kampala, 9th of December 2010.  
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Parties and party politics under the “Movement-system” 
The 1980 election also saw the entrance of a new actor at the political stage in Uganda: 
Yoweri Museveni participated in the election under the banner of the Uganda Patriotic 
Movement Party, and when the party was marginalized during the election, Museveni rejected 
the results and “went to the bush”. After several years of struggle, Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army (NRA) won the war in 1986 and transferred itself into the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM). The system that the new rulers implemented was the so-called 
“Movement-system” where parties were banned and all elections were held based on 
individual merit rather than party affiliation. It has therefore often been called a “no-party 
system”. However, scholars have called it both a full-fledged “one-party state” (Olaka-
Onyango 2000: 55) and a limited multiparty system (Kasfir 1998: 55). Carbone (2003: 487) 
argues that this is not correct, and that the almost twenty years with “Movement-system” was 
in fact a hegemonic party system, where, although opposition parties were allowed to exist, 
they were marginalized and existed as “licensed parties”. In this period, the NRM was able to 
shape the playing field and to a large extent marginalize the traditional parties (Kasfir 1998; 
Carbone 2003). This legacy has had a massive effect. Jack Sabiiti, Party Treasurer of the 
FDC, said in an interview that the NRM-party in a way has had a twenty-five year head start 
on all the other parties, something the other parties are struggling to catch up with.74 This was 
echoed by the other opposition parties and politicians as well.75
Two institutional elements from the Movement-system are still in place and extremely 
important today. The first is that they established participatory democracy through local and 
regional councils; first called the “Resistance Councils” (RCs) and later renamed “Local 
Councils”. These structures, which run from the village all through the district level, are 
named LC1 to LC5 and are still in place today. During the “Movement-system” these 
candidates were elected on individual merit, rather than a party ticket and this has left a clear 
legacy on the local government system (Makara, Rakner and Svåsand 2008: 279). According 
to Gloppen et al. (2006: 23-24) the NRM-party took advantage of this during the first 
multiparty elections in 2006 to improve their access to resources. These partisan local 
governance structures are of significant help for the NRM-party and a big source of 
frustration for the opposition parties, who struggle to create a grassroot-organization even 
today. The overwhelming majority of the NRM-party officials in local positions also give the 
party more people with official positions who receive public salaries. In 2006, NRM or non-
 
                                                 
74 Kampala, 12th of December 2010. 
75 Interview with party representatives of UPC and DP, Kampala, December 2010. 
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partisan NRM-leaning candidates won most of the seats in the regional elections. This also 
seemed to be the case in 2011 when elections for LC1 and LC2 positions were in fact 
canceled due to a lack of funding. The last election for these levels of government was held in 
2002, and that was on a non-partisan basis (Semakula 2011). This means that most of these 
structures are still effectively based on the “Movement-system”, which has been shown to 
benefit the NRM-party in the past. It has broadened their clientilist network and also increased 
the revenue for the party. They also benefit from a broader organizational base, and having 
more volunteers as a part of this legacy of being in power.76
Another institutional legacy of the “Movement system” that has continued to yield 
benefits for the NRM-party after the implementation of multiparty politics is the system of 
Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) who are appointed by the President. Each District 
has its own Commissioner who is paid by the state, and the RDCs are first and foremost loyal 
to the president himself (Kasfir 2000: 75). Thus, President Museveni has a whole host of state 
employees who owe their allegiance primarily to him. This is a massive resource advantage, 
and RDCs across Uganda have yet to switch allegiance from the party to the state which is 
actually employing them.
 
77
 
 This leads them to harass opposition politicians, as well as openly 
campaigning for the NRM-party and President Museveni (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011: 
15). The issue of RDCs is thus a part of the issue of the separation between the state and the 
NRM-party, and the clientilist ties of the ruling party. This institutional arrangement is very 
negative for the opposition, who commented negatively on this issue during interviews done 
in Kampala in December 2010. 
Previous elections in Uganda under Museveni 
The first presidential election under the “Movement-system” was held in 1996. President 
Museveni won a very comfortable victory with 74% of the votes. Even though it was held 
under the “Movement-system” there was still some form of opposition, and the role of money 
in the election reflected this. According to William (1997) Museveni misused his incumbency 
advantages, and, by increasing the costs of participating in the election, almost made it into a 
“one-man show”. It was very difficult to separate the policies and programs of the state from 
that of Museveni, especially as many projects were introduced and inaugurated just before the 
election (William 1997: 173). This was a big funding advantage for the incumbent, and shows 
                                                 
76 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of the NRM-party, Kampala, 17th of December 2010. 
77 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, Kampala 9th of December 2010. 
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how money was a favored tool for the NRM-party and Museveni even before the 
reintroduction of multiparty politics. 
In 2001, President Museveni was challenged by Kizza Besigye for the first time, and 
the contest was closer than the one in 1996: Museveni’s vote share dropped to 69% of the 
votes. The election was the first time that the “Movement-system” was really challenged by 
people who were disaffected with it, and the results reflected this (Rubongoya 2007: 146). 
According to Rubongoya “the use of state resources and patronage seems to have become 
more pronounced and prominent in the run up to the 2001 election” (Rubongoya 2007: 152). 
This seems to reflect the fact that the larger the challenge faced by the ruling party in Uganda, 
the larger the use of graft-tactics seems to be. The challenge posed by Besigye in the 2001 
election, coupled with increasing donor-pressure to re-introduce multiparty politics in the 
country, contributed to a slow, controlled process of opening up for party politics led by the 
NRM-party (Carbone 2003: 498; Atoo et.al 2008: 32-33; Keating 2011; 428-429). 
The 2006 elections were the first multiparty elections to be held in Uganda since 1980. 
Party-backed candidates competed both for the presidential post and for parliamentary seats. 
The issue of political funding became even more important in this election as the stakes and 
political competition increased further. President Museveni won, but only with 59% of the 
vote, and while the NRM-party candidates won a clear majority of seats in parliament, there 
was still fierce competition. In his study of party financing in the election, Kiiza finds that 
“the NRM obtained substantial resource advantages long before the 2006 elections were 
flagged off” (Kiiza 2008: 232). This corresponds well with Rubongoya (2007: 163-175) who 
finds that from 2001 the NRM-party expanded its clientilist- and patronage network in order 
to prepare for the forthcoming multiparty election. This was put to effective use: modest 
calculations say that the NRM-party used at least 10 times as much money as FDC in the 
2006 election (Kiiza 2008: 245). 
This section has shown that political parties in Uganda have a troubled history, and 
that they historically are struggling to link citizens to the government in a way that is expected 
of them. The legacy of no-party politics under the Movement-system has given the NRM-
party and President Museveni a head-start in terms of both shaping the playing field and 
access to resources, as the party has been able to shape the state institutions for the past 25 
years. The NRM-party admits that it benefits from some of these legacies from the 
Movement-system, but says it will get better as multiparty politics settle and separates more 
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clearly from the Movement-system.78
 
 History seems to disagree however. This section has 
shown that increasing political competition has led to an increase in the use of state resources 
in NRM-campaigns. Therefore, it seems to indicate that graft-tactics have developed over 
time in Uganda, and that the NRM-party has been able to shape the playing due to their 
historical control over state institutions. This chapter now takes a look at some of these 
institutions and other structural conditions affecting political funding in Uganda. 
4.3 Structural factors affecting political funding in Uganda  
The section above has highlighted the control the NRM has enjoyed in Uganda for the last 25 
years. Two of the areas that have been affected to by this control are political institutions and 
the economic climate. These factors in turn affect the issue of political funding. 
 
The Ugandan economy and the impact on political funding 
As pointed out by General Secretary Alice Alaso of the FDC “electoral financing must be 
seen as a process, not an event” (quoted in Kiiza 2008: 233). There are several issues 
connected to the Ugandan economy that shape the sources of political funding that are 
available to fundraise from. First of all, Uganda cannot be considered to be a wealthy country. 
In 2010, the IMF calculated the GDP per capita (PPP) at $1245, which puts it in the bottom 
half of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Poverty levels and inequality remain high, especially 
in the rural area, and there are large geographical differences. According to Kiiza (2008: 233), 
the party that benefits from this is the NRM-party because they have their largest followings 
in the wealthier parts of Uganda. In general though, the poverty makes it hard for all parties to 
rely on grassroot funding in Uganda.79
Another aspect of the economy that influences political funding is the aid dependency 
of Uganda. As pointed out in chapter 3, Uganda has a very donor-dependent economy and 
according to Ayers (2006) this also has implications for the political scene. She claims that 
the neoliberal agenda of western donors has played into the hands of many African leaders, 
because it primarily focuses on strengthening the executive institution and liberalizing the 
economy. Keating (2011) partly agrees with this, but modifies it when highlighting that 
Museveni has mostly cooperated with the donors when their interests have run parallel, 
notably to strengthen the executive, decentralize the country and introduce neo-liberal 
 
                                                 
78 Interview with Hippo Twebaze of the NRM-party, Kampala 16th of December 2010. 
79 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, Kampala 9th of December 2010. 
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privatization (Keating 2011: 430). Donor support is increasingly given as budget support and 
this seems to increase possibilities of corruption and graft (Kiiza 2008: 235). In terms of 
strengthening the democratic process, the NRM does not seem to be welcoming international 
assistance, as highlighted below in the section on the legal and institutional framework. The 
donor community does focus a small portion of its support on promoting democracy, and this 
does seem to have a positive impact both in terms of funding options for the opposition and in 
terms of transparency. Thus the dependency on donor money does seem to open up for a 
revenue source that is illegal in many other African countries. Most of my interview objects in 
the opposition parties mentioned the positive effect on transparency and funding.80
The final aspect of the economic situation in Uganda that seems to have an effect on 
political funding is the role of the state in the economy. As highlighted above, the opposition 
parties are struggling to attract funds from the business community and from wealthy 
individuals living in Uganda. While this is partly due to the poorly developed organizations of 
these parties and the few linkages between them and society, it is also partly due to the fact 
that there are rumors that the government and state apparatus will target those businesses and 
cancel their contracts if they are associated with the opposition.
 
81
 
 While these reports are 
often unconfirmed, the fact that there are rumors that are not being dismissed has an effect in 
itself: it creates a fear for associating with the opposition. Finally, the privatization process 
that started after Museveni came to power and gathered pace in the early 1990’s was 
favorable to the NRM-party because it allowed the party elite to amass large personal wealth. 
In turn, they contribute large sums of money back to the party through plutocratic donations 
(Rubongoya 2007: 163-165). This indicates that the NRM-party’s control over the state has 
not only given rise to graft-practices, but also contributed to a class of wealthy Ugandans who 
have benefited from NRM-party’s control of the state.  
The presidential system 
Uganda is a presidential system with a strong presidency (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009). 
The president is elected for five years, and there are no term limits after its removal in 2005, 
so President Museveni can seek reelection as many times as he would like. Ugandan scholars 
seem to agree that the personal effect of President Museveni is an important part of the 
explanation of the NRM-party’s appeal to the public, both when it comes to voting and 
                                                 
80 Interview with Jack Sabiiti, Party Treasurer of FDC, Issa Kikungwe, Party Treasurer of DP, and John Bossa, 
General Secretary of UPC. Kampala, December 2010.  
81 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
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funding.82 Presidential campaigns are financed heavily through the parties and party budgets, 
often because they have to arrange the rallies and activities of their presidential candidates 
throughout the three-month campaign. Keeping presidential candidates in the field is one of 
the major tasks of a party in Uganda during elections, and the presidential system does seem 
to be a factor in the expenditure of political parties in the region since they focus so much of 
their resources on their presidential candidate, instead of other parts of their organization. In 
fact, both the DP and the UPC named keeping their presidential candidate in the field their 
sole financial priority during the recently concluded campaign.83
 
 
The electoral system and the race of parliament 
The electoral system for parliamentary elections in Uganda is single-member plurality system, 
and parliamentary candidates from most parties and especially opposition parties raise most of 
their campaign money themselves. The current political system in Uganda is definitely 
candidate- rather than party-centered (Helle et.al. 2011), as illustrated by the recent 
Afrobarometer (2011) survey where the candidates party was deemed to be of minor 
importance for the voter when deciding who to vote on. Candidates from the largest 
opposition party, FDC, gain some financial help with for example the printing of posters from 
the party but candidates are mainly funding their own campaigns.84 Candidates from UPC 
also receive a little help from the party,85 while candidates from the DP have to provide 100% 
of their own campaign funds.86 The NRM-party on the other hand does contribute more direct 
money to the candidate, and pays for the nomination fees and salaries for campaign agents, 
but also in the ruling MP flagbearers of the NRM are expected to fund some of their own 
campaign,87 though other sources within the party confirmed that funding campaigns for the 
party flagbearers is one of the major expenditures of the party.88
 
 This means that the NRM-
party should be able to attract both better candidates and have a larger chance of winning 
seats in this type of electoral system. 
                                                 
82 Interviews with Monica Chibita, Fredrik-Golooba-Mutebi, Julius Kiiza and Mwambutsya Ndebesa, academics 
at Makerere University, Kampala, 8th – 10th of December 2010. 
83 Interview with Issa Kikungwe, Party Treasurer of DP, Kampala 13th of December 2010 and interview with 
Peter Walubiri, Party Treasurer of UPC, Kampala 15th of December 2010 
84 Interview with Jack Sabiiti, Party  Treasurer of FDC, Kampala 12th of December 2010 
85 Interview witht Peter Walubiri, Party Treasurer of UPC, Kampala 15th of December 2010 
86 Interview with Issa Kikungwe, Party Treasurer of DP, Kampala 13th of December 2010 
87 Interview with Ofwone Opondo, Party Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala  
88 Interview with Hippo Twebaze, NRM-party, Kampala 16th of December 2010 
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The legal and institutional framework of party funding 
The law governing most aspects relating to political parties in Uganda is the Political Parties 
and Organisations Act of 2005. This law provides most of the laws governing the finances of 
political parties. First of all, the law states that all political parties should disclose their 
sources of income and hand in their audited accounts each year to the Electoral Commission 
(EC). Compliance has been low across the board, and none of the parties have handed in their 
sources of income. The opposition claims that if they disclose their source of income, these 
sources will be harassed by the NRM-party and the state (Kyalimpa 2009). Most of the 
opposition parties have handed in their audited accounts consistently over the last few years. 
The NRM-party has not. While they were working on it in December 2010, the EC had not 
approved them.89
On foreign funding, the Law states that political parties are not allowed to receive 
more than 400 million Ugandan Shillings (UGX) (approximately US$170 000) each financial 
year from a single donor, and the total amount of donations from foreign individuals, states or 
organizations cannot exceed 4 billion UGX each financial year. This has led to controversies, 
as there have been rumors that the government has pressured foreign donors to join in larger 
consortiums so as to limit their influence.
  
90 The Deepening Democracy program is an 
example of this; it pools the UK, Swedish, Danish, Dutch and Irish aid for political parties 
together, making it one donor according to the law.91
Other than this the 2005 act puts no limitation on fundraising; parties and candidates 
are free to fundraise as much as they want from Ugandan citizens residing in Uganda and 
from Ugandan businesses and organizations. However, after the implementation of the law a 
debate started on public financing of political parties, and an amendment bill was passed in 
2008. The Bill was passed in a record short five minute session.
 
92 While the idea of public 
funding is supported by the opposition, the actual Bill is opposed by many93
 
, and was mostly 
a NRM-party initiative. When reading the reasoning behind the Political Parties and 
Organisations (Amendment) Bill, 2008 it becomes clear that it was partly passed to lessen 
donor influence on political parties. Among the reasons for the law were:  
                                                 
89 Conversation with Patrick Byakagaba, contact person for political parties at the Electoral Commission. 
Telephone, 17th of December 2010. 
90 Interview with Jack Sabiiti, Party Treasurer of FDC, Kampala 12th of December 2010. 
91 Norway also participates in the DDP, but has opted not to participate in the direct support of political parties. 
92 Interview with Simon Osborn, responsible for political parties at DDP. Kampala, 20th of December 2010 
93 Interviews with PT’s and GS’ of FDC, UPC and DP, Kampala 12th – 20th of December 2010. 
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“Provisions of State funding to political parties or organizations gives them the 
opportunity and ability to maintain national interest and integrity. Non-provision of 
State funding exposes political parties or organizations to solicit and depend on donor 
aid which may compromise their national interests, integrity and independence” 
(Section 4.3 in Committee on Legal and Parliementary Affairs 2008). 
 
The law provides for public funding for political parties both for elections and day to day 
activities. For elections, all parties are supposed to be funded equally. For the 2010 elections 
each presidential candidate was given US$ 8500 in addition to two vehicles and security 
guards. The support arrived late however (Maseruka and Bekunda 2010), something which 
primarily benefited the NRM-party candidate as President Museveni has more fundraising 
possibilities than the other candidates. Nevertheless, most political candidates labeled the 
support to small to matter (Habati 2011). Parties have received no support for parliamentary 
elections, and the support for day to day activities, supposed to be based on representation in 
parliament, has not been forthcoming.94
As pointed out above, the EC is the institution that is responsible for the 
implementation of these laws and regulations. The current EC is unpopular with the 
opposition parties, and General Secretary John Bossa claim that it is “an arm of the NRM… 
this Electoral Commission is not independent”.
 This seems to indicate that implementation of this 
law will happen when the government deems it favorable, and it excludes another source of 
income for political parties. 
95
                                                 
94 Interviews with PT’s of FDC, UPC and DP, Kampala, December 2010. 
 UPC has even collected signatures during 
the 2011 campaign to cancel the mandate of the Commission. In an evaluation of the role and 
performance of the EC in the 2006 election Makara, Rakner and Rwengabo (2008) found that 
the current EC faces two problems: one of capacity and one of legitimacy. The first is related 
to both a lack of funding and lack of human resources, while the second is linked to its lack of 
independence and the nature of its mandate. The current EC was appointed by President 
Museveni in 2002 under the “Movement-system”, and its mandate has been renewed both for 
the 2006 and 2011 election with minimal changes in terms of personnel. It is formally non-
partisan, but the fact that it is appointed by the President and approved by the NRM-
dominated parliament puts its neutrality into question. In terms of its effect on political 
funding, it is the organization regulating and enforcing the disclosure of audited accounts and 
sources of income (Makara, Rakner and Rwengabo 2008: 107). Parties who do not comply 
95 Interview, Kampala, 14th of December 2010. 
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with these rules are supposed to be deregistered, but the Commission has so far never applied 
this rule, preferring to use “dialogue and persuasion” (Kiiza 2008: 243). As mentioned above, 
the NRM-party had by December 2010 failed to get their accounts approved. Both the 
opposition and Ugandan academics claims that this is due to the NRM-party not being 
interested in transparency.96
 
 This is a clear example of how the rules governing political 
funding in Uganda are selectively implemented, and that the EC is not strong or independent 
enough to effectively carry out its mandate. The European Union Election Observation 
Mission (2011:44) noted that the Electoral Commission failed to fully enforce the financing 
regulations in the 2011 elections. 
Summary: The contextual environment 
The two sections above have highlighted several links in the political funding process in 
Uganda. First of all, grassroot funding is limited not just because of the generally poor 
population in Uganda, but also because of the historically weak linkages between the parties 
that are organizationally weak and society. Furthermore, the institutional system with a strong 
presidency and an electoral system that is candidate- rather than party-centered creates high 
costs to parties that are deemed as of little importance, which makes it difficult to fundraise. 
Many parties therefore have to rely on internal plutocratic funding. The major difference 
between the ruling party and the opposition party though is that it has access to state 
resources, something which both gives them a direct funding advantage because of the role of 
the state in the Ugandan economy, and an indirect advantage through business opportunities 
for the party elite which in turn funds the party during campaigns. The importance of aid for 
the Ugandan economy seems to create funding opportunities for the opposition, but at the 
same time it has historically created possibilities for the NRM-party to expand its clientilist 
base because of access to budget support. Finally, the funding advantage enjoyed by the NRM 
is compounded by the general monetization of politics in Uganda. This creates a very uneven 
playing field which seems to preserve the status quo, and the status quo is favorable to 
President Museveni and the NRM-party, as illustrated by the gains made by the party and the 
President in the recently concluded 2011 elections. This thesis will now try to map out the 
current political playing field in Uganda. 
 
                                                 
96 Interview with Jack Sabiiti, Party Treasurer of FDC, Kampala 12th of December 2010, and Interview with 
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social Research, Kampala 9th of 
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4.4 Playing uphill on a slippery slope: the uneven funding field in Uganda  
Reviewing the previous sections, it is possible to draw out several implications for the 
political playing field in Uganda. First of all, the NRM enjoys a general funding advantage 
because it can fundraise from more sources primarily because it controls the state apparatus. 
Second, the NRM-party is trying to maximize its financial power throughout the electoral 
period, and it also seems to be trying to limit ways that the opposition can find funding. 
Finally, because of these facts the NRM-party and President Museveni does not try to reduce 
the importance of money in politics. This section will illustrate this. 
 
Maximizing the revenue – why NRM-party has a “head-start” in the funding game 
As showed in chapter 2, the enormous incumbency advantages of the ruling parties is a 
general challenge for the opposition in African politics, especially in countries with a strong 
president (Rakner and van de Walle 2009), which President Museveni must be considered to 
be (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009). Access to state resources is an incumbency advantage, 
and the NRM-party has utilized this advantage to its maximum. As stated above, the NRM-
party is very good at ad hoc fundraising. This is to a large extent linked to the fact that they 
are the party in power, and that they have access to the state. The party has little need to 
maintain a well-funded party machinery when not in campaign mode; because it knows that it 
can rely on its clientilist and patronage networks and state money during the campaigns. And 
as long as the party stays in power, they are able to maintain these income sources, barring 
any major change in the economy. This creates a “funding cycle” that depends on one internal 
event; that the party wins elections and stays in power. Figure 6.2 below illustrates this.  
 
Figure 4.2: The NRM-party funding cycle 
 
Election victory -
Party wins control 
of state
Maintenance of 
party and 
patronage 
network
Campaigns 
approaches and 
party organizes
Maintenance of 
party and clientlist 
network
Ad hoc 
fundraising  from 
plutocratic and 
graft sources
68 
 
The two parts of the funding cycle that are of greatest interest for the purpose of this thesis is 
the “Ad hoc fundraising from plutocratic and graft sources” and the “Maintenance of party 
and patronage/clientilist networks”. While most experts, journalists and members of the 
opposition seem to agree that the NRM-party and their candidates are using state resources in 
the campaign,97
Some empirical events nevertheless show that there is reason to believe that this is the 
case. First of all, there is the history of use of state resources as indicated in section 6.2 above. 
In the 2006 election, the NRM-party had unhindered access to government funds and spent 
significantly more money than the opposition parties both in the presidential and 
parliamentary races (Kiiza 2008: 244-245). Second of all, there is a gap between what the 
NRM-party spent and what they say their income is. The amount they spent on the National 
Delegates Conference far exceeds what they receive annually from their MPs and elected 
representatives (Mufumba 2010). Third, there are issues in the just concluded campaign that 
point in this direction. As stated in the introduction, the passing of a supplementary budget in 
January 2011 led to large scale suspicion and outcry among opposition politicians. The 
supplementary budget with a size of US$257 million, approved by parliament on January the 
4th, came barely six months after the original budget was posted and only two months after it 
was approved (Mwenda and Sserunjogi 2010; Nanjobe 2011). Among the expenditure in the 
budget was a US$33.6 million allocation to State House, which the opposition claimed was 
going to be used for the campaigns (Karugaba and Bekunda 2011). While these allegations 
were rejected by the NRM-party, some of the posts seem very ad hoc, such as the request for 
US$4.2 million to facilitate jobless youth (Nanjobe 2011). A day after the passing of the 
supplementary budget, it emerged that each of the NRM flagbearers were given US$8500 
each by the party, allegedly for their campaigns. The party denied any links between the 
supplementary budget and the allocation, however (Njoroge 2011a). In addition, all MPs in 
parliament were in January 2011 given US$ 8500, allegedly for monitoring of government 
programs. However, some opposition politicians “cried foul” and said this was campaign 
money to secure the status quo, the NRM-party candidates receiving five times as much of the 
money as they had five times as many representatives in the 8th parliament (Mugerwa and 
Nalugo 2011).  
 proving this is harder. 
Even while the direct use of state money for campaigns is difficult to prove, the NRM-
party does admit that it benefits from using state resources and running from position during 
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elections. Among the benefits they mention is using state transportation, as well as hosting 
meetings using state facilitation.98 While the party claims that these are natural incumbency 
advantages present in all political systems, they seem to be very prominent in Uganda 
(DEMGroup 2011: 4). Government facilities ordinarily enjoyed by the holder of an office are 
exempted from the general rule of non-use of state resources in the campaigns under Ugandan 
law (DEMGroup 2011: 8). This is a severe problem, because it legalizes the use of state 
resources and thus helps create an uneven playing field. The NRM-party also has a funding 
advantage in that they receive more coverage in the public media than the opposition parties 
(HRNJ-UGANDA 2010), and they also receive free or severely discounted airtime by private 
media owned by party supporters.99
The other side of the equation is the “Maintenance of party and clientilist/patronage 
network”. This happens in two phases. The first happen when the election is won and 
positions are handed out, using what chapter 2 identifies as patronage tactics. As stated above, 
the NRM-party government is one of the largest in the world. In 2011, the government was 
expected to be at least 78 ministers strong, adding at least six new ministries taking the tally 
of full ministries from 22 to 28, with additional sub-ministries also created (Njoroge 2011b). 
This means that the size of government has returned to the size of the national reconciliation 
government that was implemented after Museveni came to power (Kjaer 2004: 397. In 
addition, there is the large network of representative institutions at multiple levels of 
government. In the 2011 elections there were 18.629 posts which you had to pay a nomination 
to contest for, and this is only down to the LC3 level (DEMGroup 2011: 17). Below this level 
there are even more positions. This means that there are a lot of elected positions, which 
generally carry a good salary in Uganda (DEMGroup 2011). Even local positions are now 
paid some honorarium (Makara 2010: 87). There has been a significant expansion of both 
regional districts and government positions in the last ten years.  Figure 6.3 below illustrates 
this. The increase in districts has several implications. First of all, it increases the patronage 
network of the ruling party by increasing the number of elected and unelected positions. 
These positions are frequently promised as reward for supporting the NRM-party 
(DEMGroup 2011: 20). Furthermore, it increases the financial costs of all competing parties, 
something which favors the candidates of the best-financed party – the NRM-party. Finally, 
previous research has shown that residents in the newly created districts vote for Museveni 
and NRM-candidates to a significantly higher degree than residents in older districts 
 
                                                 
98 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala 17th of December 2010 
99 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Chief Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala 17th of December 2010 
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(Tumushabe 2009: 41). While decentralization has long been a policy of the current 
government (Kjaer 2004: 398-399), it has increased dramatically since the start of this 
millennium, and especially after multiparty politics was reintroduced.  Notably, this use of the 
patronage network seems to have expanded more as electoral competition has increased. 
 
Figure 4.3: The increase in districts and ministerial positions in Uganda  
 
Source: Tumushabe (2009), updated with current numbers from the Ugandan Electoral Commission 
 
The other way of the NRM-party uses graft tactics is through policy and spending, using what 
I in chapter 2 identify as clientilist tactics. This typically happens before elections. Between 
July and October 2010 president Museveni handed out over US$2.1 million through cash and 
pledges. This was part of the total of US$10.2 million that State House and President has 
budgeted for presidential donations (Njoroge 2011a). This is part of a consistent picture that 
the government increases spending before the election, in order to give hand-outs to people in 
order for them to support the party.100
 
 Kjaer and Therkildsen (2011) highlight in a 
forthcoming policy brief how President Museveni has taken control over the agricultural 
extension service program (NAADS), and used it as a tool to dispense patronage to local 
elites who can mobilize voters for the NRM-party and the President. All this shows that the 
NRM-party machinery is built for ad-hoc fundraising in front of elections, while maintaining 
the clientilist network needed to fundraise before and after the campaign period.  
Minimizing the revenue – weak opposition parties and a dependent private sector 
While the NRM-party’s ability to perform well in ad-hoc fundraising is one part of the 
political funding equation, the other part is the opposition parties’ inability to do so. There are 
                                                 
100 Interview with Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Senior Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research, Kampala 9th of December 2010. 
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several reasons for this. One is the state of the private sector, which for a large part is highly 
dependent on government contracts, and the small part that is not, is marginalized politically. 
The private sector fear government intimidation, and therefore does not contribute to the 
opposition. Secondly, the laws and regulations in place are used to both limit the possibility 
for opposition parties to solicit for funds from abroad, which is a big potential source of 
funding for the opposition. Thirdly however, the inability of the opposition to attract funds 
can not only be laid at the feet of the NRM-party. It is also because the opposition is poorly 
organized and to a large extent unable to pose a credible alternative to the NRM-party. 
All opposition parties say that their efforts to fundraise from the private sector are 
made difficult because the business community and wealthy individuals “fear” the 
government and ruling party. According to the opposition, they fear losing government 
contracts, being harassed by tax auditors, as well as more physical retaliation from the state 
apparatus.101 General Secretary of FDC Alice Alaso gave an example of a prominent and 
wealthy party member who was denied building an airstrip in western Uganda because of his 
association with the FDC.102 The NRM-party refutes these claims, saying that the opposition 
does not receive support from the business-community because “they have labeled all 
successful business people as corrupt and benefiting from government.”103
A possible new source of funding has been opened to the opposition parties through 
the emergence of donors that are willing to fund party and organization building, not just host 
external trainings and capacity building (Wild and Golooba-Mutebi 2010). This “basket-fund” 
solution advocated by the DDP has received support since the turn of the millennium, and 
gives parties more control over what they can spend the money received from donors on, 
though it still has a lot of restrictions and obligations attached to it.
 Nevertheless, as 
highlighted above the fact that this fear of government retaliation is real and exists in Uganda, 
creates difficulties for the fundraising efforts of the opposition. 
104
                                                 
101 Interviews with Party Treasurers and General Secretaries of FDC, DP, and UPC 
 This has given parties 
such as the FDC a new, public and legitimate source of funding that they can use for building 
an organization. However, direct party support has been clamped down on, and several donors 
have been pressured into pooling their resources together or withdrawing their support 
102 Interview, Kampala 13th of December 2010. 
103 Interview with Ofwono Opondo, Party Spokesperson of NRM-party, Kampala 17th of December 2010 
104 The funding can for example not be used for campaign purposes, and parties who want to qualify need to 
hand in their audited accounts. Interview with Simon Osborn, responsible for political parties at DDP. Kampala, 
20th of December 2010 
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altogether.105 As stated above, the introduction of the state subsidies to political parties can be 
seen as a direct consequence of the emergence of donors willing to support political parties. It 
will be interesting to see the future of the “basket-fund” solution, with rumors of a possible 
crack-down on the DDP-program emerging.106
As stated above, the poor organization of the opposition parties has historical roots, 
and can be linked both to pre-“Movement-system” and “Movement-system” mechanisms. The 
Ugandan opposition has traditionally had a weak resource base (Ssenkumba 1998: 178), and 
their experience with multiparty politics is very low, leading to poor organizational 
capabilities. Ssenkumba’s (1998: 190) analysis of the opposition during the “Movement-
system” could also describe the situation for most of the opposition parties today: a lack of 
funds, internal fragmentation and little connection with the grassroot. The parties have also 
failed to rally around a single candidate even though the election system would make this 
logical, and this has led to a splitting of the vote and made the opposition seem a less viable 
alternative (Makara 2010: 89-90). According to the Afrobarometer polls conducted in January 
2011, only 41% of the people asked believe that the opposition has created a viable 
alternative. Opposition party officials admit these weaknesses, but blame them largely on the 
hostile climate facing them and lack of resources.
 
107
  
 So the opposition is facing a vicious 
circle; they are not able to attract funds because they are not organized enough, and because 
they have no funds they are not able to improve their organization. The only two parties who 
seem to be consistently dedicating some of their resources to building an organization 
spanning the whole of Uganda are the FDC and the smaller People’s Progressive Party (PPP). 
Therefore, it will be interesting to follow these parties in the future and see if they reap 
benefits from it.  
The importance of money in Ugandan politics 
With the opposition facing this funding shortage and the NRM-party able to call upon state 
resources and patronage and clientilist networks, the playing field is tilted towards the ruling 
party. And this tilt is made larger by the sheer importance of money in the political game in 
Uganda. The NRM-party seems quite happy to let this be a part of the game. They have been 
named top vote-buyers both in surveys and focus groups, and there are numerous examples of 
NRM-agents being caught in the act of vote-buying (Afrobarometer 2011; DEMGroup 2011). 
                                                 
105 Interview with Simon Osborn, responsible for political parties at DDP. Kampala, 20th of December 2010 and 
Jack Sabiiti, Party Treasurer of the FDC, Kampala 12th of December 2010. 
106 Interview with Margaret Vuchiri, Editor at the Daily Monitor Newspaper, Kampala 15th of December 2010  
107 Interviews with Party Treasurers and General Secretaries of FDC, DP, and UPC 
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While the opposition parties are also participating in this practice, they do not have the 
resources to compete with the NRM-party, so we will not know if they have endorsed the 
practice at the same scale. There seems to be a consensus that, while sources differ on the 
actual numbers, the NRM has between eight and ten times as much money to spend in the 
campaigns as the opposition parties (Habati 2011). The above-mentioned increase in districts 
also increases the importance of money, as more districts mean more candidates and more 
nomination fees and campaign expenditures for all parties involved. With the resources of the 
opposition parties already stretched, and with fewer alternative sources of funding than the 
NRM-party, this makes it increasingly difficult for the opposition to compete financially with 
the ruling party.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Funding can therefore be considered to play an important part in the creation of an uneven 
playing field in Uganda. The NRM-party has maintained its dominant position in Uganda 
partly by controlling the current funding situation in the country, with the ruling party 
monopolizing access to state resources and using this to fuel their clientilist and patronage 
network. This works well with the party’s ad-hoc fundraising profile. The opposition faces a 
very challenging funding environment, and the opposition parties are not helped by their poor 
internal organizations. Therefore, they are not able to compete with the NRM-party in a game 
were money and resources have become part of the essence. All in all, this chapter has 
highlighted how the ruling party tilts the playing field in Uganda by using political funding as 
a tactical tool both to strengthen itself and weaken the opposition. The chapter has shown that 
the playing field is so uneven, and the NRM-party so much in control, that they through their 
electoral authoritarian dominance can shape the playing field to suit their style of fundraising: 
ad-hoc through plutocratic and graft sources. 
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”Before the elections, fifty parties appeared and were funded to campaign. This money was not spent in the 
campaign because most of these parties did not campaign.”  
Adalberto da Costa Junior, Secretary of Assests in UNITA - on the distribution of state subsidies in the 
2008 election in Angola.108
 
 
Chapter 5 – Political funding in Angola: The story of an elite-driven party 
Visiting the party offices and headquarters of political parties in Angola can tell you a lot 
about the present power balance in the country as well as the nature of the parties. When 
doing fieldwork, I visited the offices of most political parties of note in present day Angolan 
politics. Bloco Democrático (BD), an opposition party with no representation in Parliament, 
have turned a garage just outside the city centre into a party office, which also combined as a 
place to print and store material for the party. The Secretary General met me by himself, and 
perhaps that was a good thing as there was not a lot of room for other people in the garage. 
The smallest of the three former liberation movements, Frente Nacional de Libertação de 
Angola (FNLA), which almost matched the military might of MPLA when Angola gained 
independence in 1975, today have three seats in the legislature. I talked to the Head of their 
Parliamentary Group in a run-down two-story office in downtown Luanda. The entrance was 
controlled by a group of old men sitting on chairs on the pavement outside the office, and me 
and my interpreter had to go through several clerks to reach our interview object. The Partido 
de Renovação Social (PRS), a party who primarily got their eight seats in Parliament through 
votes in the internal regions of Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte, has their office in a small but 
relatively nice house in the embassy area in central Luanda. Their office was quiet, organised 
and welcoming. UNITA, the largest opposition former civil war rival of the MPLA, owns and 
rents several offices in Luanda, but still does not feel completely welcome; they still have 
unanswered claims on several large buildings in the city which were taken over by the MPLA 
during the Civil War.109
The MPLA headquarters in Luanda occupies several blocks in the centre of Luanda. 
The next-door neighbour is the state-owned television channel. The whole compound is 
walled, and you have to pass a gatehouse and leave your ID to enter.
 Illustratively, the Secretary of Assets in the party chose to meet me in 
one of the many large hotels in Luanda.  
110
                                                 
108 Interview, Luanda, 27th of January 2011. 
 Inside, there are newly 
paved two-lane roads linking at least five eight-story buildings housing the “high and mighty” 
109 Interview Adalberto da Costa Junior, Secretary of Assets in UNITA, Luanda, 27th of January 2011. 
110 Interestingly, the only other place I went in Luanda that commanded the same security procedures was the US 
Embassy. 
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within the party, as well as other parts of the party organization. After passing through the 
gatehouse, we still had to navigate another security checkpoint and two secretaries in order to 
reach the Secretary of Information of the Politburo of the MPLA for the appointed interview. 
The above tells you two things about the current state of political parties in Angola. First of 
all, many of the parties are still affected by their organization during the civil war, and 
especially the parties that sprung out of the liberation movements are organised in a strict 
hierarchical way. Secondly, and most importantly, the state of their party offices reflects the 
current general financial state of the political parties; no-one can compete with the economic 
and organizational muscle of the MPLA. This financial muscle was put to effective use in the 
2008 parliamentary election, when the European Union Election Observation Mission found 
that “the playing field for political contestants was unbalanced by the MPLA’s use of state 
resources during its campaign” (EUEOM 2008: 20). This seems to indicate that MPLA’s 
financial advantage is connected to their control of the state apparatus. After the election, 
UNITA lodged a complaint to the National Election Commission111
 
 in Angola (CNE) 
regarding what they perceived to be illegal funding by commercial bank BDE of the MPLA’s 
campaign. The CNE promised to investigate the complaint, but two years later UNITA had yet 
to receive a response. All this illustrates the complexity of the funding issue in Angola, and 
the difficulty in gathering data on it. This chapter will show that in order to understand the 
financial side of the political playing field in Angola, one has to take into account factors such 
as the economy, history and political organization of the country. In order to highlight this 
though, the thesis will first look at what types of political funding that are important for the 
political parties in Angola. In section 5.1 it will therefore clarify the situation of the dependent 
variable in Angola. After this the chapter turns to the independent variables and try to map the 
causal mechanisms surrounding political funding.  The focus will be on historical elements 
(5.2), and also structural elements such as the economy and political institutions (5.3), and 
identify reasons for why the funding situation is as it is. Finally, this chapter will map out the 
political funding system in Angola and the implications of it (5.4). 
5.1 The financial situation of political parties in Angola in 2011 
Political funding is not considered to be the biggest challenge of political parties in Angola. 
Most of the opposition parties complain about more directly oppressive methods used by 
MPLA, while the ruling MPLA has ample access to funding. Nevertheless, when probed there 
                                                 
111 Commisão Nacional Eleitoral de Angola 
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does seem to be important issues in Angolan politics that are connected with the issue of 
funding, and most parties have clear opinions on what these issues are.112 The following 
section will present the funding situation of the largest parties represented in the Angolan 
Parliament, as well as two parties that currently have no MPs. Finding data on the financial 
situation of political parties in Angola is hard. Article 96 of the Angolan Electoral Law113 
specifies that all parties competing in elections must hand in their audited accounts to the 
Tribunal das Contas114
 
 (TdC) and CNE no later than sixty days after the announcement of the 
election results. Parties who qualify for state subsidies must hand in their accounts annually. 
Yet these accounts are not made public. While in Luanda repeated attempts at contacting the 
TdC in order to try to both interview them and to gain access to the accounts were 
unsuccessful. Therefore, I have to rely on the information given by the political parties as well 
as previously published reports. 
MPLA  
The MPLA is without a doubt the richest and most well-off party in Angola. After the 2008 
legislative election, MPLA hold 86% of the seats in the Angolan Parliament. This means that 
they receive the lion’s share of the official state subsidies, which is distributed based on the 
parties’ representation in Parliament.115 According to Santana (2006: 45) state subsidies is the 
main source of income for parties that qualify for it, and thus a substantial portion of MPLA’s 
income should be expected to come from this source. This was confirmed by Secretary of 
Information Rui Falcao, who claims that it is the “main source of income for this party”.116
                                                 
112 Interview with party representatives of the major Angolan political parties, Luanda, January 2011 
 
Nevertheless, the enormous financial muscle that the MPLA displayed before the 2008 
parliamentary election cannot just come from state subsidies. The ruling party initiated their 
campaign five months before the campaign period started, and six months before the actual 
election (Campos 2008: 9). The state subsidies were given based on the 1992 election results 
at this time and in that election MPLA only won a slight majority and should thus only have a 
slight funding advantage: before the 2008 election MPLA received US$ 19 million in state 
subsidies, only US$ 7 million more than UNITA (Human Rights Watch 2009: 20). This is a 
lot less than even modest estimates of what the MPLA spent in the 2008 campaigns (Roque 
2009: 142). It therefore seems like a reasonable assumption that the MPLA can rely on 
income from other types of fundraising as well, especially during elections. There is a 
113 Law 7/2004 
114 Office of the Auditor General 
115 Law revising the Law on Financing of Political Parties (Law 7/2002) 
116 Interview Luanda, 26th of January 2011 
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tradition and expectation within the party that members in public positions and especially 
members in elected position should contribute both a percentage of their salary to the party, as 
well as regular larger donations whenever the party requires it. Some of the members within 
the MPLA are among the richest persons in Angola, in fact, in 2003, the seven richest men in 
Angola were all part of the top tier of the MPLA (McMillan 2005: 156). The MPLA is the 
only party that has a meaningful organization across the country, both in towns and rural 
areas. At the same time, membership dues from regular members were not considered an 
important source of income for the party.117 Finally, the ruling party has established a large 
network of party businesses, especially related to their PR-department, which generates 
income for the party.118 According to Marques (2010) the party businesses are gathered within 
the business conglomerate Sociedade de Gestão e Participações Financeiras (GEFI).119
As mentioned before, the use of public resources during the 2008 campaigns was 
widespread, and it was hard to separate the state from the party (Campos 2008; Human Rights 
Watch 2009). The government inaugurated a significantly higher number of government 
projects in the period leading up to the election than they have in previous years, and this was 
done in such a way that these projects appeared as part of the MPLA-campaign (Chabal 2007: 
148; Campos 2008: 9; EUEOM 2008: 21). While this is not direct use of state resources, it 
creates the impression that the party and the state are similar, and thus that the projects are 
funded as much by MPLA as it is by the Angolan state. State officials were also reported to be 
threatened into supporting the MPLA (EUEOM 2008: 21). Both of these issues must be 
considered a funding advantage. The lack of separation between the state and the party in 
Angola is there for all to see,
 Its 
current business portfolio includes 64 companies in sectors such as hotels, industry, banking, 
fisheries, media, construction and real estate. These businesses are among the most important 
in the Angolan economy. 
120
                                                 
117 Interview with Rui Falcao, Secretary of Information in the Politburo of MPLA, Kampala, 26th of January 
2011 
 and this became very apparent for a lot of Angolans in 2008 
when “all over Angola, a significant number of civil servants did nothing in august 2008 
except work for the MPLA’s campaign” (Pacheco 2009: 133). The cooptation of traditional 
authorities and “Soba’s” have further strengthened the patronage-network as a source of 
funding for the party (Roque 2009; Orre 2010a; Schubert 2010: 666). At MPLA rallies in the 
118 Interview with Rui Falcao, Secretary of Information in the Politburo of MPLA, Kampala, 26th of January 
2011, see also Orre (2010) 
119 “Business Management and Participation Company” 
120 Even Secretary of Information of the Politburo of MPLA Rui Falcao agreed that they had “some issues” with 
this. 
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2008 election campaign, gifts such as motorbikes and televisions were regularly given to the 
local population (Human Rights Watch 2009: 22). 
Other forms of graft have been more direct. The above-mentioned GEFI has in the past 
benefited from “murky transfers of state assets” (Marques 2010) which has strengthened the 
clientilist networks of the MPLA. According to Tony Hodges, there is every reason to believe 
that “oil-financed patronage has been a fundamental part of the strategy pursued by the 
President for the conservation of political power” (Hodges 2007: 186). The oil sector creates 
direct income for the Angolan state and thus indirectly the ruling party. It also creates a 
“rentier class” of Angolan citizens that depend on the state in order to prosper economically, 
and thus support the MPLA with both votes and material and non-material resources. This 
“rentier class” can be considered to be part of the Angolan elite, but it is not necessarily part 
of the party-elite; those who occupy the top tier of the party and are members of the politburo 
(Messiant 2001; 2007). They are all party supporters though, and depend on the party for 
financial benefits. Finally, the income from oil-related business has also created a very 
wealthy “internal” party elite that benefits from favourable access to government contracts 
and tenders (Hodges 2007). These internal elites are expected to contribute to the party, as 
described above. This is a clear combination of graft and plutocratic funding. The general lack 
of transparency in Angola makes such transactions easy to conduct and hard to track 
(McMillan 2005; Hodges 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2008; Human Rights Watch 2010). 
It is increasingly hard to separate between the government and many of the larger 
Angolan enterprises (Vines et.al 2005). This is an effect of what Schubert (2010: 666) calls 
the partidarização of the Angolan economy: the post-war economic boom has been led by 
party elites and relatives of the President. Sonangol is a case in point, where most of the 
senior executives and directors are members of the MPLA.121
                                                 
121 Interview with leader of OSISA-Angola, Luanda 24th of February 2011; see also de Oliveira (2007). 
 Parts of signature bonuses from 
oil contracts have previously shown up in accounts related to important figures within the 
MPLA (McMillan 2005: 159-160). The party also enjoys unequalled access to the Angolan 
media, especially the state-owned newspapers that have a monopoly outside Luanda (Campos 
2008: 10). The representatives of the party also control large parts of the independent media; a 
company closely linked with President dos Santos recently bought a large share of several of 
the independent newspapers in Luanda (Human Rights Watch 2011). This control over the 
most important enterprises in the Angolan economy and society creates opportunities for 
“graft-generated” plutocratic funding. According to Roque “it is estimated that the MPLA’s 
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2008 campaign cost $300 million, likely funded by donations from Sonangol and Endiama as 
well as from private companies and investors” (Roque 2009: 142). US$ 30 million was 
donated for the 2008 campaign of MPLA by seventy wealthy businessmen after the third 
National Congress of the MPLA in 2008 (Human Rights Watch 2009: 21). This is 
problematic, given that official contributions from state owned enterprises and foreign entities 
are not allowed by the Angolan Law on Political Parties and the Electoral Law.122
The above seems to indicate that the MPLA gets the “best of both worlds” in terms of 
funding: it both gets the lion’s share of the official subsidies, and in addition to this has a large 
patronage- and clientilist network that both generate direct income from state sources to the 
party, as well as generate income for internal and external elites that contribute with large 
donations to the party when needed. In addition to this, the MPLA has the best and largest 
organisation, which makes them better able to fundraise from sources based on smaller 
internal donations and party business. 
 
 
UNITA 
After finally coming out of the bush in 2002, UNITA claims to have established itself as the 
only other party in Angola besides the MPLA that truly has a national presence,123 although 
this presence in the countryside has waned considerable following the end of the civil war.124 
According to Secretary of Assets in UNITA, Adalberto da Costa Junior, the main source of 
income for UNITA at present is still the state subsidies, although these decreased immensely 
after the 2008 election.125 Using the amount they got before the 2008 election as an indicator, 
their current representation would give them around US$ 2.5-3.5 million in state subsidies a 
year, a staggering fall from the US$ 12-15 million126 they received before the election. The 
fact that UNITA has large-scale social obligations as well increases the importance of this. 
The party is responsible for the well-being of former UNITA-soldiers who fought during the 
civil war, as well as wives or orphans who lost their family fighting for UNITA. In addition, 
they have to pay scholarships for students associated with UNITA to receive an education 
abroad.127
                                                 
122 Law 7/2004 and 2/2005 
 All in all, Adalberto da Costa Junior thinks that the party would need “three times 
123 Interview with Secretary of Assets of UNITA Adalberto da Costa Junior, Luanda 27th of January 2011 
124 Interview with leader of OSISA-Angola, Luanda 24th of February 2011, see also Orrre (2010: 115-116) 
125 Interview, Luanda 27th of January 2011 
126 Depending on whether you believe the numbers of Human Rights Watch (2009) or Amundsen and Weimer 
(2008) on the previous size of the state subsidies. 
127 Interview with Secretary of Assets of UNITA Adalberto da Costa Junior, Luanda 27th of January 2011, see 
also Amundsen and Weimer (2008: 30) 
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their current level of income to cover running expenses, even outside campaigns”.128
Nevertheless, while UNITA certainly have burdens from its legacy as the civil war 
rival of MPLA, it also enjoys some benefits. First and foremost, it owns more businesses and 
property than any of the other opposition parties, and it has previously been linked with 
interests in the diamond industry in Eastern Angola (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 30). The 
latter has been denied by UNITA, and they have continuously complained about their 
properties not being returned to them as agreed upon in the peace accords.
 In the 
2008 election, the party complained about the lateness of the campaign funding that were 
supposed to be given to all political parties by the state on an equitable basis. The money, 
which totalled at US$ 1.2 million for each party, was not given to the parties until three weeks 
before the election (Human Rights Watch 2009: 21). From 2002 some elements from UNITA 
took part in the Governo de Unidade Nacional (GURN) government that was established in 
the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and this provided some access to state institutions, which could 
have helped their financial position (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 30). This was curtailed 
along with any other such privilege after the 2008 election and the abolishment of GURN.  
129 Radio station 
Rádio Despertar is affiliated with the party,130
The party does receive contributions from its members (Amundsen and Weimer 
2008:30), but it faces problems with this type of grassroot fundraising because such a large 
part of the economy is controlled by the MPLA. This makes it difficult for them to attract 
funds, because most of the business community supports the MPLA. This leaves UNITA with 
the possibility of fundraising from the internal elite of the party. Like the MPLA, UNITA has 
a strong culture of contributing to the party coffers when needed.
 but it only broadcasts in Luanda and has 
regularly been closed down by the government. Furthermore, UNITA is also closely 
associated with PR- and communication company Socitel, which generates some income for 
the party (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 31). Finally, the party enjoys some support from 
UNITA supporters living abroad. 
131
 
 This, together with public 
subsidies and party-associated business, produces the bulk of the funding for UNITA. 
PRS 
The third-biggest party in the Angolan Parliament is also the oldest of the non-liberation 
movement parties. It was established in 1990, and enjoys strong support in both Lunda Sul 
                                                 
128 Interview Luanda, 27th of January 2011  
129 Interview with Secretary of Assets of UNITA Adalberto da Costa Junior, Luanda 27th of January 2011, see 
also Amundsen and Weimer (2008: 30) 
130 Though it now officially has the status of an independent radio station (Roque 2009: 141) 
131 Interview with Secretary of Assets of UNITA Adalberto da Costa Junior, Luanda 27th of January 2011 
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and Lunda Norte as well as (to a lesser extent) Moxico, which are the easternmost provinces 
of Angola.132 The party is considered to be well-organized and well-funded (Roque 2009: 
145). The PRS actually gained two additional seats in the 2008 election, taking their total up 
to eight seats, half of that of the biggest opposition party UNITA. Subsequently this also 
increased their share of the state subsidies, which the party names as its most important source 
of income in addition to contributions from its members. Finally, the party’s elected officials 
also contribute 10% - 15% of their salary to the party.133
The party enjoys strong support in the diamond-rich areas of the country, and 
Amundsen and Weimer (2008: 18) found that this regional support does not only translate into 
political support but also financial support. The members contribute both materially and 
through volunteering. They own some infrastructure and property, but they claim that their 
effort to expand this part of the party business has been hampered by the MPLA 
government.
  
134
 
 Before the 2008 election, the PRS, who is considered to be a moderate 
opposition party who at least in the past has cooperated closely with MPLA (Amundsen and 
Weimer 2008: 17), had two government portfolios in the GURN government, and these 
portfolios also created income for the party. The loss of this has been compensated by the 
increase in state subsidies, which must now be considered to be the most important source 
together with membership-dues and internal and external plutocratic funding.  
FNLA 
After the opening up of multiparty-politics in Angola at the beginning of the 1990s FNLA 
returned from its exile in Zaire to participate as a political party. After the death of founder 
Holden Roberto the party has suffered numerous party splits which have threatened to unravel 
the whole party organization of the former liberation movement (Amundsen and Weimer 
2008: 19-20). FNLA has its strongest following in the north; particularly Zaire and Uige are 
provinces where they have a strong following, and it was primarily here that they garnered the 
votes that gave them 3 MPs in the 2008 legislative election. The party thus qualifies for state 
subsidies, but has not seen any party funding for a number of years. While the FNLA claim 
that this is because the FNLA have been too critical of the MPLA and that the government 
                                                 
132 In fact, due to the large support enjoyed by the PRS Lunda Sul was the only province where MPLA came 
close to receiving less than 50% of the vote in the 2008 election. 
133 Interview with Sapalo Antonio, Head of the Parliamentary Group of PRS, Luanda 18th of January 2011, see 
also Amundsen and Weimer (2008: 18) 
134 Interview with Sapalo Antonio, Head of the Parliamentary Group of PRS, Luanda 18th of January 2011 
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therefore is punishing them,135 the official reason is that the party splits have made it difficult 
for the government to identify the legitimate arm of the party (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 
20). This seems legitimate, but it should nevertheless have ended when the Election 
Commission approved one of the factions for the 2008 election. Even after the election, the 
party claims that the subsidies have not been forthcoming.136
Therefore, the main source of income for the party is membership contributions. 
Members of the party are required to pay a fee of US$ 1 each month, but how many who 
actually do this is a contested issue.
 
137
 
 The party has a strong culture for contributing, and the 
MPs and elected officials contribute a portion of their salary to the party. In addition, Leader 
of the Parliamentary Group N’Gola Kabangu claims that the party would have been able to 
raise significant money from supporters abroad, but that this is denied to them by law. He thus 
sums up the financial situation of the FNLA like this: 
”Inside Angola we do not get enough money, and we are forbidden by law from 
getting money from outside. This was a big source for us. So because of that we are 
facing big problems. We are fighting very hard because we cannot practice politics 
without money.”138
 
  
Political parties outside parliament – BD and PDP-ANA 
Due to the perceived importance of the state subsidies in Angola, I felt it was necessary to 
include some of the political parties who do not have representation in parliament in order to 
illustrate what the reality is like for parties that do not enjoy the benefit of state subsidies. 
Bloco Democrático (BD) is the new party born out of the Frente para a Democracía party 
that disbanded itself after the 2008 elections. It did this in order to avoid being forcefully 
disbanded for not reaching the threshold of 0.5% of the votes in a legislative election that 
parties are required to reach in order to continue to be registered. The party has its 
membership base in the intellectual circles of the major cities (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 
14). After the election BD was the first opposition party to re-register, and the party is 
struggling with the financial weight of this challenge. Re-registering the party is very 
expensive; the Law on Political Parties demands that you need to collect 7500 signatures of 
                                                 
135 Interview with N’Gola Kabangu, Head of Parliamentary Group of FNLA, Luanda, 21st of January 2011 
136 Interview with N’Gola Kabangu, Head of Parliamentary Group of FNLA, Luanda, 21st of January 2011 
137 Interview with N’Gola Kabangu, Head of Parliamentary Group of FNLA, Luanda, 21st of January 2011, see 
also Amundsen and Weimer (2008: 20) 
138 138 Interview with N’Gola Kabangu, Head of Parliamentary Group of FNLA, Luanda, 21st of January 2011 
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which there has to be no less than 150 signatures from each Province in Angola. Furthermore, 
you need a photocopy of an identity document of each of the subscribers. BD has struggled to 
cope with these expenditures, but claim to have done so primarily through the contributions of 
its members and donations from friends outside the party.139 The party has faced problems in 
acquiring property, but was finally due to inaugurate its new office in Viana outside Luanda 
later in 2011. This lease is sponsored by a prominent member within the party. The goal is for 
membership dues to cover running expenses and other sources of income used for expanded 
their resource base.140 The lack of public funding limits the activities of the party, and they 
are struggling. Nevertheless, they used some of the money given to the FpD in the 2008 
election to acquire equipment such as cars, computers and printers, and this is something the 
party benefits from today. Because they dissolved themselves before the courts did, they were 
allowed to keep most of these goods.141
PDP-ANA
 Thus the party has made the most of the one-time 
support for parties with no parliamentary seats. 
142 was the only party that reached the 0.5 threshold required to survive the 
election but did not get any representation in parliament, something which the party is very 
dissatisfied with. They claim that the amount of votes they garnered should mathematically be 
enough for them to receive a seat in parliament, and that the electoral system is favourable to 
the bigger parties and the MPLA. The lack of representation in parliament has hit them hard 
financially, as they no longer qualify for state subsidies.143 The party gets by based on 
membership contributions, but these are barely enough to suffice and President of the party 
Sindiangami Mbinde confirms that they struggle to fundraise from the private sector.144 PDP-
ANA has previously been considered a moderate and MPLA-close opposition party, and as 
part of the GURN government they had some access to government resources (Amundsen and 
Weimer 2008: 25). But recently things have changed; PDP-ANA was the only registered 
political party that initially endorsed the protests called against MPLA and President dos 
Santos in March 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2011) The party has previously been supported 
in the poor areas of Luanda such as Palanca, but was unable to compete with the MPLA’s 
financial muscle in the 2008 election.145
                                                 
139 Interview with Filomeno Viera Lopes, Secretary General of BD, Luanda 23rd of January 2011 
 The party’s financial position is precarious due to its 
140 Interview with Filomeno Viera Lopes, Secretary General of BD, Luanda 23rd of January 2011 
141 Interview with Nelson Pestana, Member of BD and Political Scientist, Bergen 25th of February 2011 
142 Partido Democrático para o Progresso – Alliança Nacional Angolano 
143 Interview with Sindiangami Mbinde, President of PDP-ANA, Luanda 24th of January 2011. 
144 Interview Luanda, 24th of January 20011 
145 Interview with Sindiangami Mbinde, President of PDP-ANA, Luanda 24th of January 2011. 
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lack of state subsidies, but they have managed to preserve a small organization based on 
voluntary work and contributions from wealthy members within the party. 
 
The financial strength and diversity of the MPLA and the financial weakness of the opposition 
All in all, section 5.1 seems to indicate that while most political parties do not seem to think 
that political funding is the most essential issue in Angolan politics at present, there is 
nevertheless a very uneven playing field both in terms of financial strength and access to 
possible revenue sources. First of all, there can be little doubt that MPLA has a lot more 
money than the opposition parties. Perhaps surprisingly though, it not just the size that varies, 
but also the number of possible revenue sources: the ruling party has more possible revenue 
sources that can be considered as important or very important in their fundraising efforts. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates this by using the 13 subtypes of funding sources identified in figure 2.2 
in chapter 2 and classifying the parties according to how important they are for each of the 
parties in Angola based on the findings above.146
 
 It shows that while the ruling MPLA have 
multiple revenue sources that they can call upon, the other parties are left with few.  
Figure 5.1: Number of funding sources sorted after degree of importance for different political parties in 
Angola 
 
Source: See appendix 3 
 
Most of the sources that are important to the opposition are based on grassroot or 
internal plutocratic funding. It is nevertheless important to remember that the categorization is 
based on relative importance. Even though membership dues are considered to be of high 
importance for BD and only of medium importance for UNITA and MPLA, the two larger 
                                                 
146 See appendix 3 for full classification of all subtypes for all parties 
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parties are nevertheless likely to generate much more revenue in actual numbers. An 
important consequence of this is that the few sources the small parties have will naturally be 
considered to be important no matter how small they are. Nevertheless, figure 5.1 seems to 
confirm most of the elements in terms of number of sources presented in table 2.3 in chapter 
2: the incumbent party enjoys access to more sources of revenue than the opposition parties 
do. Sources linked to the state are especially important for the party in power, and both state 
subsidies and income from graft is very important for MPLA. Nevertheless, formal state 
subsidies are also very important for the opposition parties that qualify for them, something 
which the theory seemed to indicate that it would not be. This is linked to the general 
importance of the state in the Angolan economy, and will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
The three subcategories of foreign funding are deemed to have little or no importance. 
This is because it is illegal for political parties to receive funding from foreign entities in 
Angola.147 Therefore, the opposition has been cut off from the only funding source that 
theoretically should favour them more than the incumbent party. International agencies were 
active in providing technical support and voter education before the 2008 election, but this 
rapidly changed after the 2008 election. USAID considers it “not strategic” to work with 
political parties after the election, as the opposition has little power to affect the outcome 
anyway.148
 
 Plutocratic funding is important, and internal plutocratic funding is the only factor 
that is considered to be of high importance for both the opposition and the incumbent party, as 
indicated by the theory. Nevertheless, the size of the plutocratic funding is much higher for 
the incumbent party, and there seems to be a link between the graft category and that of 
plutocratic funding, as indicated in the theory chapter. Finally, grassroot funding is of some 
importance for all the political parties, but it is relatively more important for the small parties 
who do not qualify for party funding between elections. In general, these findings seem to 
correspond well with the little previous work that has been done on party funding in Angola 
(Santana 2006: 48-49; Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 9). Taking these observations and 
findings into account, the rest of this chapter will look at reasons for why the funding situation 
in Angola is as described above, and what the consequences of this are. 
                                                 
147 Law 7/2004 Electoral Law of Angola, Article 94  
148 Interview with Ranca Tuba, Leader of Democracy Promotion for USAID in Angola, Luanda 21st of January 
2011 
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5.2 Political parties in Angola: A brief historic outlook 
As stated in chapter 2 and 3, there is every reason to believe that a phenomenon such as 
political funding has been affected by historical factors, both of contextual- and non-
contextual origin. This means that in order to investigate the mechanisms surrounding 
political funding in Angola, one has to review elements of Angolan history that are relevant 
for the issue of political funding. Representatives of all political parties point to specific 
elements of the history of Angola as major explanatory factors for why the political situation 
and the funding situation are as they are today.149
 
 Therefore I will present a brief history of 
the political parties in Angola, and highlight the elements that seem to have affected the 
current funding situation. 
The first political parties – the three liberation movements 
The first political parties that emerged in Angola were the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. These 
were first generation liberation movements that fought against the Portuguese colonial regime 
in the 1960s and 70s. After the Portuguese gave up their colonial empire in 1975, the 
liberation movements turned on each other and thus started a civil war that would rip Angola 
apart for the best part of the next 27 years. The three parties had different international 
supporters, and the first part of the conflict was heavily tainted by Cold War-allegiances. 
MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba; UNITA was supported by the United 
States and South Africa150 and FNLA by Mobutu’s Zaire and to some extent the United States 
(Birmingham 2002: 147). The military legacy and international support was created a lasting 
impact on the nature of the political parties that received this support. All three organizations 
are hierarchical; this especially holds for the MPLA. When in Angola, I observed a very 
strong internal unity within the parties, and it was difficult to speak to lower-level officials 
because they would constantly worry about whether their superiors would approve of what 
they were saying. This hierarchical legacy has created a system with little transparency, which 
can also be seen in the area of political funding. The non-liberation movement parties in 
Angola all express the importance of this legacy on the party system in Angola.151
The FNLA was quickly defeated by the MPLA and withdrew to Zaire, but UNITA 
established supremacy in the South-Eastern part of the country and especially in rural areas. 
 
                                                 
149 Interviews with representatives of MPLA, UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD and PDP-ANA, January 2011 
150 UNITA also received support in from China in the 1960s and 70s. Savimbi received most of his military 
training there, for example. This is part of the explanation for why the Chinese presence in Angola did not “take 
off” until the end of the Civil War. It can also partly explain the hierarchical organization of UNITA, as Savimbi 
was inspired by the Chinese Communist Party. 
151 Interviews with representatives of PRS, BD and PDP-ANA, Luanda, January 2011 
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MPLA received most of their support from the urban population, as well as Angolans from 
mixed decent and from the Mbundu ethnic group. After a coup attempt made by disenchanted 
poor from Luanda and led by Commander Nito Alves killed several of the top leadership of 
MPLA in 1977, the party became more paranoid and worried about other factions within the 
party, and even more elitist than it was previously. After this, the party-elite focused even 
more on protecting their own interests (Birmingham 2002: 153; Messiant 2007: 96). At the 
beginning of the 1980’s the party became increasingly elitist and linked to the person of 
President dos Santos (Vidal 2007: 129). Thus the fear of facing an internal revolt can be seen 
as one of the driving factors behind the importance of plutocratic funding in Angola.  
While MPLA controlled the cities and the northern regions, the Ovimbundu people in 
the central highlands was considered the ethnic backbone of UNITA. Throughout the civil 
war MPLA kept control of the coast and thus also the oil industry, while UNITA for long 
periods dominated the diamond areas of north-eastern Angola (Hodges 2007). While the 
importance of oil and diamonds in Angola is debated further in section 5.3 below, it is 
important to notice that this legacy still seems to have an effect on the type of business the 
different parties are linked to. MPLA still controls the oil economy, while UNITA and to 
some extent the PRS have connections within the diamond industry. This can be seen as a 
legacy of the geographical zones they controlled during the civil war. Though MPLA 
controlled much of the country for most of the 70s and 80s, there was to some extent always 
fighting, and after Reagan came to power in the US and combined with increased support 
from South Africa UNITA battled hard in the South. The civil war became even less civil 
(Birmingham 2002: 154-55). The end of the Cold War had to come before the first attempt to 
peacefully solve the dispute succeeded. 
 
The first peace and the 1992 election 
With the end of the Cold War the parties returned to the negotiating table, and a peace accord 
was finally reached in Bicesse, Portugal in 1991 and elections where scheduled for 1992. The 
process was controlled by the United Nations, and the world was watching. A flurry of new 
parties were established, and the process leading up to the September 1992 elections were 
considered to be very encouraging, with a relatively free and fair campaign (Maier 1996; 
Birmingham 2002). The MPLA, who controlled the Angolan government and oil industry, 
campaigned on economic policies. Starting in the late 80s and intensifying in the lead-up to 
the election dos Santos and the MPLA toned down the communist rhetoric and ideology, 
especially in relation to the economy. Now the focus was much more on privatization and 
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socialist democracy (Birmingham 2002; Lodge et.al 2002; Messiant 2007). In general, afro-
communist parties were not as ideologically strong as communist regimes elsewhere. They 
had a more pragmatic approach to communism (Lewis 2006: 477). This had important 
consequences for the development of Angolan economy and the type of patronage network 
the MPLA was able to implement. Privatization created new opportunities, as discussed more 
thoroughly in the following sections. Savimbi and UNITA on the other hand ran a much more 
lively and populist campaign (Maier 1996).  
The election was generally considered to be free and fair by international observers 
(Lodge et.al. 2002: 20). The MPLA won the legislative election with 54% of the votes, but the 
presidential election was a more even contest. While President dos Santos won with 49,6% of 
the votes compared to Savimbi’s 40%, he failed to garner the 50% required, and the 
presidential contest went to a second round because none of the candidates got the required 
50%. According to Birmingham “the countryside voted for the opposition, for Savimbi and 
for change, while the towns voted for the government, for preferential economic treatment 
and for armed protection from the hungry raiders out in the rural areas” (Birmingham 2002: 
172). This indicates that even in the 1992 election, MPLA benefited from controlling the 
economic resources of the state. UNITA and Savimbi decided to not accept the results 
however, and the second round of the presidential election was never held and war resumed. 
The post-1992 civil war was in many ways different from the first round of the civil 
war. First of all, it was not primarily funded from abroad anymore. While the MPLA 
government in Luanda relied on oil income, UNITA controlled much of the diamond trade, 
and there were plenty of foreign buyers for both (Birmingham 2002: 174-175). Oil generated 
more income than the diamonds though, and the parties came to a peace agreement in Lusaka 
in 1994. In this agreement the parties agreed to create a common government (the previously 
mentioned GURN), but it took a few years for it to take effect. MPLA and dos Santos was 
nevertheless able to use this to attract elements of the opposition to the capital and co-opt 
them into the government and their constantly expanding patronage-network, who at this time 
was benefiting from the extensive privatization process (Birmingham 2002; Hodges 2007), as 
well as the “colonization” of civil society in the capital (Messiant 2001). The peace agreement 
did not last long, and the fighting kept on with varying intervals until the Angolan army killed 
Savimbi in 2002. 
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The new peace and the controlled approach to the 2008 election 
Militarily defeated, UNITA finally handed in their guns in 2002 after agreeing to the so-called 
Luena-accords that among other things included an amnesty for war crimes committed during 
the conflict. This “second peace” was very different from the first, and MPLA was very much 
in control of the situation. The leader of OSISA-Angola described the process following the 
Luena-accord as: “the accommodation of the one who lost. And when you lose you shut up; 
then you have to obey the rules of the winner”.152
Once UNITA left the countryside, MPLA moved in and established itself as a major 
societal force in many of the former strongholds of the opposition-movement. UNITA was 
mainly limited to Luanda and the other major cities (Roque 2009: 140).
 Roque echoes this and points out that the 
nature of the peace gave the MPLA the power to shape the political process as they wanted: 
“In short, the victorious MPLA had license to shape the post-war political configuration to 
suit its interests” (Roque 2009: 139). This seems to indicate that the political process after the 
war has pretty much been dominated by the MPLA. According to Vidal (2007: 144) the 
MPLA has been preparing for elections ever since its party congress in 2003. Since the theory 
presented in chapter 2 indicated that such control should lead to a favourable climate for the 
incumbent party, this seems to be consistent with the theory. Part 5.4 below will look closer at 
how this control has been manifested in terms of political funding. 
153 This meant that 
UNITA lost its membership base and the MPLA expanded theirs; by 2008 MPLA had 2.8 
million people on its membership rolls out of a population of approximately 16 million 
(Roque 2009: 140), and most of the increase in membership after the end of the civil war has 
come from previous UNITA strongholds in the central highlands (Vidal 2007: 145). In some 
areas of Angola it is more normal and important to have a voter and party card than it is to 
have an identity card.154
The 2008 elections provided the result that everyone observing the build-up expected: 
MPLA won a landslide and has used its overwhelming majority in the parliament to change 
the constitution. While the new constitution is generally in line with democratic constitutions 
in terms of its focus on human rights and equality, it does concentrate even more power in the 
hands of a president that is not even directly elected anymore. According to Orre the 
 This indicates the importance of the system surrounding the ruling 
party in post-civil war Angola.  
                                                 
152 Interview, Luanda, 24th of January 2011, also echoed by Chabal (2007:  7, 14) 
153 Also mentioned in interview with leader of OSISA-Angola, Luanda 24th of January 2001 
154 Interview with leader of OSISA-Angola, Luanda 24th of January. He based his comments on research 
(unpublished) done in a municipality outside Lubango where they found that the citizens are more likely to have 
party and voter cards than other ID-cards. 
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constitution brought very little new to the table, and rather seems to “cement the status quo in 
Angola: the party-state remains entrenched under the supreme leadership in the person of 
Preident dos Santos” (Orre 2010b: 13). In terms of political funding, history seems to indicate 
that the status quo is quite favourable for MPLA, and especially the upper tier of the party; the 
so-called party elite. This historical account has shown how the MPLA have gained and 
maintained control over Angolan society, and how some of these historical elements still have 
an effect on political funding. Two of the aspects of Angolan society which MPLA has 
gradually taken control over is the economy and the legal and institutional framework. I will 
now turn to these structural factors. 
 
5.3 Structural factors affecting political funding in Angola 
Besides historical factors there are structural factors that are just as important when trying to 
explain the causes of the political funding situation described in part 5.1 above. I focus 
primarily on economic factors and the legal and institutional framework. 
 
Economic factors – It’s the oil, stupid! 
Two factors already mentioned in section 5.2 deserve more attention; the importance of oil 
and natural resources for the Angolan economy, and the importance of the state and the 
patronage network in the distribution of resources. As mentioned above, by the late 80’s 
MPLA took up a more capitalist rhetoric and started to privatize the economy. This brought 
new possibilities to expand their patronage and clientilist networks. Even NGO’s were 
included and used as a tool in this process. Messiant (2001) shows how the establishment of 
the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) was used as a tool to extend patronage and 
clientilist networks as a result of funding by the ruling elite within the MPLA through 
privatization and the oil economy. By the late 1990’s there was almost a personality cult 
surrounding president dos Santos, and you had to be a member of some kind of state-
sponsored civil-society organization often linked financially to the MPLA elite to take part in 
this network (Messiant 2001; Birmingham 2002; Hodges 2007). By the early part of this 
millennium MPLA had established a system “of clientilism in which members of the 
nomenklatura were able to make considerable financial profits from the privileged legal 
position by intervention in the informal (and illegal) economy” (Messiant 2001: 288).  
Messiant called this clientilist and patronage economy “the government’s most basic strategy” 
(Messiant 2001: 294). The importance of the President and what Messiant calls the 
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nomenklatura155
As explained in chapter 2, the size of such a network based on graft depends on the 
income of the government. In Angola, the state has a fool-proof source of income: oil. And it 
has lots of it. According to IMF the country had a GDP per capita (PPP) of $5632 in 2010, 
something which is far above the average of Sub-Saharan African economies. Most of this 
income is from the oil industry; Angola is the second-biggest producer of oil in Africa. The 
oil sector in Angola is not transparent. In 2001, British Petroleum (BP) announced that it 
would publish its payments to governments worldwide. Soon after, Sonangol’s President 
Manuel Vicente sent a letter where he threatened BP with contract termination if the company 
published these numbers from Angola (McMillan 2005: 163). While there has been increasing 
transparency since 2004 (Hodgens 2007), a recently published report revealed that there is a 
massive difference in figures both in terms of oil production and dividends paid to the 
Angolan government when you compare the numbers of Sonangol and the Finance Ministry 
(Global Witness 2011). A lot of money is unaccounted for in the Angolan economy. 
Examples of oil-money turning up in foreign accounts in Switzerland or other tax havens 
linked to President dos Santos himself, his family or other members of the MPLA-elite are 
numerous (McMillan 2005; Roque 2009). Some of this benefits the party. In addition, the oil 
economy generates other needs which the party businesses can benefit from (Marques 2011). 
These businesses are often given monopolies in their area, which makes them even more 
lucrative.
 in this system cannot be understated. This nomenklatura is then linked 
closely to the party, for which it provides both income and social support (Marques 2011). It 
also limits the fundraising possibilities of the opposition, because if you are contributing to 
the opposition you are most likely not within the patronage- or clientilist-network.  
156 Finally, there is the issue of the Chinese presence in Angola. Some of the 
opposition parties stated that they believed China’s economic activities in Angola support the 
incumbent regime.157
                                                 
155 I do not use the term nomenklatura, but rather talk about the elite, which is a wider concept than the 
previously introduced “party elite”. The elite also includes the economic dependent upper echelons of Angolan 
society who are closely tied to, but necesserialy members of, MPLA. 
 While the Chinese do not seem to support MPLA directly, their 
activities allow the government to keep many of their deals secret and thus decrease 
transparency (Roque 2009: 148; Schubert 2010: 658). To say that the Chinese infrastructure 
program in Angola has done the government “no harm” would be an understatement, and 
there seems to be a clear indication that infrastructure programs initiated with Chinese 
assistance multiplied before the 2008 election, and that this increased the popularity of the 
156 Interview with Nelson Pestana, Political Scientist at CEIC and Member of BD, Bergen, 25th of February 
2011. See also Roque (2009) and de Morais (2011) 
157 Interviews with opposition politicians of UNITA and FNLA, Luanda, January 2011. 
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MPLA (Chabal 2007: 146).  To say that the Chinese back MPLA with funds directly and that 
their presence must be considered a major funding advantage would be equally erroneous 
though.  
All this seems to indicate that the structure of the Angolan economy creates an ideal 
situation for the MPLA to maintain control over political funding. First of all, the size of its 
graft-funded network is large enough to both create a large, dependent elite that supports the 
party, and at the same time limits the fundraising possibilities of the opposition. This in turn is 
fuelled by an oil economy which both creates a state-centred and prosperous economy which 
increases the state coffers, and decreases the general transparency which makes it easier for 
the party to spread its graft-network. And as long as the oil-money flows into the state coffers 
and MPLA controls the state, this network can expand.158
 
  
The legal and institutional framework 
The electoral system in Angola is proportional and party-centred. The parliament has 223 
seats, 130 of which are divided by the national vote of a party and 3 of which are decided by 
the votes of expatriates. The other 90 seats are divided based on the votes within the 18 
regions of Angola. This introduces a slight federal touch to the electoral system and creates 
slightly disproportionate relationship between votes and seats. This is quite normal in systems 
based on proportional representation. It nevertheless favours parties with strong regional 
support, such as PRS. However, the fact that most of the seats are divided by national votes 
makes it imperative for the parties to compete on a national basis in order to challenge for 
power, and this stretches their resources. Angola is a very expensive country to campaign in, 
with poor infrastructure and communication facilities. In addition, the fact that the state media 
is the only media that broadcasts and publishes outside Luanda and that this media is heavily 
biased towards the ruling party (EUEOM 2008: 26; Roque 2009: 141-42), makes it even more 
difficult for most political parties to reach all areas of the country. The government control of 
the media was lamented by all the opposition parties interviewed.159
Following the Bicesse accords in 2002, MPLA started preparing for elections and 
pushing legislation through parliament (Vidal 2007: 144). Two of the laws that were passed 
touched directly on the issue of political funding. The Electoral Law (Law 7/04) regulates 
  Thus the national 
constituency favours parties with a large and well-funded organization. The primary effect of 
the electoral system therefore seems to be that it increases the importance of the party. 
                                                 
158 A sharp drop in oil prices would be a significant challenge to the MPLA though. 
159 Interviews with representatives of UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD and PDP-ANA, Luanda January 2011 
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electoral campaign finance. It specifies which sources that can contribute financially to the 
campaign of political parties, and which sources that are not allowed. Most interestingly, the 
law specifically states that the parties cannot receive financial contributions from foreign 
entities or state-owned institutions and companies. It also specifies that all parties shall be 
given state financing no later than ninety days prior to Election Day, and that this support 
shall be given to all competing parties based on the principle of equality. Finally, the law 
specifies the above-mentioned requirements in terms of reporting. In fact, the law specifies 
that the accounts must be published in a daily newspaper as well. The Law on Political 
Parties (Law 2/05) also regulates political funding, both directly and indirectly. Article 7 
specifies that all parties have equal rights in terms of access to public installations and state 
finance. Finally, this law also specifies that “affiliation in a political party does not confer any 
rights of a patrimonial nature”.160 This means that the being a member of a party gives you no 
additional rights over other citizens. It is not surprising that the laws affect the types of 
political funding; indeed they are meant to affect it. But what is interesting is what types of 
funding are allowed for, and what parts of the law that are implemented in practice. First of 
all, as pointed out in part 5.1, foreign funding is not allowed, and this is interesting given that 
this is one of the few sources that theoretically should contribute funding opportunities for the 
opposition. FNLA was very critical towards this part of the law.161 Like all the other elements 
of the laws though, it is selectively implemented, as illustrated by the fact that USAID and the 
German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung were allowed to carry out some capacity building with the 
political parties before the 2008 election.162
The institutions that are meant to enforce these laws are the CNE that is charged with 
ensuring that the elections are free and fair, Comissão Interministerial para o Processo 
Eleitoral (CIPE) that is inter-ministerial body responsible for the practicalities of the process, 
and the previously mentioned Tribunal das Contas who is charged with controlling the 
accounts of the parties in cooperation with CNE (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 6-7). The 
CNE is a formally independent body, but it is overwhelmingly dominated by the members of 
the MPLA (Schubert 2010: 660-61). According to Adalberto da Costa Junior, the opposition 
members of the CNE had little or no saying in the planning of the election, and the 
Commission was frequently dictated by other supporters of MPLA who were formally not 
 It is especially important that the laws on 
transparency and on state subsidies seem to be selectively implemented.  
                                                 
160 Law 2/05, Article 23.1 
161 Interview with N’Gola Kabangu, Head of the Parliamentary Group of FNLA, Luanda, 21st of January 2011 
162 Interview with Ranca Tuba, Leader of Democracy Promotion  USAID in Angola Luanda 21st of January 2011 
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part of the Commission. As an example he claimed that the company responsible for the 
distribution of voting material on Election Day was handpicked by the director of the National 
Reconstruction Office General Kopelipa, who is considered to be the second most powerful 
man in Angola and close with the President.163 CIPE is also controlled by the government and 
the ruling party (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 7). Finally, while TdC is formally 
independent, President dos Santos has recently stated that the MPLA “had not been fulfilling 
its watchdog role through the tribunal de contas” (quoted in Marques 2011). As stated by 
Angolan political scientist Nelson Pestana: “Tribunal das Contas is the right institution, it just 
practices its mandate wrong”.164
All this seems to indicate that while the legal framework seems to affect political 
funding directly through the laws that govern the political game, one must investigate the 
implementation of the legal and electoral framework to fully understand the effects of this on 
political funding. This will be done in the next section, which seeks to show how the issue of 
political funding is linked to the issue of the electoral authoritarian nature of the MPLA 
regime. The party seems quite happy to preserve the privileges of the party elite, which is 
dependent on the party just as much as the party is dependent on it. This seems to go back all 
the way to the start of the MPLA-era. And the intelligent and subtle switch from communist 
ideology to practical capitalism and privatization which has happened simultaneously with 
increasing oil-revenues has allowed the party to build its patronage- and clientilist network 
gradually, especially after the military defeat of UNITA in 2002.  
 
 
5.4 Controlling the state and controlling the opposition: Political funding in Angola 
As pointed out in the chapter 2, the ruling party in political in electoral authoritarian regimes 
typically use their control of state institutions to manipulate the regulation of political funding 
rules to favour themselves. The sections above have illustrated the massive funding gap 
between the MPLA and the opposition parties in Angola, as well as historical and structural 
reasons for this. It has highlighted that the MPLA does not only control formal state 
institutions, but even most of the Angolan economy is firmly under the control of cadres 
within the MPLA. This highlight that the ruling party has indeed managed to “politicize” 
public resources; which according to Greene (2010) is one of the primary reasons for why 
dominant parties in such systems continue to win elections. This section will illustrate how 
MPLA uses its control of the state and the economy to control and create an unlevel playing 
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95 
 
field in Angola. This has resulted in what I perceive to be extreme incumbency advantages 
that are linked to the electoral authoritarian nature of the regime. These extreme advantages 
are reflected both on the number and size of funding sources for the MPLA, and the lack of 
funding sources for the opposition. 
 
Funding MPLA-style - Mixing graft and plutocratic funding through control of the state 
Section and figure 5.1 highlighted the multitude of sources available for the MPLA to raise 
funds from. The party has a bigger membership base than the other parties combined. More 
importantly in a financial sense however, is that the party enjoy the lion’s share of both formal 
state subsidies and illegal state funding acquired through graft. Their party businesses enjoy 
important privileges given by the government and thus are income-generating machines. In 
addition, controlling the state and the economy has created an additional layer of elite 
Angolans who owe much of their wealth to the party and the party elite. How is this linked? 
 
Figure 5.2: The economic relationship between the elite, the state and the MPLA in Angola 
 
 
Section 5.2 shows how the MPLA have maintained control of the state in Angola since 
independence. The importance of the state in the Angolan economy has already been 
demonstrated and transparency is low. This means that the MPLA is able to control most of 
the funding options simply by controlling the state. In a country where this is the case, being 
in power is everything. Vidal (2007: 146) points out that there is “no clear distinction between 
the public and the private” in Angola, and that this is a major advantage of the MPLA. While 
Vidal (2007) and Messiant (2007) point out that it is not as much the party in power as it is 
the people in power, this is irrelevant here because the party is the network that binds them 
Elite
MPLAState
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together. While the party might not get as much direct income from graft as they would in 
countries were partisan interests came above the interests of individuals, in Angola you have a 
system that combines graft with plutocratic funding. Figure 5.2 above illustrates this.  
The figure shows that the largest player in Angola is the elite that include both the 
party elite and a dependent group of people outside the party. These groups of people supply 
the party with plutocratic funding. As figure 5.2 shows, what they get in return is control of 
the state through an election victory. This provides them with graft opportunities. In this 
sense, while the elite might be the most important player, the current electoral authoritarian 
system in Angola depends on MPLA because it is the vehicle used by the elite to mobilize 
voters and win elections. And the party wins elections by using its major funding advantage 
and control over the state apparatus to selectively distribute resources through patronage and 
clientilist networks. In addition, the party has a clear role in mobilizing the newly 
incorporated rural parts of the population in the MPLA-network (Orre 2010a: 94). Thus while 
the most important factor in the system might be the elite surrounding President dos Santos, it 
could not function without the help of the party. In fact, one might argue like Orre (2010a) 
that there is a fusion between the state and the ruling party in Angola. While Angola has no 
state-party and is a multiparty system, MPLA can be considered to be a part of the party-state 
because it is an organization built up around controlling the state and dispersing the financial 
benefits from this control. Chabal (2007: 12) points out that the current regime in Angola 
derives its power from two sources. One is the military, which is a “silent threat” that can be 
used as a “hard power” when needed. The other is the party, which is the subtle and more 
elegant vessel which the elite exercise its control over Angola: 
 
“It [MPLA] has become a formidable political instrument. It is true that the 
presidential system as it was consolidated by dos Santos after Neto’s death does not 
depend on the party since it is in the hand of a single man. All the same, the party is 
organised and disciplined enough to be used as an effective tool when called upon to 
do so. Since there is no meaningful distinction between party and state, the MPLA can 
never be short of resources to mount whatever campaign (electoral or otherwise) 
required by the leader” (Chabal 2007: 12, emphasis added). 
 
The recent constitutional change has highlighted the party as the preferred vessel of 
the regime to control power because it establishes party-based parliamentary elections as the 
legitimate way of gaining power. And as long as the party elite controls the oil-rich public and 
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private sector in Angola and can distribute graft-related material benefits and Chinese-backed 
infrastructure programs, it is hard to see how the MPLA could lose such elections, except 
perhaps through a steep drop in oil prices which would limit the graft-related income of the 
elite and thus the financial clout of the ruling party. As it stands, the party has a stranglehold 
on the political situation in Angola through its control of the state coffers.  
 
The issue of state subsidies and the problem of the opposition  
It seems like a paradox that even though the MPLA received the lion’s share of the formal 
state subsidies in Angola, it is perhaps less dependent on it than the opposition parties who in 
actual numbers receive far less. Nevertheless, because they have fewer alternative funding 
sources as described in figure 5.1, they simply do not have any other choice but to rely on 
state subsidies. There are few other realistic sources of funding. The above mentioned control 
of both the public and private economy by the MPLA makes it impossible for even private 
businesses to contribute with any money to the opposition parties. In the words of Vidal “it 
was simply not possible for a medium or large business to operate without political consent 
from the top” by the mid-1990s (Vidal 2007: 149). It seems equally improbable that the 
opposition can raise significant amounts of funds from private individuals. There are indeed 
many rich individuals who could contribute to political parties in Angola. If you are employed 
in the public sector or in the oil sector, salaries in Angola are high enough that a party could 
fundraise from the so-called middle class (Vidal 2007). The problem is that these are the same 
individuals who are part of the dependent elite and thus dependent on the state and thus 
indirectly on the MPLA for their income. This leaves them with smaller internal donations 
and membership fees from dedicated followers, and most of their organizations are not 
developed enough to fundraise from these sources even if the members had resources to 
contribute. Thus the parties are left with the state subsidies. 
This dependency on state subsidies can be exploited by the ruling party. The above-
mentioned case with the FNLA losing their state subsidies serves as an example of how the 
government can use the threat of withholding state subsidies as a tool to keep the opposition 
parties checked. Even after the 2008 election, FNLA has yet to receive their state subsidies. 
According to Vidal (2007: 151) the support for all political parties was withdrawn during the 
constitutional deadlock of 2005. This creates a situation where opposition parties seem to be 
“financial hostages” of the government. As pointed out by a leader in OSISA-Angola: “as 
long as parties all over Africa will depend on public funding, they will continue to be hostages 
of the ruling party …. When you speak strongly against the government, we say that “the tap 
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stops running”.165
Another way which state subsidies can be used by the incumbent party to control or 
disadvantage the opposition is through the timing of when it is released and to who it is given. 
While section 5.3 shows that the law actually regulates this, it is nevertheless selectively 
implemented. This is especially true with the campaign funding. Two instances from the 2008 
election highlight this. The Angolan government set aside US$17 million for campaign 
financing which was supposed to be divided equally between all competing parties and 
coalitions (Roque 2009: 142).
 While his conclusions about Africa in general might be a bit stretched, 
there seems to be an indication that he might be right in the Angolan context. 
166 Even before this though, all the 135 officially registered 
political parties had received a one-time payment of US$120 000 (EISA 2010). Only 50 
parties (24 parties running alone and 10 party-coalitions) actually applied to be approved for 
the election though, and out of these only 10 parties and 4 coalitions were allowed to run. The 
others failed to meet the standards. This means that over US$10 million was spent on parties 
that did not even run in the election. While the motivation behind this move is unclear, it is 
possible to see it as a move to split the opposition or at the least an abuse of state resources.167 
The US$ 17 million which were allocated for the campaign though, was not given to the 
parties until one to two weeks before the election, a straight forward violation of the Electoral 
Law (EUEOM 2008; Human Rights Watch 2009; Roque 2009). All the representatives of the 
opposition parties said that this greatly affected their ability to campaign in the 2011 
election.168
 
 At the same time, it did not affect the MPLA as much because they had other 
sources of income, as illustrated by the fact that it had already campaigned for five months 
before this point. Thus the financial situation for the opposition parties in Angola is hard, 
especially if you consider their ability to fundraise in order to effectively participate in 
elections rather than just survive as a party. As long as they pose no significant risks to the 
government, the parties can survive on the state subsidies.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to map out the funding situation for political parties in Angola, 
and the implication of this. The chapter has shown that there is a big funding gap between the 
MPLA and the opposition parties in Angola. This gap is not just in size, it is also there in 
                                                 
165 Interview, Luanda, 24th of January 2011 
166 Weimer and Amundsen (2008) puts this at US$ 170 million, but this must surely be a typo in their source as 
the confirmed amount per party is US$1.2 million (Human Rights Watch 2009: 21) 
167 Interview with Nelson Pestana, Political Scientist and member of BD. Bergen, 25th of February 2011 
168 Interviews with high ranking officials of UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD, PDP-ANA, Luanda, January 2011 
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terms of the diversity of sources that the parties can fundraise from. MPLA benefits from 
access to all of the theoretical funding sources that were identified to be favourable to the 
incumbent in chapter 2 because of the control of the state apparatus and the government. At 
the same time, there seems to be a symbiosis between the state, the party and the elite in 
Angola, in which the elite depends on the party to control the political game, and in turn uses 
the power from this control to distribute selective benefits to themselves. Thus there is a 
peculiar combination of graft-related income and plutocratic funding that seems to benefit 
both the elite and the party machinery of the MPLA. There are both historical and economic 
reasons for this. First of all, the elitist nature of the ruling party goes back to the emergence of 
the MPLA in power and its different fractions at the time. By being funded by the party elite 
and “non-political” economic elite the party does not depend as much on its rank-and-file 
members for its financial security, and thus it is easier to control them. The importance of the 
state and oil in the economy creates an economic environment that seems to foster a culture of 
non-transparency and possibilities for graft. All together, this indicates the importance of the 
level of financial control that the MPLA currently enjoys in Angola. 
On the other hand the opposition parties struggle with their dependency on the formal 
state subsidies. Because of this dependency the defeat in the 2008 legislative election did not 
only have political but also economical consequences for the parties: especially UNITA lost 
most of its income. There are few other sources of income for the smaller opposition parties, 
and their organizations are often not developed enough to expand them so that grassroot 
funding can become a meaningful source of contributions. All in all, this shows the level of 
control that the MPLA has over the financial aspects of Angolan politics. While the 2008 
election was positive in the sense that it was peaceful and the first meaningful exercise of 
electoral accountability since the 1992 election, it also served to consolidate both the political 
and financial power of the MPLA and its ruling elite. The question now is how it uses its 
power. Will it continue to use its control and consolidate as an electoral authoritarian regime 
that relies on the “soft power” of controlled elections? Will it allow further democratization in 
future elections and create an opportunity for the other parties to compete on a financially 
equal basis? Or will it use its newly verified control to clamp down on the opposition and civil 
society in Angola? The events in the years leading up to the next legislative election will give 
a firm indication of this. 
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“There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money – and I can’t remember what the second 
one is”  
- Republican party boss Mark Hanna, explaining how politics works169
Chapter 6 – Uganda and Angola compared: Tentative conclusions on political funding in 
electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
What can the combined case studies of Uganda and Angola teach us about the issue of 
political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa? This chapter will 
try to summarize the findings of the thesis by comparing the conclusions of the two case 
studies against each other, and by highlighting the similarities and differences between the 
cases it will modify and build on the theory presented in chapter 2, and thus provide tentative 
conclusions to the question above. The chapter will thus serve as both a cross-case 
comparison and as a conclusion of this thesis. 
 
6.1 Aligning theory with empirical evidence - sources of political funding revisited 
The first step in the process is to evaluate the first part of the research question: what types of 
political funding are available in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
what contextual factors shape the funding? In chapter 2 I identified a theoretical model for 
political funding sources in Sub-Saharan Africa, and through my two case studies I have tried 
to identify the importance of these sources for the different parties in Uganda and Angola, as 
well as contextual factors affecting them. By comparing the results of the case studies with 
each other and the theoretical model it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about 
the importance of the different types of political funding sources and subcategories identified 
in figure 2.2 and table 2.3. 
 
Grassroot funding 
All three subtypes of grassroot funding were identified as being of medium importance in the 
theoretical discussion of importance in Sub-Saharan Africa. While membership dues and 
small donations were hypothesized to be important for both the incumbent and opposition, 
party business was thought to primarily benefit the incumbent party. By and large, the two 
case studies seem to verify this, but with some minor differences. First of all, while 
membership dues cannot be seen as the most important source of income for any party in the 
two countries, it is nevertheless generally more important in Angola. This holds for both the 
incumbent and the opposition. There are several reasons for this. First of all, even though 
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there is a striking inequality in Angola, the general poverty level is still higher in Uganda, and 
the parties in Angola can thus charge higher membership fees from its members. Second of 
all, parties are generally more important in Angola, where there is a party-centred electoral 
system, rather than in Uganda, where there is a candidate-centred electoral system. This could 
lead to more people seeing the importance of contributing to the party coffers. Nevertheless, 
my interviews seem to indicate that even though representatives of most political parties say 
that membership dues and small donations are important sources of funds, it is not sufficient 
to run the party, especially during campaigns. My case studies indicate that small donations 
are generally given through material support rather than financial contributions, and they are 
more important during campaigns than between elections. In terms of party business, there are 
clear differences between Uganda and Angola. In Uganda, the NRM-party does not own as 
much party business as could be expected of a ruling party. Again, seems to be linked to the 
importance of the candidate rather than the party, as well as the historical legacy of the 
“Movement-system”. In Angola on the other hand, MPLA clearly benefits from the extensive 
business network it controls, and the party seems to actively use this tool in order to raise 
funds for the party. UNITA also has some party business. My analysis seems to indicate that 
the longevity of the civil war in Angola and the geographical affinity of the parties have 
generated more party infrastructure there than it did in Uganda, were the civil war was shorter 
and the NRM-party did not have the need to establish the same amount of party infrastructure.  
 
Plutocratic funding 
My case studies have confirmed Saffu’s claim that “donations are the modal source of 
political financing in Africa” (Saffu 2003: 23). Plutocratic funding from the elite in both 
Angola and Uganda is extremely important, both for the opposition and the incumbent 
parties. There is a clear difference between internal and external plutocratic funding however. 
While internal plutocratic funding is important both for the incumbent and the opposition, 
external plutocratic funding is more important for the ruling party than it is for the 
opposition. This holds across cases, though external plutocratic funding is slightly more 
important for the opposition in Angola than in Uganda. This could be due to the general 
income level and the fact that the Angolan elite is larger than the Ugandan one. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the incumbent party is the primary beneficiary of external plutocratic funding fits 
well with the theoretical argument presented in chapter 2. In electoral authoritarian regimes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it seems like the “fear” of alienating the ruling party is high enough to 
scare external investors away from the opposition parties. While there are indications that this 
102 
 
“silent threat” is real, it does not really matter if it is, as it works as a deterrent anyway. In 
addition, the importance of the state in the economy makes it imperative to be on good terms 
with the ruling party. 
Internal plutocratic funding is the only factor that seems to be of high importance for 
all political parties in both Uganda and Angola. This highlights the role of political 
entrepreneurship in Africa; the elite seem to prefer engaging directly in politics rather than 
funding someone else to do the “work” for them. This is buttressed by the fact that political 
positions in Africa are high-income jobs, as illustrated by the situation in Uganda. Plutocratic 
funding can thus be seen as an investment in a future career. This is problematic given that it 
creates elite parties that are funded and run by a small fraction of the population. Parties in 
both Uganda and Angola are to a large extent financed by the elite, which is reflected in the 
poor links between the parties and society. For the opposition in Uganda and Angola, internal 
plutocratic funding is essential. Not only do the opposition parties depend on the personal 
wealth of the candidates themselves to run the campaigns, but it also depends on regular 
contributions from its elected members to sustain the party between elections. It is normal for 
elected politicians to contribute a portion of their salary to their parent party both in Uganda 
and Angola, and this is a much more steady source of income than grassroot contributions. 
Parties therefore depend on being in position to a much larger degree than in countries where 
grassroot funding can sustain party organizations. This makes it harder for the small parties to 
build organizations, something which again increases the importance of the personal wealth of 
key individuals within the party. In Uganda and Angola today, it seems that you have to be 
rich or know rich people to compete as an opposition party. 
The final finding on plutocratic funding that deserves mention is that for the ruling 
party plutocratic funding seems to be linked intrinsically with the internal and external elite’s 
access to state resources and the use and distribution of graft.  In both Uganda and Angola 
many of the richest people in the country are members of the party elite or family or 
associates of the party elite, and they contribute in kind to the party when needed, especially 
during campaigns. This link between plutocratic funding and graft seems to be one of the 
factors that contribute most towards creating an uneven playing field and thus an electoral 
authoritarian regime in Uganda and Angola. I will return to this in section 6.2 below. 
 
State subsidies 
In terms of state subsidies, there is naturally a large difference between Uganda and Angola 
given that there is party funding between elections in Angola, while in Uganda it has not yet 
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been implemented. Two observations are nevertheless very interesting. First of all, state 
subsidies are “addictive”; they have become very important for political parties in Angola. 
Second, there is a clear indication that state subsidies as implemented in Angola clearly 
increase the importance of winning seats in parliament, and thus increases the difference 
between the winners and the losers of the electoral competition.  At the same time though, the 
state subsidies increases the dependency on the state of the small political parties who win 
seats, something which can be used by the ruling party as a tool of control. This is linked to 
the third observation: state subsidies seem to be implemented to the degree that they favour 
the ruling party. Selective implementation seems to be a general characteristic of the official 
funding system in both Uganda and Angola, as illustrated by the delay of official campaign 
funding in recent elections in both countries. This observation will be discussed more 
thoroughly in section 6.2.  
 
Income from graft 
The case studies of Angola and Uganda have by and large confirmed the importance 
attributed to graft in the theory. Graft is important, and fundamentally it is the only source of 
funding that is exclusive to the ruling party. This is not to say that the opposition parties 
would not use this funding tactic if they could, but since they do not have access to state 
power it is simply not available to them. The cases do suggest that the theory does perhaps 
understate the sophistication of the graft-networks. First of all, patronage tactics that enable 
the party to distribute positions and clientilist practices that enable the distribution of 
favourable policy seems to be more important than the direct use of official money. The 
ruling parties have politicized official positions both in Angola and Uganda, and use this as a 
tool to increase their control over the state and to increase their resource bases. In Angola, 
public officials visibly campaigned for the ruling party in 2008, while in Uganda you have 
public servants such as the RDCs who are appointed and answer directly to the President. 
Both the MPLA in Angola and NRM-party in Uganda also tend to increase the use of 
selective and favorable policies before elections. While both of these advantages can be seen 
as an incumbency advantage that we also see in democratic systems, the sheer scale of which 
these tactics are being utilized severely compromises the level playing field and makes it 
extremely difficult for the opposition to compete. In addition, there have been instances of 
more direct use of state money as well. In Angola this has primarily happened through 
privatization of state assets, while in Uganda the President is actually allowed to use state 
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resources in the campaign. In Uganda the passing and timing of the supplementary budget 
creates a direct link between the campaigns and increased Presidential spending. 
Finally, the within-case studies have highlighted how the composition of the economy 
creates different graft opportunities, and how the ruling parties adapt their strategies to suit 
this. In Angola, the importance of oil and other valuable natural resources have created an 
environment with low transparency and many possible opportunities for the elite to make 
money from this lucrative trade. The elite therefore rely on the MPLA to keep control of the 
state so that they can maintain control over the oil revenues. In Uganda on the other hand, the 
absence of such resources and the importance of aid has created a different form of graft, in 
that it is more direct abuse of government money, policy and positions. It will be interesting 
to see whether the newly discovered oil in Western Uganda will change this. 
 
Foreign funding 
Like state subsidies, the issue of foreign funding sources also differ widely between the two 
countries as it is illegal in Angola and legal (though strictly regulated) in Uganda. A likely 
reason for the difference between the countries is that Uganda is more dependent on western 
donors in general, and that it thus is harder for them to deny aid targeted at political parties. 
Nevertheless, as the case study shows it is strictly regulated and there have been talks about 
implementing state subsidies in order to lessen the influence of donors. In Angola, the denial 
of foreign funding is unpopular with the opposition parties, and denies them a revenue source 
that clearly would benefit them financially. At the same time, the presence of direct donor 
funding of political parties seems to increase transparency. In terms of the other two subtypes 
of foreign funding, they seem to be of limited importance in Uganda and Angola. The 
exception is the NRM-party, who clearly benefits from having powerful allies abroad who 
have supported the party financially before. All in all, the case studies show that foreign 
funding can play a role in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, but it 
depends on the position that the country is in and what is most beneficial for the ruling party. 
 
Modifications of the theoretical model 
All this indicates that the theoretical model presented in table 2.3 was not far off the 
mark. Some modifications need to be made however. First of all, state subsidies, and 
especially party funding, will most likely be important in those countries that have this type of 
funding. The case of Angola illustrate this: in a country where especially the opposition has 
few significant sources of funding, state subsidies quickly gain importance for those who 
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qualify. The same goes for foreign funding: if allowed, it will most likely have a significant 
impact on parties in Sub-Saharan African countries. Other than that, there are small variations 
between the cases, notably because of the fact that the Angolan system is more party-centric 
than the Ugandan system, and that the Angolan economy is less transparent due to the 
importance of oil and other natural resources. Nevertheless, the theoretical model seems to 
broadly fit. First of all, the incumbent party has access to several possible sources of funding 
that the opposition parties does not have access to. Furthermore, while grassroot funding 
cannot be dismissed as a source of funding, it cannot be relied upon as the main source of 
income for political parties in the setting investigated. For the opposition parties this thus 
leaves foreign funding, which is normally strictly regulated, and internal plutocratic funding 
as the only really viable sources of income in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As the two case studies of Uganda and Angola have shown and as will be highlighted 
in the next section, this is not coincidental. 
  
6.2 The role of political funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
The secondary issue that this thesis has investigated is the implications of political funding for 
the electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. My case studies have illustrated the 
process and mechanisms surrounding political funding in two such regimes. Both case studies 
have shown the important role that money and funds play in the recent electoral successes of 
the ruling parties. Both case studies have shown how the incumbent parties have used state 
resources to tilt the playing field in their favour. And both case studies have shown how the 
ruling parties have manipulated the laws governing political funding and the implementation 
of these laws in order to weaken the opposition parties that they compete against. At the same 
time, the case studies suggest that contextual factors have contributed to different approaches 
in terms of how these results have been achieved. 
 
Keeping your friends close... 
Perhaps the most significant finding of the case studies of Angola and Uganda is that they 
both show that there is a clear funding gap between the incumbent party and the opposition 
parties, and furthermore that the regimes seem to exploit this purposefully. As indicated in the 
section above, the big difference between the opposition parties and the ruling party in Angola 
and Uganda is that the ruling party controls the state and can use state resources by using 
graft-tactics. This enriches the parties directly, but also indirectly through enriching the ruling 
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elite who then contributes with plutocratic funding back to the party. When comparing the 
funding relationship between the state and the ruling parties in Uganda and Angola presented 
in figure 4.2 and 5.2 respectively, we see that they are quite similar. They are both continuous, 
which indicates that as long as the parties are successful in capturing state power through 
elections they will be able to control the electoral game and keep the funding cycle going. It is 
important to notice though that my case studies highlight that the chain may also break down 
if economic factors change and create a big drop in state revenues. A big and long-term drop 
in oil prices could provide such a shock in Angola, an in Uganda a major cut in budget 
support from the donors could potentially have the same effect. Nevertheless, the case studies 
indicate that an electoral authoritarian regime can be quite stable if the ruling party manages 
to preserve or expand its clientilist and patronage networks before elections. They thus verify 
the findings of previous researchers such as Rakner and van de Walle (2009), Salih and 
Nordlund (2007) and Gyimah-Boadi (2007) that highlight this as a serious issue for the future 
of African democracy.  
 
… And your “enemies” dependent and weak 
However, the case studies also show that you cannot simply focus on the how the incumbent 
parties strengthen their financial position, you also have to look at how they create an unlevel 
playing field by manipulating the number and size of the sources that the opposition can 
fundraise from. Thus they can prevent the opposition from challenging them electorally. 
Rakner and van de Walle posit that the key causal mechanisms that undermine the role of 
elections as a mode of transition towards democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa are the “limited 
resources of opposition parties, combined with the pervasive ability of presidential parties to 
draw on state resource for clientilism” (Rakner and van de Walle 2009: 205). The case studies 
of Angola and Uganda suggest that some incumbent parties actually take it a step further and 
actively work to prevent the opposition from gaining enough funding to realistically threaten 
their hold on power in elections. While employing different strategies, both incumbent parties 
seem to use political funding as a tool to not only manipulate the freedom of demand  as 
hypothesized by Schedler (2002: 40), but also what he calls freedom of supply. The opposition 
parties are fragmentalized or constrained from becoming viable alternatives through 
manipulation of the funding process.  
In Uganda, the ruling party keeps the opposition weak by denying the political parties 
funds to compete by refusing or limiting access to potential sources through legal regulation, 
or by making the potential sources aware of the consequences of contributing to the 
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opposition. The opposition parties are thus stuck in a situation where they do not have an 
organization strong enough to challenge the incumbent party in elections. It is illustrative that 
the second largest group in the Ugandan Parliament after the 2011 election does not come 
from an opposition party; they are independent candidates.   
The approach of the ruling party in Angola is slightly different. MPLA seems to 
control political parties by manipulating state subsidies in order to actively encourage and 
discourage party formation at different stages in the electoral cycle. Also, the fact that party 
and campaign funding from the state is distributed to all actors during the campaign period 
and not throughout the whole electoral cycle would seem to create an incentive for parties and 
political actors to compete for votes separately, instead of forming a single alternative to the 
ruling party. All this seems to indicate that you can manipulate what Schedler (2002b: 106) 
calls the “actor space” and weaken and fragmentalize the opposition by controlling the 
funding. While the statement of the leader of OSISA-ANGOLA that political parties in Africa 
become “hostages” of the ruling party when state subsidies are introduced might be a little 
dramatic, the Angolan case seems to indicate that state subsidies does seem to leave the 
opposition open for manipulation under electoral authoritarian regimes. The Angolan and 
Ugandan cases show that research on political funding cannot just focus on what types of 
funding the opposition does get access to either; it is just as important to see what types of 
funding the opposition does not get access to. And, if they do get access, it is also important to 
investigate when and how often they get access to it.  
Thus the conclusion in terms of my secondary research question is that control over 
political funding seems to be an important tool in the “authoritarian toolbox” of the incumbent 
party in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. This tool is softer and more 
subtle than those of a more fully-closed authoritarian regime. Instead of resorting to straight 
out physical repression, the ruling party in such regimes can rely on controlling the freedom of 
demand and freedom of supply of the political system through manipulating the availability of 
political funding for different actors. In the post-third wave of democratization world where 
most countries accept the democratic shell of multiparty elections, it is more important than 
ever to identify and expose such tools for what they are: a means to create a playing field that 
is not level and thus the continuation in power of the ruling party.  
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
The cross-case comparison provides us with some tentative conclusions about political 
funding in electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, and thus a natural synopsis 
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of the thesis. First of all, it has shown that a variety of funding sources are available for 
political parties in these regimes, but that the ruling parties have more sources that they can 
fundraise from than the opposition parties. While grassroot funding plays some role for most 
parties, the three subtypes do not provide enough funding for any political party to get by on. 
This seems to hold across both cases. Plutocratic funding on the other hand is essential for 
political parties in these types of regimes. While external plutocratic funding primarily 
benefits the ruling party, internal plutocratic funding is important for all parties. State 
subsidies are important in Angola, while foreign funding is important in Uganda. Both of 
these sources of funding are regulated and implemented through legal regimes, and they are 
thus easily manipulated by the ruling party. Finally, my case studies indicate that graft related 
income is very important in electoral authoritarian regimes, but that it only benefits the ruling 
party. The way it is utilized varies across cases, depending on contextual factors. In general, 
the political history of a country seems to have a profound impact on political funding. It is 
therefore difficult to compare across cases. Nevertheless, the incumbent parties in both 
Uganda and Angola seem to have benefited from their control over state institutions during 
the transition to electoral and multiparty politics. This control is tempered by other contextual 
factors such as the composition of the economy of a given country.    
Furthermore, both case studies analysed have highlighted that political funding seem 
to be a very important issue confronting political parties in electoral authoritarian regimes, 
and that the funding gap between the ruling party and the opposition is one of the major 
reasons why the playing field in these countries is not level. The cross-case comparison has 
highlighted that the incumbent party in such regimes will use their power to create a 
favourable financial climate for their own party. The comparison also indicate that the ruling 
party will use its political control in order to limit the number of sources of funds available to 
the opposition.  
Uganda and Angola are both electoral authoritarian regimes, and the ruling parties are 
not afraid of using the political control to create a playing field that favours them. Control 
over political funding is an important tool for preserving their rule. This thesis has shown that 
manipulating the funding process can have a powerful impact on the political process, and be 
an important mechanism in the authoritarian toolkit of electoral authoritarian regimes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Wafula Oguttu’s words describe this toolkit as much as it describes the 
biggest challenges of the opposition in Uganda in 2011: “Funds and fear. Fear and funds”.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: 
 
Interview guide representative of political party 
 
General questions about political parties: 
1. What are the main challenges for political parties in your country? 
2. Have there been any changes in the party system since the last election? 
3. How do you perceive the role of an opposition party in the party system? 
4. Does the incumbent party inhabit any structural advantages compared to the other 
parties? 
 
Party finance/resources – questions concerning finances of own party: 
5. Could you please tell me something about the general financial state of the party?  
6. What are the major sources of income for your party? 
7. What are the major sources of expenditure for your party? 
8. During election campaigns, are candidates and their campaigns paid for by the party or 
the individual candidate? 
9. What is the situation for your party in terms of getting media coverage of party 
activities, policy and candidates? 
10. Does your party have enough resources to maintain an organization covering the 
whole country over time? 
11. Are private individuals and businesses willing to back your party? 
 
General questions concerning party finance: 
12. What do you perceive to be the most normal type of political funding today in you 
country?? 
13. What is your view on how political parties should be financed? 
14. What is your opinion on legal regulations on party funding/party expenditure? 
15. What can be done to improve transparency on the issue? 
16. Do you believe that there is a level playing field in terms of finance for political 
parties today? 
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Interview guide Academic 
 
General questions about political parties: 
1. What are the main challenges for political parties in your country? 
2. How do you perceive the role of an opposition party in the party system? 
3. To what degree would you say that the party system in your country is permanent? 
4. Does the incumbent party inhabit any structural advantages compared to the other 
parties? 
a. What structural advantages does the party in power enjoy? 
b. Do the structural advantages limit itself to the executive office? 
 
General questions concerning party finance: 
5. Could you tell me something about the general financial state of the political parties? 
6. What are the major sources of income for political parties? 
a. Who are the most important actors in the funding of political parties? 
7. As shown by the lack of reports on the issue, there is little or no transparency on party 
funding. What can be done to improve this? 
8. Do parties have enough resources to maintain an organization covering the whole 
country over time? 
9. How is time in the media divided between the parties? 
10. What is your view on how political parties should be financed? 
a. What is your opinion on the proposal of public funding of political parties? 
11. What is your opinion on legal regulations on party funding/party expenditure? 
12. Who benefits from the current system of party funding? 
 
General questions: 
13. Any question on this topic that I should have asked? 
14. Any particular you would recommend me to talk to? 
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Interview guide media: 
 
General questions about political parties: 
1. What are the main challenges for political parties in your country? 
2. How do you perceive the role of an opposition party in the party system? 
3. To what degree would you say that the party system in your country is permanent? 
4. Does the incumbent party inhabit any structural advantages compared to the other 
parties? 
a. What structural advantages do the party in power enjoy? 
b. Do the structural advantages limit itself to the executive office? 
 
General questions concerning party finance: 
5. Could you tell me something about the general financial state of the political parties? 
6. What are the major sources of income for political parties? 
a. Who are the most important actors in the funding of political parties? 
7. As shown by the lack of reports on the issue, there is little or no transparency on party 
funding. What can be done to improve this? 
8. What is your opinion on the proposal of public funding of political parties? 
9. Who benefits from the current system of party funding? 
10. How important are resources for getting attention in the media? 
a. Should time in the media be considered as part of the funding issue? 
11. What principles do the media follow in their coverage of political activities? 
 
General questions: 
12. Any question on this topic that I should have asked? 
13. Any particular you would recommend me to talk to? 
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Appendix 2: List of persons interviewed during fieldwork 
 
Uganda: 
Name Type Org/Party Position Date 
Monica Chibita Aca Makerere University Mass Comm 08.12.2010 
Fredrik Gooloba-
Mutebi 
Aca Makerere Social Science 
Research Insitute 
Pol Scientist 09.12.2010 
Mwambutsya Ndebesa Aca Makerere University History 10.12.2010 
Julius Kiiza Aca Makerere University Pol Scientist 10.12.2010 
Jack Sabiti Pol FDC  Treasurer 11.12.2010 
Issa Kikungwe Pol DP Gen Secretary 13.12.2010 
Alice Alaso Pol FDC  Gen Secretary 13.12.2010 
Joseph Bossa Pol UPC  Gen Secretary 14.12.2010 
Wafula Oguttu Pol FDC  Spokesperson 14.12.2010 
Peter Walubiri Pol UPC  Treasurer 15.12.2010 
Hippo Twebaze Pol NRM  Assistant to 
Gen Sec 
16.12.2010 
Ofwono Opondo Pol NRM  Spokesperson 17.12.2010 
Mathias Nsubuga Pol DP Gen Sec 18.12.2010 
Margareth Vuchiri Med Editor  Daily Monitor 15.12.2010 
Nicholas Sengoba Med Political Commentator Freelance 18.12.2010 
Simon Osborn GOV Responsible for political 
parties 
DDP 20.12.2010 
 
Angola: 
Name Type Org/Party Position Date 
Sapalo Antonio Pol PRS Head of parliamentary 
group 
18.01.2011 
Adalberto da Costa 
Junior 
Pol UNITA Secretary of assets 27.01.2011 
Rui Falcao Pol MPLA Secretary of information 26.01.2011 
Filomeno Viera Lopes Pol BD Secretary general 23.01.2011 
Sindiangami Mbinde Pol PDPANA President 24.01.2011 
N’Gola Kabangu Pol FNLA Head of parliamentary 
group 
21.01.2011 
Nelson Pestana Aca/Pol CEIC-
UCAN/BD 
Professor/Activist 25.02.2011 
Alves da Rocha Aca CEIC Economist 28.01.2011 
Sérgio Calundungo NGO ADRA Civil Society 26.01.2011 
 NGO OSISA-
ANGOLA 
Civil Society 24.01.2011 
Ranca Tuba GOV USAID Democracy promotion 21.01.2011 
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Appendix 3: Classification of subtypes of political funding in terms of which political 
parties they are important for 
 
Uganda: 
Type of funding No/low importance Medium importance High importance 
Membership dues NRM, DP, UPC FDC 
 Small donations 
 
NRM, FDC, UPC, DP 
 Party business FDC NRM, UPC, DP 
 Internal Plutocratic 
  
NRM, FDC, DP, UPC, 
External Plutocratic UPC, DP FDC NRM 
Party funding NRM, FDC, UPC, DP 
  Campaign funding 
 
NRM, FDC, UPC, DP 
 Patronage FDC, UPC, DP 
 
NRM 
Money from graft FDC, UPC, DP 
 
NRM 
Clientilism FDC, UPC, DP 
 
NRM 
Donor NRM 
 
FDC, DP, UPC 
Diaspora NRM, FDC, DP UPC 
 Covert DP FDC, UPC NRM 
 
Angola: 
Type of 
funding No/low importance Medium importance High importance 
Membership 
dues 
 
MPLA, UNITA, PRS, 
PDP-ANA FNLA, BD 
Small 
donations MPLA, UNITA,  PRS, BD FNLA, PDP-ANA 
Party business PRS, FNLA, BD, PDP-ANA UNITA MPLA 
Internal 
Plutocratic 
  
MPLA, UNITA, PRS, FNLA, 
BD, PDP-ANA 
External 
Plutocratic 
 
UNITA, FNLA, BD- 
PDP-ANA MPLA, PRS 
Party funding FNLA, BD, PDP-ANA 
 
MPLA, UNITA, PRS 
Campaign 
funding MPLA, UNITA, PRS FNLA, BD, PDP-ANA 
 
Patronage 
UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD, PDP-
ANA 
 
MPLA 
Money from 
graft 
UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD, PDP-
ANA 
 
MPLA 
Clientilism 
UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD, PDP-
ANA 
 
MPLA 
Donor 
MPLA, UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD,  
PDP-ANA 
  
Diaspora 
MPLA, UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD,  
PDP-ANA 
  
Covert 
MPLA, UNITA, PRS, FNLA, BD,  
PDP-ANA 
   
Classifications are based on data presented in section 4.1 and 5.1 respectively. 
